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Abstract 
Settler colonialism played a constitutive role in the construction of democratic culture in 
the antebellum United States.  This dissertation argues that democratic values of popular 
sovereignty and social equality acquired their conceptual coherence and institutional 
realization through settler conquest and indigenous dispossession.  Out of this dynamic 
emerged an “ideology of democratic empire,” a distinct ideological formation in which 
the active agent of expansion is not colonial administration or the imperial state but the 
people in their sovereign capacity for self-government.  In this mode of empire, settler 
conquest acted as a form of foundational violence that enabled the construction of a new 
democratic society through the elimination of indigenous sovereignty.  I trace the 
ideological development of democratic empire in three phases.  First, federalist 
discourses in the revolutionary period provided a new world conception of empire that 
privileged the equality of quasi-sovereign settler communities over notions of empire 
organized around the governance of colonial dependencies.  Second, social equality in the 
Jacksonian period developed in relation to settler expansion, which guarded against the 
resurgence of feudal land title in the New World and ensured the priority of popular 
sovereignty over aristocratic systems of rule.  The last phase unearths counter-narratives 
of democratic empire to reveal how colonial subjects challenged settler-colonial rule by 
reconfiguring antebellum notions of popular sovereignty.  Through a conceptual-
historical reconstruction of the relationship between settler expansion and American 
democracy, my project provides the basis for a decolonial theory of democracy that de-








   iv 
Table of Contents 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS         i 
ABSTRACT          iii 
INTRODUCTION:  The Ideology of Democratic Empire    1 
Chapter One 
Infant Empire:  The Ideological Origins of Democratic Empire   44 
Chapter Two 
Democracy, Empire, and the American Founding     83 
Chapter Three 
The Tocquevillean Moment:  Settler Expansion and the  
Democratic Social State        119 
         
Chapter Four 
 








William Apess and the Paradox of Settler Sovereignty    243 
 
CODA:  Unsettling Democracy       279 
 







The Ideology of Democratic Empire 
 
“We seek not the empire of the sword – not the empire of the Inquisition – not the empire of despotism; but 
the empire of the people – the empire of the rights of man.”  Daniel Ullmann, The Course of Empire (1856) 
 
“What is a new state formed in the Western deserts of America, if it be not a new colony?”  Edward 
Gibbon Wakefield, England and America (1833)  
  
  An increasingly pervasive assumption in contemporary American political culture is 
that democracy and empire are mutually exclusive currents of political thought and 
institutional development.  Indeed, this entrenched assumption crucially inflects official 
state ideology in contemporary politics.  In an attempt to restore a benign image to U.S. 
foreign policy, President Obama confidently announced in his famed “Cairo Speech” that 
“America is not the crude stereotype of a self-interested empire.  The United States has 
been one of the greatest sources of progress that the world has ever known.  We were 
born out of revolution against an empire.”  If official U.S. ideology asserts that America 
is not an empire precisely because it is a democracy, new left revisionists emerging out of 
opposition to U.S. intervention in Vietnam and Korea asserted precisely the reverse.  For 
William Appleman Williams, one of the preeminent scholars of American empire, the 
tragedy of American history is that imperial policies of expansion and conquest have 
undercut the promise of American liberty.  Although “empire as a way of life” constitutes 
a durable facet of the American political tradition, it represents a separate stream of 
political development from the emergence and formation of American democracy.
1
   
                                                 
1
 Williams, Empire as Way of Life (Oxford University Press, 1980); and The Tragedy of American 
Diplomacy (Norton, 1988).  The revisionist consensus established by Williams persists among those who 
seek to condemn U.S. imperial policy on the liberal left today.  Especially see Chalmers Johnson, Nemesis:  
The Last Days of the American Republic (MacMillan, 2007). 
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 This dissertation challenges this assumption by demonstrating that democracy and 
empire are mutually constitutive in the historical construction of antebellum political 
culture.  Focusing on how dominant conceptions of popular sovereignty developed in 
relation to the politics of settler expansion, I provide a conceptual and historical 
reconstruction of the imperial foundations of modern American democracy.  An analysis 
of the relationship between settler-colonial expansion and democratic conceptions of 
popular sovereignty is ripe for further examination.  In spite of the continued efforts of 
scholars to place colonial expansion at the center of modern political thought, few have 
fully explored the relationship between popular sovereignty and settler colonialism.  In 
fact, democratic theorists continue to insist that popular sovereignty is inherently 
antithetical to colonial expansion.  Affirming that America is indeed an empire, Philip 
Green and Drucilla Cornell contest that because empire inevitably “subordinates the 
people to the nation,” there “is no such thing as democratic empire.”  As the nation 
assumes the form of an “imperium spread over thousands of square miles,” they maintain 
that “the principle of popular sovereignty must be abandoned in practice.”2  Practices and 
values of democratic citizenship, owing their vitality to localized frameworks of popular 
sovereignty, are incompatible with imperial frameworks of territorial expansion.  By 
divorcing popular sovereignty from the specific cultural norms that lend it intelligibility, 
imperial frameworks of rule evacuate the “sovereign people” of any coherent identity. 
 Such assertions depend upon an objectivist framework of democratic theory.  In this 
historical understanding, we step into the horizon of the past with objective, preconceived 
                                                 
2
 “Rethinking Democratic Theory” Journal of Social Philosophy, 36, 4 (Winter 2005), p. 528. 
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notions of what democracy is or should be and then evaluate the institutions and practices 
of the past according to our contemporary understandings.
3
  In contrast to objectivist 
frameworks, this project shows that popular sovereignty and settler colonialism were 
intricately connected in antebellum American thought and culture.  Democratic values of 
political liberty and self-rule developed within the discursive horizon and material 
conditions of settler expansion even as those values directly engendered expansionary 
tendencies.  While there is no necessary link between democracy and empire, this is also 
to say that there is no necessary contradiction that we can posit in advance of our 
understanding of their historical development.  Rather, the process of imperial expansion 
was constitutive of the very meaning of democracy as it circulated within the political 
culture of the antebellum U.S. 
Democracy, Empire, and Popular Sovereignty 
 Despite the fact that modern democratic thought is co-existent with and deeply 
implicated in empire from its inception, the writing of imperial and colonial histories of 
modern democracy has only just begun.  Perhaps one of the most enduring conceptual 
frameworks in these efforts has been that of liberal imperialism.
4
  Although historians are 
                                                 
3
 I adopt and adapt this critique of objectivist frameworks of democratic theory from Russell Hanson, The 
Democratic Imagination in America (Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 3. 
4
 On the relationship between liberalism and empire, see Uday Mehta, Liberalism and Empire:  A Study in 
Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (University of Chicago, 1999); Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to 
Empire:  The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton University Press, 2005); 
Domenico Losurdo, Liberalism:  A Counter-History (Verso, 2011); Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire:  
Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism (Princeton University Press, 2010); Richard Tuck, The 
Rights of War and Peace:  Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford 
University Press, 1999); James Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key:  Imperialism and Civic Freedom 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009); David Armitage, “John Locke, Carolina, and the Two Treatises of 
Government,” Political Theory, 32, 5 (Oct. 2004), pp. 602-627; and Barbara Arneil, John Locke and 
America:  The Defense of English Colonialism (Oxford University Press, 1996).  On the relationship 
between republicanism and empire:  Edward Andrews, Imperial Republics:  Revolution, War, and 
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increasingly uncovering its complex and contested legacy, the basic idea of liberal 
imperialism is a defense of European expansion on the basis of the unfitness of non-
European subjects for liberal government.  Its claim to embrace a “universal 
constituency” notwithstanding, liberalism has employed a variety of exclusion clauses to 
justify the continued exploitation of colonial subjects and intervention in non-European 
societies.  By privileging certain anthropological capacities rooted in Enlightenment 
political culture, liberal imperialism exempts colonized societies from the promise of 
liberal ideals.  As a result, colonized societies are relegated to what Chakrabarty calls the 
“waiting room of history” where they are subjected to regimes of enlightened despotism 
before they can suitably rule themselves according to liberal principles.
5
 
 While scholars of imperial history and modern political thought have analyzed the 
ideologies of liberal imperialism at the heart of the British and French empires, much less 
attention has been given to how ideologies and practices of settler expansion have figured 
into the formation of American democratic ideals.  Despite a growing literature exploring 
how key concepts of European political thought were articulated in response to the 
politics of imperial expansion, the role of empire in American thought is severely 
understudied.
6
  Rooted in a new current of scholarship, this dissertation examines the 
ideological and cultural development of American democracy in the context of settler 
colonialism, a distinct form of colonialism aimed at the appropriation of indigenous land 
                                                                                                                                                 
Territorial Expansion from the English Civil War to the French Revolution (University of Toronto Press, 
2010); Joshua Simon, “Simón Bolívar’s Republican Imperialism:  Another Ideology of American 
Revolution,” History of Political Thought, 33, 2 (Summer 2012), pp. 281-304. 
5
 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe:  Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton 
University Press, 2009), p. 8.  Mehta, Liberalism and Empire, p. 46.   
6
 Jennifer Pitts, “Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism,” Annual Review of Political Science, 13 
(2010), p. 217. 
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rather than the exploitation of indigenous labor.  Specifically, it foregrounds the process 
by which democratic conceptions of popular sovereignty and social equality were 
conceptually forged in relation to settler ideologies that sanctioned imperial expansion on 
a continental and global scale.  In emphasizing how the politics of settler expansion have 
shaped ideals of popular sovereignty, I develop the concept of democratic empire as a 
distinct ideological formation from liberal imperialism.   
 In spite of their historical and theoretical sophistication, discussions of liberal 
imperialism largely fail to capture the distinct imperial and colonial dynamics of the 
antebellum U.S. for two primary reasons.  First, they tend to collapse democratic 
ideologies into liberal ideologies, thereby disavowing the distinctive role of popular 
sovereignty in the former.  Second, they center on the strategies of exclusion that liberal 
imperialists employed to justify the exploitation and extraction of indigenous labor and 
resources rather than the expropriation of indigenous land characteristic of settler colonial 
forms of expansion.  While the present section will focus on the first limitation, the next 
section will focus on the second.  In both cases, I seek to illustrate how we misunderstand 
American ideologies and practices of empire and colonization if we map onto American 
development a set of concepts and categories that were developed in different geographic 
and historical contexts.  The ideology of democratic empire, therefore, provides a more 
appropriate interpretive framework for analyzing the relationship between democracy and 
empire in settler colonial contexts.   
 As historians of political ideology have long noted, liberalism and democracy have 
become only contingently conjoined in modern politics.  Because democracy has 
 6 
 
historically been seen as a potential threat to individual liberty, popular sovereignty has 
occupied an uneasy position in liberal discourse.  “[T]he concept of popular sovereignty 
is doubly objectionable [to liberalism] because it implies the existence of a recognizable 
entity which can be called ‘the people.’  This offends against the liberal doctrine that 
society is made up of discrete individuals, or at the most, groups all with their particular 
and distinct wills and interests.”7  Furthermore, liberalism has a notoriously thin 
conception of citizenship that privileges the negative rights of freedom from government 
interference over the positive rights of political participation and collective self-rule.  Yet 
as this dissertation argues, it is precisely the intricate link between principles of popular 
sovereignty and democratic citizenship on the one hand and practices of settler expansion 
on the other that defines the ideology of democratic empire.  Thus, a focus on the 
entwinement of liberalism and empire alone cannot explain the discursive structures of 
justification that reconciled democratic values with processes of settler expansion.
8
 
                                                 
7
 Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 76-77.  
Norbert Bobbio, Liberalism and Democracy (Verso, 2005). 
8
 In analyzing the ideology of democratic empire over that of liberal imperialism, my point is not suggest 
that liberal ideas played no part in the formation of democratic empire.  Rather, it is to suggest that liberal 
ideas do not exhaust the ways democracy and empire were articulated together in the American political 
imagination.  In this manner, my account significantly differs from previous critiques of the relationship 
between settler colonialism and American liberal ideology that focus on how narratives of self-reliant 
individualism masked the colonial violence of indigenous conquest and imperial expansion.  While my 
account draws on this line of analysis, it also moves beyond an exclusive focus on liberal individualism by 
attending to the role of settler expansion in setting the boundaries of popular sovereignty and political 
community.  My wager is that settler colonialism is constitutive of American democratic culture beyond 
merely the acquisitive and appropriative ethos of liberal individualism explored by Louis Hartz.  Instead of 
an exclusive emphasis on liberal ideology, I use the term “American democracy” to encompass liberal, 
republican, and colonial ideologies.  For critiques of the relationship between settler expansion and liberal 
individualism, see Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence:  The Mythology of the American 
Frontier, 1600-1860 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1973); Michael Rogin, Fathers and Children:  
Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation of the American Indian (Vintage, 1976); Kevin Bruyneel, “The 
American Liberal Colonial Tradition,” Settler Colonial Studies, 3, 3-4 (2013), pp. 311-321. 
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 The key differences between the two ideological formations can be further 
understood by considering the case of John Stuart Mill.  Often taken as the representative 
figure of liberal imperialism, Mill famously wrote, “Despotism is a legitimate mode of 
government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the 
means justified by actually effecting that end.  Liberty, as a principle, has no application 
to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being 
improved.”9  In his effort to discern the proper scope of individual liberty, Mill provided 
a powerful justification of British colonial rule.  While the imperial metropolis was to be 
governed in accordance with liberal principles of representative government, Mill 
condemned colonial subjects in India to the arbitrary rule of British administrators.  Yet 
in spite of his positive views about the democratization of British society, Mill insulated 
the rule of the British colonies in India from popular control.  Indeed, he was irate when 
Parliament abolished the East India Company after the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 and 
imposed direct rule on the colonies.  For Mill, colonial expansion was the domain of 
intellectual elites who possessed the special talents for leading colonial subjects down the 
path of civilization.  Precisely because of rather than in spite of its liberal elements, 
Mill’s was a decidedly anti-democratic imperialism, thus excluding popular sovereignty 
from having any role in carrying out British imperial ambitions.
10
 
Such a position might seem irrelevant in the larger scheme of things, but it is 
precisely in opposition to this aspect of liberal imperialism that we can best understand 
the ideology of democratic empire.  Lacking a robust conception of popular sovereignty, 
                                                 
9
 Mill, “On Liberty,” On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 14-15. 
10
 Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government,” On Liberty and Other Essays, pp. 264-265, 454. 
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an emphasis on liberal discourses alone cannot explain how U.S. expansionists 
constructed a popular constituency that demanded territorial expansion and then enlisted 
that constituency in the process of empire-building.  Although liberal imperialism 
justifies colonial rule through the positive benefits that it confers to the colonized, it 
makes no pretense to democratic rule in the acquisition of new territory.  In the ideology 
of democratic empire, conversely, democratic self-rule is not simply the end of imperial 
expansion, but is also its primary means.  Rather than a centralized state or colonial 
administration, democratic empire casts “the people” in their sovereign capacity for self-
government as the primary agent of colonial expansion.  My central argument, then, is 
that settler-colonial discourses constructed the “sovereign people” as an imperial 
constituency who demanded territorial expansion as a necessary correlate of democratic 
equality and self-rule.  As a result, American democracy was framed within a geographic 
and historical imaginary in which the vitality of democratic society rested on settler 
expansion and indigenous dispossession. 
Among most imperial historians, democratic empire refers to “empires where all 
classes in the home territories share in the project of rule.”11  The idea has perhaps been 
most forcefully advanced by the early twentieth century sociologist Franklin Giddings, 
who wrote, “The world has been accustomed to think of democracy and empire as 
antagonistic phenomena.  It has assumed that democracy could be established only on the 
ruins of empire, and that the establishment of empire necessarily meant the overthrow of 
                                                 
11
 Charles Maier, Among Empires:  American Ascendancy and its Predecessors (Harvard University Press, 
2009), p. 21.  For this definition at work, also see Herfried Münkler, Empires:  The Logic of World 
Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States (Polity Press, 2007), pp. 154-161. 
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liberty by a triumphant reign of absolutism.”  Yet, Giddings argues that the modern era is 
“witnessing the simultaneous development of both democracy and empire,” resulting in 
the formation of a “democratic empire.”  Throughout the nineteenth century, Giddings 
observed, the two most powerful nations on earth – Britain and the U.S. – became more 
democratic in their internal organization while expanding their boundaries through the 
acquisition of new territorial possessions.  The basic principle of democratic empire is 
that as a nation establishes itself as “the nucleus of an empire” it can successively annex 
new territories and continue to be democratic.  By reconciling colonial expansion with 
egalitarian principles, democratic empires govern acquired territories democratically 
while maintaining a strong imperial government.
12
 
Although this basic understanding captures many key features, it tends to understand 
the impulse for democratic expansion within a theoretical framework of democratic 
responsiveness in which democratic empires expand because they are beholden to the 
demands of “the people” for land, liberty, and equality.  That is, colonial expansion 
occurs because democratic-imperial states are responsive to the desires of popular 
constituencies for more territory.  What I contest in this notion of democratic empire is its 
static understanding of “the people” as a bounded entity.  Democratic theorists have 
recently argued that the idea of the people that underwrites modern theories of popular 
sovereignty is not an objective referent, an aggregation of individuals, or a culturally and 
territorially bounded entity but is rather a political process in its own right that involves a 
                                                 
12
 Giddings, Democracy and Empire (MacMillan, 1900), pp. 3, 11.  See Sandra Gustafson on Giddings, 
“Histories of Democracy and Empire,” American Quarterly, 59, 1 (March 2007), pp. 116-117. 
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dialectical interaction between citizens and institutions.
13
  If so, then frameworks of 
democratic responsiveness fail to capture how the very process of settler expansion was 
involved in the construction of democratic citizens and democratic publics. 
Understood in these terms, it is possible to see political enactments of “the people” as 
co-articulated with imperial ideology and institutional processes of expansion.  If ideals 
of popular sovereignty are constructed through historical processes, then it should be 
clear that in the context of the antebellum U.S. the politics of settler expansion comprised 
a constitutive context that gives form to those very ideals.  As a result, notions of 
democratic empire which view settler expansion as the product of popular demands for 
land, liberty, and equality are limited because they view the people as a bounded entity 
whose political claims and demands get translated into state policy.  If democratic 
theories that see the people as constructed through historical processes are correct, then 
frameworks of democratic responsiveness necessarily fail to capture the dynamic 
relationship between settler expansion and popular sovereignty. 
 If we focus more directly on the concept of popular sovereignty, it becomes clear that 
democratic and liberal discourses stand in distinct positions in relation to empire.  
Whereas liberalism is about defining the scope and limits of political power, democracy 
has more to do with establishing the location of the sovereign in society.
14
  Empire poses 
a set of problems to liberalism concerning the encroachment of power beyond its proper 
                                                 
13
 Jason Frank, Constituent Moments:  Enacting the People in Postrevolutionary America (Duke University 
Press, 2009).  Paulina Ochoa Espejo, The Time of Popular Sovereignty:  Process and the Democratic State 
(Penn State University Press, 2011).  Lisa Disch, “Democratic Representation and the Constituency 
Paradox,” Perspectives on Politics, 10, 3 (Sept. 2012), pp. 599-616. 
14
 Russell Hanson, The Democratic Imagination in America, p. 13. 
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constitutional limits as well as the violation of its universal assumptions.  In dealing with 
these problems, liberal imperialists relied on strategies of exclusion that rationalized the 
imposition of colonial rule on colonized subjects in excess of the proper constitutional 
limits of sovereign power.  However, empire poses a distinct set of problems to 
democratic discourse.  Historically, democratic discourses have been less inclined to 
embrace a “universal constituency,” opting instead to locate popular self-rule in the 
distinct practices, identities, and cultures of local communities.  The problem of empire 
from the perspective of democracy, then, is that expansion risks hollowing out the 
institutions and cultures of self-rule, diffusing the concentration of popular sovereignty in 
local constituencies across the vast spaces of territorial empire. 
In the process of constructing the sovereign people as an imperial constituency, 
ideologies of democratic empire embraced the “constituent power” of the people as the 
authorizing force of territorial expansion.  If constituted power refers to institutionalized 
political power ensconced in settled constitutional forms and delegated powers such as 
elected assemblies, judicial bodies, or executive offices, constituent power is the power to 
begin, end, or modify those institutionally delegated powers.  More saliently for our 
purposes, constituent power entails the sovereign power of the people to constitute a new 
social and political order.  As the source of political legitimacy in modernity, constituent 
power is necessarily superior to constituted power.
15
  Read against the backdrop of the 
                                                 
15
 The literature on constituent power is becoming increasingly large.  My definition here draws on 
Edmund Morgan, Inventing the People:  The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America (Norton, 
1989), p. 81.  The best works on the topic remain Andreas Kalyvas, “Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and 
the Constituent Power,” Constellations, 12, 2 (June 2005), pp. 223-244; and Antonio Negri, Insurgencies:  
Constituent Power and the Modern State (University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
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American and French revolutions, constituent power is “co-original and coeval” with “the 
birth of the modern doctrine of popular sovereignty,” in which democracy comes to 
describe both processes of “popular foundings” and “collective acts of self-legislation.”16 
In terms of this conceptual distinction, it is evident that frameworks of liberal 
imperialism (lacking a robust concept of popular sovereignty) and democratic 
responsiveness (viewing popular constituencies as stable and objective entities) both fail 
to capture how the constituent power of the people becomes the foundation of imperial 
authority.  If claims to represent the people or speak on the people’s behalf in fact 
constitute “the people” as a popular constituency, as Jason Frank has shown, then efforts 
to enlist the people in the process of empire-building constituted the American people as 
an imperial constituency.  That is, attempts to justify democratic expansion by invoking 
the demands of popular movements for land and liberty do not reflect some pre-
determined constituency but rather shape the cultural boundaries of popular sovereignty 
as such.  In this regard, the very definition of popular sovereignty, insofar political liberty 
requires a social and economic basis in the egalitarian distribution of land, comes to rest 
on processes of land appropriation. 
The problem for democratic empire, then, is how do popular constituencies become 
imperial constituencies?  Following James Tully, we might differently ask the question:  
in what sense does the constituent power of popular sovereignty become an imperial 
power?  Constituent power, far from a neutral category of political experience, is an 
essential component of imperial authority in many modern democracies.  In the modern 
                                                 
16
 Andreas Kalyvas, “Constituent Power,” Political Concepts:  A Critical Lexicon, Issue 3.1 (Winter 2013).  
Available at:  http://www.politicalconcepts.org/constituentpower/.  
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international order, Tully notes, the “norm of democratization” has served to “legitimate 
the coercive imposition” of Western forms of politics, economy, and society on the non-
West.  This “imperial right” manifests itself in different ways whether we are talking 
about free trade imperialism and neocolonialism, which subjects colonized societies to 
economic dominance rather than formal political control or the indirect rule of 
exploitation colonies through colonial administration.  In the context of settler societies 
such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S., imperial right has been vitally 
linked to democratic authority.  With these forms of “replication imperialism,” the norms 
and institutions of modern democracy were built upon the eradication of indigenous 
cultural forms, which was achieved through indigenous dispossession.
17
   
In its focus on constituent power and the construction of political constituencies, 
Empire of the People builds on though differs from Aziz Rana’s Two Faces of American 
Freedom.  Rana’s contribution is an elaboration of the notion of “settler freedom” that 
captures the complex relationship between republican liberty and colonial exclusion in 
American constitutional development.  Rana argues that the early American experience 
with settler colonialism established patterns of constitutional development such that the 
pursuit of republican freedom necessitated greater external exclusion of colonized 
subjects.
18
   If Rana gives emphasis to constituted power, the narrative offered here 
                                                 
17
 Tully, “The Imperialism of Modern Constitutional Democracy,” The Paradox of Constitutionalism:  
Constituent Power and Constitutional Form, edited by Loughlin and Walker (Oxford University Press, 
2007), pp. 328-329. 
18
 Aziz Rana, Two Faces of American Freedom (Harvard University Press, 2011).  For other works that 
focus on the relationship between democracy and empire at the level of constitutional development, see 
Gustafson, “Histories of Democracy and Empire;” Daniel Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire:  New York and 
the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664-1830 (University of North Carolina 
Press, 2005); Paul Frymer, “Building an American Empire:  Territorial Expansion in the Antebellum Era,” 
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emphasizes the forms of authority that settlers have harnessed in claiming their powers to 
erect a new, democratic order on top of expropriated land.  Rana focuses on how populist 
and republican legal principles issued in the legal exclusion of indigenous peoples from 
the principles of liberty and equality embedded in the constituted order, while largely 
neglecting to note that the creation of democratic society is itself an act of conquest. 
My focus, therefore, is less on the legal hierarchies and constitutional structures that 
define American settler colonialism than on the social norms and habits of citizens that 
mark the boundaries of popular sovereignty.  That is, I am concerned not just with 
normative commitments embedded in constitutional law, but also with the social norms 
and narratives that define “the people” as an imperial constituency.  In making this 
distinction, I draw on the work of Sheldon Wolin, who notes that there are two dominant 
understandings of democracy in American thought:  as a constitutional form and as a 
political culture.  To understand democracy as a constitutional form is to view politics in 
terms of the construction of political institutions and the development of constitutional 
principles, while to speak of it as a political culture is to talk of politics in terms of norms, 
habits, customs, and symbols that animate the shared ethos of a political community.  If 
the former locates the nation in the institutions that organize political community, the 
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latter finds the nation in its national character and cultural ethos.
19
  The construction of a 
democratic community entails the founding act of setting up the political institutions that 
bind a collectivity as well as the ongoing cultivation of social practices and shared 
customs that make those institutions and membership in them meaningful.   As 
Tocqueville famously noted, America is democratic less because of its formal 
constitution than because of the social conditions of citizens, which provides the firmer 
foundation for its constitutional form. 
In reference to this distinction, it becomes clear that Rana’s account of how settler 
ideologies “fused ethnic nationalism… and republicanism to combine freedom as self-
rule with a commitment to territorial empire” resides solely at the level of constitutional 
development.
20
  By placing democracy at a socio-cultural level – in what Tocqueville 
called the “democratic social state” – rather than solely at a constitutional level, I argue 
that we are in a better position to understand how deeply structures of settler colonialism 
have pervaded the very conceptual definition and social basis of modern American 
democracy.  The relationship between settler expansion and American democracy rests at 
a deeper level than legally codified forms of exclusion.  Settler colonialism produces the 
norms that define the identity of the sovereign people as such, and it acts as a “force that 
unifies, limits, and stabilizes the people within the metropole by employing violent forms 
of exclusion.”21  In spite of his assertion that settler colonialism establishes the political 
institutions and constitutional norms of popular self-rule, Rana fails to provide an account 
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of how popular sovereignty has been conceptually defined through logics of settler 
colonialism.
22
  By attending to the informal social basis of American democracy this 
dissertation better accounts for the ways in which settler expansion has constituted the 
identity of the sovereign people as an imperial constituency. 
To further understand this, let us recall that in focusing on the location of the 
sovereign in society my objective is to trace how the politics of settler colonialism 
constructed popular constituencies as imperial constituencies, imposing boundaries 
around popular sovereignty in accordance with the dynamics of settler expansion.  I 
invoke the phrase “location of the sovereign” here in two primary senses.  First, it 
involves the question of the social location of sovereignty in the one, the few, or the 
many.  In their attempts to assert the sovereignty of the people over monarchical and 
aristocratic forms of rule, American democrats saw settler expansion as a vital means of 
preventing the resurgence of Old World hierarchies in the New World.  If what 
Tocqueville called the “democratic social state” meant a form of society defined by the 
absence of feudal hierarchies, widespread property ownership enabled by indigenous 
dispossession defined the very meaning of modern American democracy. 
Second, it involves questions concerning the boundaries and geographic location of 
popular sovereignty.  While we typically think of popular sovereignty as particular to a 
bounded territorial space, ideologists of democratic empire thought of popular 
sovereignty in much more expansive terms.  During the revolutionary period, popular 
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sovereignty was thought to be specific to particular settler communities, embodied in 
colonial and state legislatures.  As the new republic expanded its borders across the trans-
Appalachian frontier, however, settlers began to rethink the norms of democratic 
citizenship.  In this new understanding of citizenship, settlers understood popular 
sovereignty as inhering not in a specific colony or territory, but in a body of people who 
have removed themselves from the settled societies of the eastern seaboard to establish 
new communities in the western territories.  In bearing their sovereignty across space 
through westward migration, settlers saw popular sovereignty as a trans-territorial feature 
of a broader national community, which inhered not in specific territories but in the 
continent as a whole.  The national sovereignty of the people, therefore, was forged 
through processes of settler expansion.  In conceiving of the location of popular 
sovereignty in this way, democratic expansionists came to rely on strategies of exclusion 
that defined the boundaries of popular sovereignty through the disavowal and elimination 
of indigenous sovereignty as having any legitimate claim to New World territory.   
Settler Colonial Strategies of Exclusion 
Beyond the focus on popular sovereignty, the distinction between liberal imperialism 
and democratic empire can also be understood by paying attention to the distinct colonial 
formations that both ideologies seek to justify.  Mill himself distinguished between two 
different types of colonies in the British Empire.  While some colonies “are composed of 
people of similar civilization to the ruling country; capable of, and ripe for, representative 
government” (e.g. settler colonies in Canada and Australia), others “are still at a great 
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distance from that state” (e.g. India).23  Mill is making here what is now a widely 
recognized distinction between “settler colonies” and “occupation” or “exploitation 
colonies.”24  If exploitation colonies rely on either the extraction of valuable resources or 
the exploitation of indigenous labor, settler colonies are characterized by the 
expropriation of indigenous land.
25
  Concomitant with the “mass transfer” of European 
populations across space, settler colonialism is marked by the “demographic takeover” of 
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  In settler regimes, colonialism is woven into the very fabric of a 
society’s culture and politics.  Rather than a singular event, colonialism is the condition 
of political life in settler societies, structuring its basic institutions and value systems. 
 In the first and most basic instance, settler colonialism entails the outward migration 
of settlers from a metropolitan center to establish colonial outposts on the periphery of 
empire.  Settler regimes expand through the replication of metropolitan cultures and 
institutions in new territory.  Settlers seek to make that space familiar by importing their 
own customs and social relations.  Although they are replications of metropolitan 
societies, settler colonies necessarily exist as distinct and separate communities.  Settler 
colonialism thus proceeds through the removal of a fragment of the metropolitan 
population who abandon the old order so as to constitute a new and separate political 
society, giving rise to “founding cultures” and “new world imaginaries” that both 
continue and break with metropolitan cultures.
27
 
 In creating new societies in a new political space, settler colonists always have to deal 
with pre-existing orders and identities that occupy and inhabit that space.  In grappling 
with this problem, settlers rely on conquest as the primary means of land appropriation.  
In the most simplistic sense conquest is the coercive acquisition of territory.  According 
to the right of conquest embedded in seventeenth and eighteenth century international 
law, superior military strength confers a just title to rule over newly acquired territories 
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and subjects gained through force and violence.
28
  At a more complex level, however, 
conquest is the “paradigmatic form of founding violence.”  It enacts the erasure and 
elimination of a prior political order so as to make way for the constitution of a new 
regime.  As a form of foundational violence, conquest institutes a “political and legal 
caesura” that ruptures and “interrupts political continuity,” creating an empty space in 
which to impose a new political order.
29
 
 Conquest is thus integral to settler colonialism.  Distinct from the exploitation 
colonialism of the nineteenth-century French and British empires in which the 
relationship between colony and metropole was signified by the exploitation of 
indigenous labor, settler colonialism entails the elimination of the native and the 
expropriation of indigenous land.  Also distinct from mass migrations in which migrants 
return to the home country, settlers come to stay.  As such, “invasion is a structure and 
not an event.”  Settler colonialism names more than an event or process concerning the 
creation of a new society; it denotes the structure of a society founded on conquest and 
the elimination of native modes of life.
30
  Settlers are, in the words of Lorenzo Veracini, 
“founders of political orders who carry their sovereignty with them.”31  In settler regimes, 
colonial expansion operates through the constituent power of settlers to establish their 
sovereignty on top of an expropriated land base.  As a form of constituent power, settler 
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colonialism entails the foundational violence of conquest in which the elimination of old 
cultures and identities enables the consolidation of a new political order. 
 It is clear here that liberal imperialism and democratic empire rely on distinct 
strategies of exclusion.   If liberal-imperial strategies of exclusion focus on justifying the 
continued exploitation of indigenous labor and the rule of colonial administration, the 
strategies of exclusion in democratic empire are oriented toward rationalizing indigenous 
dispossession and land appropriation.
32
  In its focus on land appropriation, settler 
strategies of exclusion revolve around what Patrick Wolfe calls the “logic of native 
elimination” in which a “new colonial society” is erected “upon an expropriated land 
base.”33  Although they greatly vary, ideological rationalizations of such processes center 
on strategies of colonial disavowal, which involve attempts to disavow an indigenous 
presence by casting the land as “empty” or uncultivated, what in legal discourse is known 
as terra nullius (land belonging to no one).  Other means of colonial disavowal involve 
narratives of the “vanishing Indian” in which settlers justified territorial expropriation by 
casting indigenous communities as retrograde and decaying societies, thereby loosening 
their sovereign claims over the land.
34
  Fundamentally premised on the Lockean notions 
that indigenous communities lack advanced means of agricultural improvement and 
political modes of organization characteristic of modern European sovereignty, all such 
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strategies rest on the assertion of European superiority over the social forms of 
indigenous communities, and they all encourage the disappearance of indigenous 
societies to make way for a newer and more advanced form of society.
35
 
 Although “native elimination” is a harsh term that evokes images of physical 
genocide, indigenous dispossession need not necessarily proceed through physical 
extermination.  Often times, mechanisms of forced removal and assimilation offer more 
ideologically consistent modes of native elimination.  In a certain sense, indigenous 
assimilation was opposed to racially-exclusivist thinking because it acknowledged the 
mental and physical capacities of Indians to enter into and acculturate themselves to 
white civilization.  Nevertheless, the basic idea of assimilation was that native modes of 
life were inferior to European forms of social and political organization.  Assimilation 
thus appeared to white settlers as a means of offering the “gift” of civilization to Indians 
rather than a form of elimination.  In any case, the intended and practical effect of 
assimilationist policies was the extirpation of indigenous land claims.  In the case of 
native peoples, “democracy’s intolerance of difference has operated through inclusion as 
much as through exclusion.  Some differences are absorbed rather than excluded.”36 
 Aside from the distinction between liberal-imperial and democratic-imperial 
strategies of exclusion, the dynamics of indigenous dispossession and the distinct modes 
of racialization they produce can be further understood in contrast to the forms of racial 
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slavery that also defined the antebellum period.
37
  Although both highlight the way 
American settlers have constructed what scholars have variously called a “white 
republic,”38 “herrenvolk democracy,”39 or “racial polity,”40 chattel slavery and indigenous 
dispossession represent distinct structures of colonial domination that rely on different 
practices of racialization.  Perhaps the most salient example of this is how miscegenation 
laws operate differently for bodies that have been racialized through regimes of chattel 
slavery and those bodies racialized as indigenous through land expropriation.  Regarding 
indigenous peoples, miscegenation laws allowed inter-racial mixing in order to encourage 
adaptation to white culture.  No amount of assimilation, conversely, could remove the 
brand that slavery stamped on black skin.  The distinction between these modes of 
racialization rests on a difference in the modes of colonial exploitation at work:  with 
indigenous peoples, the relation of exploitation is focused on land appropriation; with 
racial slavery it is the extraction of value from labor.
41
 
 Historically, therefore, miscegenation laws have worked to assimilate indigenous 
peoples into white citizenship.  Granting citizenship to natives (i.e. inclusion) is itself a 
form of colonization.  This basic idea also finds expression in Tocqueville’s famous 
chapter on three races in Democracy in America.  Tocqueville notes that while Indians 
could become white if they wanted to, no amount of acculturation would curtail the tide 
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of white prejudice against blacks.  Tocqueville’s observation points to the different 
regimes of exploitation.  Whites, Tocqueville suggests, would accept Indians into their 
cultures because they want their land, not their labor.  As along as indigenous individuals 
adopted institutions of private property and practices of liberal citizenship, settlers could 
appropriate indigenous land through legal means.  By eliminating indigenous customs 
and culture, settlers understood that they could also eliminate indigenous land claims.  
Because racial slavery was focused on extracting value from labor, it sought the 
reproduction of the labor power of the slave as a form of capital investment.   
Defining Democratic Empire 
One of the primary reasons that we fail to understand the imperial and colonial 
dynamics of the antebellum U.S. is that dominant conceptions of empire fail to capture 
the historical and conceptual specificity of settler colonial empires.  Michael Doyle, for 
instance, defines empire as “a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state 
controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society.  It can be achieved 
by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social, or cultural dependence.”42  
However elegant this formulation may be, it risks obscuring the distinctiveness of 
empires that expand through settler colonialism.  Rather than the direct or indirect control 
of the political sovereignty of another society, what is at stake in settler forms of 
expansion is the elimination and disavowal of indigenous sovereignty. 
Understood in these terms, the ideology of democratic empire is closer to what 
scholars have called a “settler empire,” which expands through the colonial replication of 
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republican polities in distant territories and not the construction colonial dependencies.  
In settler empires, the spatial movement of migrants entails the displacement and 
replacement of indigenous sovereignties with settler sovereignty.
43
  Whereas colonial 
empires expand through the direct control of the internal sovereignty of foreign 
dependencies, settler-colonial empires expand through the construction of “isopolitical” 
relations between settler communities that are equal and quasi-sovereign in their political 
status yet united in a broader federal union or commonwealth.  In this mode of imperial 
organization, citizens of one polity retain their civic status in transferring to another 
polity or in constructing new civil societies on expropriated land.
44
 
As a broad justification of settler-colonial expansion, there are four primary features 
of the ideology of democratic empire.  First and most significantly, it contained 
conceptions of popular sovereignty and political liberty that privileged the active 
participation in and control of citizens over public affairs.  In the most basic sense, 
democratic conceptions of popular sovereignty were affixed to frameworks of settler 
expansion by emphasizing the necessity of landed property for the cultivation of the 
norms, customs, and values of democratic citizenship.  In a more complex sense, 
however, the ideology of democratic empire embraced the sovereign capacity of settler 
communities for popular self-rule as the primary engine of territorial expansion.  In this 
imperial imagination, the popular sovereignty of settler communities was not conceived 
as being exclusive to a particular land or territory, but rather as a collective set of 
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capacities and rights that communities carried with them in migrating to distant 
territories.  That is, sovereignty inheres in settler communities who undertake the labor 
and risk of expanding and migrating and not the geographic location of the settler 
community.  In this broader ideological vision, settlers employed federalist discourses to 
articulate a new world conception of empire that expands through the power of settlers to 
constitute new political communities and then integrate into a territorial state. 
Second, ideals of social equality, understood as a form of civic and economic 
egalitarianism divorced from the privileges of inherited social rank, stood at the center of 
the ideology of democratic empire.  Insofar as popular sovereignty rested upon the broad 
diffusion of power throughout society, social equality buttressed democratic forms of 
popular self-rule by ensuring that citizens have an equal share of power over public 
affairs.  Social equality did not entail a levelling economic equality of result, but rather 
the absence of aristocratic privilege and social values of deference and hierarchy.  As 
with ideals of popular sovereignty, landed property was the basis of egalitarian society.  
In the context of an expanding political economy, democratic expansionists saw land 
appropriation as a means of guaranteeing social equality among citizens and thwarting 
the concentration of landed capital in the hands of the economic and political elite.  
Significantly colored by the “safety valve” theory of democratic expansion, the social 
basis of democratic order rested on landed expansion so as ensure the equal civic status 
of citizens. 
Third, democratic empire was marked by an advanced commercial ideology that 
privileged the right of settlers to remove and migrate independent of centralized state 
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power.  Clearly influencing British colonists, Blackstone famously defined personal 
liberty as the “power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to 
whatsoever place one’s own inclination may direction.”45  In practical terms, this focus 
on migration and movement translated into a powerful commercial ideology that 
facilitated the mass transfer of metropolitan culture and capital across the trans-
Appalachian west.  While these conceptions of commercial liberty were certainly defined 
in opposition to protectionist policies of state control, they also embraced an egalitarian 
component in opposing the concentration of wealth and landed capital that hindered the 
spread of “democratic capitalism.”46  The impulse for capitalist expansion in American 
democracy derived not just from economic interests but also from political-ideological 
dynamics that saw the spread of commercial markets as a means of ensuring democratic 
stability.  What distinguished U.S. settler expansion from other forms of European 
expansion was how profits derived from colonial production were channeled into the 
creation of a new society and not back to the mother country.
47
 
Fourth, the ideology of democratic empire fostered conceptions of time and space that 
provided a powerful ideological impulse for settler expansion.  Democratic discourse in 
the antebellum U.S. upheld notions of historical progress and democratic providence that 
cast democracy as the highest stage of modern civilization.  Spatially, these notions of 
civilizational progress translated into a normative commitment to territorial expansion as 
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a means of ensuring democratic stability.  Distinct from its ancient connotations of 
turbulence, democratic society acquired social and institutional stability from settler 
expansion, which propelled its historical progression from one stage to another.  
Politically speaking, these spatio-temporal assumptions produced hierarchical effects that 
divided the time and space of modernity into savage and civilized.  Political orders are 
both spatial orders and temporal orders.  Settler societies are ordered through a normative 
division of space that differentiates between societies that are organized according to 
modern democratic principles and those that aren’t.  Whether it is the removal of the 
indigene from civilized spaces or the transformation of the savage wilderness into 
civilized societies, American democracy encourages the normative division of space.
48
  
Settler societies are also ordered through temporal divisions in which both citizen and 
indigene are tensed.  If the settler-citizen occupies the future tense of modernity and 
progress, the indigene stands for the past tense of savagery and nature.  U.S. democratic 
identity thus coheres around a set of hierarchical and normative orderings that divide 
settler-citizens and indigenes along different temporal frames, each entailing a different 
“narrative tense of social belonging.”49 
Ideological History 
 By tracing development of the ideology of democratic empire, this dissertation offers 
not an intellectual history of empire and colonization but rather an ideological history.   
In the fashion of Cambridge School techniques of discourse analysis developed by 
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Quentin Skinner, the intellectual history of political discourse puts primary focus on the 
linguistic regularities and shared vocabularies that provide the context for the emergence 
of political values and ideas.  The meaning of a text or idea is not uncovered through a 
close reading aimed at retrieving moral axioms about human nature or universal truths 
about political order but requires situating a text in its historical context.  Drawing on 
speech act theory, such interpretive techniques emphasize the public legibility of political 
argument.  Because political discourses are united by broader regularities in the 
vocabularies political actors use to influence politics, intellectual historians can uncover 
the intention of an author by examining the linguistic contexts that govern the formation 
of political arguments.  Through contextualization, intellectual historians can illuminate 
the linguistic conventions that help us understand what an author or speaker was doing 
with a particular language.
50
 
 Although my approach to ideological history adopts many of these interpretive 
techniques, it also moves beyond these approaches to emphasize the sociological and 
material contexts of political ideology.  Instead of focusing solely on discursive and 
linguistic contexts, Ellen Meiksins Wood argues for attention to the “deep structural 
contexts and long-term social transformations” that shape political thought and culture.51  
In its exclusive focus on political languages peculiar to a specific historical moment, 
Skinnerian approaches risk detaching consideration of the social conditions and economic 
processes from the discursive structures and linguistic contexts that shape political 
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debate.  This in turn restricts the range of historical contexts that account for the historical 
specificity of a given political discourse.  Attention to how political values develop in 
relation to large-scale historical and social processes widens the range of contextual 
factors relevant to the formation of political ideologies. 
 A broader sense of what counts as relevant historical context is necessary if we are to 
pay attention to how material processes of settler colonization shaped the foundation of 
democratic society in the United States.  Building on Wood’s insights here, I argue that a 
more synthetic understanding of imperial ideology requires attention to the material and 
institutional processes of colonization that shaped the conceptual development of 
democratic values, as well as the ideologies and discourses of colonization that lend 
justification to those institutional and social processes.  The two should not be broken 
down into a dichotomous binary like base and superstructure but should be seen as two 
moments of an integrated totality.  To have a truly dynamic understanding of politics and 
culture, political development must be understood as “a continuous interaction between 
ideology and the material forces of history.”52  Without attention to how both aspects 
mediate each other in a dialectical fashion, we fail to account for the full range of 
historical contexts that govern the development of ideological constructs. 
 Within this contextual understanding of ideological history, the concept of ideology 
operates on two levels of analysis.  At the simpler and programmatic level, ideological 
history involves tracing the conceptual lineages and discursive effects of “legitimizing 
constructs” that rationalize power relations and the construction of colonial hierarchies.  
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In this sense, ideology is not simply a dogma or doctrine, but rather “the system of 
beliefs, values, fears, prejudices, reflexes, and commitments – in sum, the social 
consciousness – of a social group, be it a class, a party, or a section.”53  Ideologies thus 
provide for the cohesion of groups in consolidating social power and governing authority.  
With this understanding in mind, this dissertation focuses on tracing the ideological 
development of democratic empire as a distinct mode of thought and culture, which in 
turn provided the discursive structures of justification within which settlers rationalized 
colonial expansion.  Rather than incidental features of empire, these discourses and 
ideologies are constitutive of the very process of settler expansion. 
At a deeper and constitutive level, ideologies are not simply instrumental constructs 
used to justify power and domination but actually structure consciousness and group 
identity.
54
  In focusing on the role of ideology in constituting popular constituencies as 
imperial constituencies, this dissertation thus places emphasis on what Priscilla Wald 
calls “official stories,” authorizing narratives that emerge out of nationalist and popular 
movements and in turn “constitute Americans.”  Such narratives – what Rogers Smith 
calls “stories of peoplehood” – provide the means by which individuals identify with the 
community they live in.
55
  But such narratives are neither static nor monolithic because 
they change in relation to shifting material conditions and must therefore be refashioned 
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and retold.  Rather than isolated currents of political thought, settler colonial narratives 
were central to the ongoing re-definition of democratic identity and culture. 
 If ideologies refer to the beliefs and ideas that allow particular classes, groups, or 
parties to justify domination over other groups, then it is necessary to understand the 
specific class dynamics behind the ideology of democratic empire.  In one of its original 
formulations, Karl Marx famously characterized the concept of ideology thusly:  “The 
ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the 
ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.”  For 
Marx, “ruling ideas” both reflect “dominant material relationships” and rationalize 
exploitative relations of power and domination.  Ideas and ideologies not only emerge out 
of concrete historical contexts, they also have discursive effects that provide justification 
for continued regimes of exploitation.
56
 
 While the capitalist classes of Europe dominated the working classes through the 
development of liberal-democratic ideals of bourgeois freedom, North America posed to 
Marx slightly different dynamics of ideological development.  In more places than one, 
Marx claimed that the most highly developed state in the modern world was the United 
States.  It was in America, Marx observed, that the modern state had most successfully 
combined commitments to social equality and political democracy with capitalist 
expansion in a single institutional framework.
57
  Unburdened by rigid social hierarchies, 
political institutions in the U.S. embraced popular sovereignty, extensive suffrage, and 
social equality in a way that served rather than threatened capitalist expansion.  Perhaps 
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the primary reason for this was the role of expropriated land in grounding bourgeois 
democracy.  Although classes certainly existed in the U.S., “they have not become fixed, 
but continually change and interchange their elements in constant flux.”  For Marx, 
modern means of production have developed in America without the sharpening of rigid 
class distinctions.  The reason, he speculated, was that the “stagnant surplus population” 
which typically drives down wages and fans the flames of class conflict has been 
siphoned off to the west through the promise of landed independence.  Colonization thus 
prevented the formation of a fixed class structure.  Instead of clashing with the “means of 
production,” the masses comprised a “youthful movement” aimed at making a “new 
world” in the west.58  By suppressing class conflict through colonization, the sovereign 
people became an intelligible entity of political rule. 
 This dissertation thus explores how a sort of democratic-colonial ideology emerged 
from this process.  The expropriation of indigenous land offered settlers a means of 
escape from the accumulation of misery plaguing the European working classes.  This 
form of democratic expansion produced a distinctive political culture of empire and a 
powerful justification of indigenous dispossession.  In antebellum America, liberal-
democratic ideology was not the mode of thought of the industrial-capitalist elite.  It was 
the product of a cross-class coalition with roots in mass society and the agrarian west, 
dominated by settlers who posed their own social conceptions as a form of national 
ideology.  If we focus on the expropriation of land rather than the exploitation of labor, 
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then the ideological apparatus of democratic empire centers not on the reproduction of 
exploitative labor relations but on justifying continued regimes of land appropriation. 
 Due to the relevance of its material and institutional contexts, the ideological 
development of democratic empire also closely aligns with partisan dynamics.  Drawing 
on British ideological precedents and colonial discourse, the Federalist coalition during 
the constitutional period first articulated an imperial identity for the new nation.  
Although Federalist thought largely rejected the language of democracy as a suitable 
expression of imperial ambitions, the Republican coalition under Jefferson and then the 
Democratic coalition under Jackson articulated democracy and empire together in a 
single national ideology.  As the Democratic Party splintered into pro- and anti-slavery 
factions after the close of the Mexican War in 1848, the Free Soil Party and eventually 
the Republican Party connected the project of democratic expansion to an anti-slavery 
and free labor agenda.  By grounding their claims to rule in settler political culture, these 
partisan regimes offered compelling visions of national identity rooted in the ideology of 
democratic empire.  Partisan conflicts in these episodes of political development did not 
just reflect underlying ideological conflicts but also significantly structured them.  Since 
ideologies always exist in concrete institutional contexts, the shifting dynamics of 
partisan coalitions play a significant role in shaping American ideological history. 
Empire and Exceptionalism 
The failure on the part of scholars to fully address the historical and conceptual 
specificity of American ideologies of empire tends to reinforce narratives of American 
exceptionalism.  For Donald Pease, American exceptionalism is woven into the fabric of 
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U.S. imperial ideology such that the two are largely indistinguishable.  In order to situate 
the study of American political culture in a global rather than national context, Pease 
proposes what he calls the “comparative analysis of imperial state exceptionalisms” to 
uncover how politics and culture coalesce into larger imperial ideologies without 
reinforcing the sense of American development as an “exception” to the norm of 
European imperial state development.
59
  Edward Said accurately captured the impetus 
behind such comparative analysis:  “Every single empire in its official discourse has said 
that it is not like all the others, that its circumstances are special, that it has a mission to 
enlighten, civilize, bring order and democracy, and that it uses force only as a last resort.”  
That is, every imperial state formation propagates a vision of itself as exceptional.  Said 
both refutes the notion of American exceptionalism and highlights that “discourses of 
exceptionalism are part of the discursive apparatus of empires themselves.”60 
Exceptionalist discourses occupy a central position in the ideology of democratic 
empire.  As demonstrated throughout this dissertation, the ideology of democratic empire 
hinges on a norm/exception structure of justification that operates on two levels of 
analysis.
61
  On one level, the ideology of democratic empire portrays U.S. territorial and 
economic expansion as a benevolent and consensual process that occurs through the 
spread of American culture and commerce.  Coercive and violent processes of war and 
conquest are then cast as exceptions to the general rule of democratic empire.  On another 
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level, the ideology of democratic empire juxtaposes a democratic imperial imaginary to a 
despotic imaginary characteristic of the Russian, British, French, and Spanish empires 
also vying for control of the Americas.  Because the United States expands through 
culture and commerce rather than war and conquest, it is considered to be an exception to 
the norm of European imperial development and thus exempt from the laws of history 
that dictate the decline of all earthly empires. 
In this view, the democratic principles that govern the internal organization of the 
political community represent the core meaning of the American political tradition, while 
the exclusions and hierarchies imposed on colonized subjects represent aberrations to 
dominant currents of political culture.  To complicate this understanding, I employ what 
Said calls a “contrapuntal reading” to highlight how the exceptions of democratic empire 
constitute its norm.
62
  Such a mode of analysis involves juxtaposing the democratic 
principles of liberty and equality animating the self-rule of the American republic to the 
practices of empire-building and settler expansion that engendered hierarchies of 
indigenous dispossession.  The purpose of contrapuntal analysis is to illustrate how 
democratic ideals and values were locked in a mutually constitutive relationship with 
discourses and practices of settler conquest.  By juxtaposing the internal principles of 
democratic self-rule that govern the domestic politics of the nation with the external 
spaces of the colonial frontier, contrapuntal analysis captures democratic empire in the 
process of its political, social, and ideological formation. 
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Although I focus on the ideological development of democratic empire in the U.S. 
context, I have no intention of presenting the American experience with empire as unique 
or exceptional.  One can find parallels with this ideological configuration by putting 
democratic empire in a transnational and comparative perspective.  Perhaps the most 
obvious point of comparison is the British Empire of the nineteenth century, not in the 
exploitation colonies of Africa and Southeast Asia but in the settler colonies of Canada, 
Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand.  The experiences of the British Empire after 
the rebellions of Lower and Upper Canada, partially in an attempt to thwart a repetition 
of the American rebellion, led British colonial architects to integrate democratic 
principles and imperial frameworks of rule in the Durham Report of 1838. The outcome 
significantly mirrored the American framework of combining territorial expansion with 
democratic self-rule in settler colonies.
63
   
Beyond Anglo-settler-states, one sees profound similarities in the role of frontier 
discourse in the formation of liberal-democratic ideology in South America.  In his 
classic work of Latin American literature, Facundo, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento 
illustrated how the division between civilization and savagery boldly colored the hue of 
Argentine federalism in the nineteenth century.  The ideology of the frontier exemplified 
in Frederick Jackson Turner’s “frontier thesis” had wide resonance throughout the 
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Americas, North and South.
64
  In contrast to the American experience, frontier expansion 
in Russia led not to an economic system based on free labor or a robust democratic 
ideology but instead to the consolidation of a feudal empire.
65
  My broader comparative 
gesture here is to suggest that the ideology of democratic empire is most likely to be 
prevalent in settler polities wherein self-constituted republics on a local scale expand by 
self-replicating across space.  Nevertheless, settler ideologies of democratic empire are 
not exclusive to Anglo-settler states, and settler empires do not always rely on democratic 
ideals for their justification.  
The similarities in these colonial ideologies stem from networks of “overlapping 
territories” and “intertwined histories” generated by global processes of expansion, 
commerce, and conquest.
66
  As European empires fought over and traversed the globe, 
they spread their distinctive political cultures on a planetary scale.  I must leave it up to 
other scholars to assess these comparisons and determine whether these other settler 
societies warrant the label “democratic empire,”  but by reading the American experience 
against these other historical instances in a transnational context we greatly enhance our 
ability to pinpoint the historical specificity of the distinct ideological formation I seek to 
explore.  Furthermore, as I will document extensively, there was a comparative 
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dimension built into U.S. imperial ideology.  The presence of other empires in the 
political space of the New World forced democratic expansionists to tacitly compare U.S. 
imperial power with that of other imperial states that shared the same expansionist 
ambitions and posed challenges to U.S. claims for territorial sovereignty.  Colonial 
development and its supporting ideologies are never insular processes, but develop in 
relation to each other. 
Chapter Outline 
 The argument in this dissertation proceeds through three primary phases.  The first 
phase charts the ideological origins of democratic empire in the colonial and founding 
periods of American history.  Chapter one focuses on debates about the proper balance 
between colonial authority and imperial sovereignty during the Imperial Crisis.  It further 
establishes that the conflict between colonial settlers and metropolitan authorities was 
largely a debate over the proper terms and conditions of imperial organization.  
Understood in this way, the American Revolution was in key respects an attempt by 
settlers to lift barriers that metropolitan authorities imposed on westward expansion.  The 
fundamental point that settlers made in these arguments was that barriers to settler 
expansion subjected the colonies to the metropolitan center in a way that cast them as 
colonial dependencies.  In response, settlers articulated an alternative vision of imperial 
expansion in which the constituent parts of empire were equal rather than dependent 
entities.  The chapter goes on to argue that the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 
institutionalized a new world conception of empire that privileged the equality of quasi-
sovereign settler communities over notions of empire organized around the governance of 
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colonial dependencies.  In spite of the central principles of equality at the center of this 
new notion of empire, the Ordinance encouraged the further dispossession of indigenous 
communities as a necessary feature of republican expansionism. 
 Continuing this line of analysis, the second chapter examines the relationship between 
democracy and empire in the constitutional debates.  Although federalists during the 
constitutional period fused popular sovereignty and imperial sovereignty in a single 
institutional framework, democratic principles occupied an ambiguous role in this new 
vision of empire.  For many Federalists during the constitutional debates, democracy 
represented the primacy of settler sovereignty over the authority of the imperial state, and 
thus posed serious obstacles to federalist visions of a stable though expansive republic.  
Exemplified in ongoing frontier conflicts, the primacy of settler sovereignty at the local 
level over national authority was ultimately antithetical to federalist visions of empire.  
As Jack Greene has noted, the Revolution continued rather than resolved the conflict 
between metropolitan authorities and provincial sovereignties in the new republic.
67
  For 
this reason, the constitutional conflict between settlers and federalist elites mirrored the 
conflict between settlers and metropolitan authorities during the Imperial Crisis.  Within 
the terms of this ideological conflict, the seeds of democratic empire were planted in the 
early years of the republic as Democratic-Republican societies along the frontier and 
Jeffersonian republicans began to fuse democratic visions of popular self-rule with 
national visions of settler expansion. 
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 The dissertation then proceeds in the second phase to examine the ideological 
development of democratic empire from the Jacksonian period through the end of the 
Civil War.  Focusing on the works of Alexis de Tocqueville, Ralph Waldo Emerson, John 
O’Sullivan, William Seward, and Walt Whitman, the three chapters of this section 
examine how emergent notions of democratic identity emerged in relation to imperial 
processes of war, conquest, and indigenous dispossession.  The guiding thread across 
these chapters is a social and cultural conception of democracy – what Tocqueville called 
“the democratic social state.”  All of these writers embraced a theory of political 
development that understood democracy not just as a form of constitutional government 
but more saliently as a form of culture and society that privileged popular sovereignty 
and social equality over feudal social arrangements.  In this socio-cultural concept of 
democracy, settler expansion guarded against the resurgence of feudal land title in the 
New World by ensuring the primacy of civic equality in the context of an expanding and 
industrializing political economy.  Regimes of settler colonialism and indigenous 
dispossession constituted the very foundation of American democracy by shaping the 
values, habits, and customs that defined the boundaries of popular sovereignty. 
 Chapter three traces how new conceptions of democracy expressed in Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America acquired their conceptual coherence in relation to the politics of 
settler expansion and land appropriation.  For Tocqueville, American democracy was 
defined by the double absence of feudal social arrangements and indigenous 
sovereignties.  Insofar as American democracy conceptually emerged in reference to 
processes of native elimination, settler colonialism provided the very foundation of 
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democratic society.  Chapter four expands this analysis to the writings of Emerson and 
O’Sullivan against the backdrop of the U.S. conquest of Mexico.  While O’Sullivan 
presented a relatively conventional socio-economic argument in favor of imperial 
expansion, in which the acquisition of new land ensured the landed independence of 
democratic-settlers, Emerson recast this argument in the terms of transcendental and 
romantic philosophy.  For both writers, the possible re-colonization of Texas and Oregon 
by Britain threatened to reinstate feudal land title, violating democratic principles of 
social equality and popular sovereignty.  Chapter five examines similar themes in the 
politics of Seward, Whitman, and the free soil movement of the 1850s and 1860s.  In the 
free soil politics of the period, the expansion of slavery represented a feudal threat to 
democratic equality.  In response, free-soil democrats rearticulated democratic empire as 
a form of free labor empire that privileged egalitarian expansion over the oligarchic 
empire of slavery.  In doing so, they also provided a powerful ideological justification of 
native elimination based on the construction of civilizational hierarchies. 
 While the previous two sections focus on official narratives and legitimizing 
constructs of settler expansion, the last section emphasizes the counter-narratives told by 
colonial subjects of democratic empire.  Although the link between democratic 
conceptions of popular sovereignty and settler expansion were deep, colonized subjects 
of democratic empire spun counter-narratives of settler expansion which provided a 
broad ideological critique of democratic empire.  The closing chapter examines the 
thought and politics of the Pequot Indian William Apess, who highlighted the prospects 
of de-constituting democratic empire, in effect challenging the boundaries and meaning 
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of hegemonic conceptions of democracy and popular sovereignty.  In this way, he offered 
a compelling counter-history of democratic empire, illuminating the political possibilities 
that exist within the horizon of its rule.  Instead of rejecting democracy and the American 
Enlightenment it sprang from as imperial conceit, he appropriated and revised antebellum 
notions of democracy and put them in service of forceful critique of settler expansion. 
 Apess’s counter-narrative offered an ideological critique of narratives of democratic 
empire that obscure the foundational violence and constitutive exclusions that form the 
basis of U.S. political order.  Through an imaginative appropriation of the basic terms 
and concepts of American democratic thought, however, he enlisted modern democracy 
in the struggle against settler colonial empire and in doing so transformed it into 
something that exceeds its original meaning.  Apess’s essential contribution to the 
tradition of anti-imperial democracy was to affix an element of cultural autonomy to 
prevailing frameworks of popular self-rule, thereby overcoming the homogenizing and 
assimilationist impulse of the American democratic tradition.  Much more than a call for 
the recognition of cultural rights, Apess’s assertion of cultural autonomy and political 
sovereignty meant undermining the sovereignty of the liberal-democratic state, exposing 
the foundational violence of modern American democracy in persistent regimes of settler 
colonization that are ideologically obscured in triumphal narratives of democratic 
expansion.  By highlighting the foundational violence of democratic empire, Apess 
shows how the political foundations of American democracy rest on constitutive 
exclusions and forms of conquest that prevent the liberal-democratic state from ever 




Infant Empire:  The Ideological Origins of Democratic Empire 
“To secure a conquest, it was always necessary to plant a colony, and territories, thus occupied and settled, 
were rightly considered, as mere extensions, or processes of empire.” Samuel Johnson, Taxation No 
Tyranny. 
  
 In conventional historical narratives, the birth of the United States represented an 
anti-imperial revolution.  Reflecting such assumptions, one prominent historian has 
recently argued that the founding generation drew from the Roman experience to 
demonstrate the “incompatibility of republican order with imperial politics” and that the 
“establishment of the empire and the demise of the republic went hand in hand.”1  
Scholars largely agree that while France built an overseas empire on the basis of 
republican principles, American colonists cast their new republic as an “anti-imperial 
power.”2  In this conventional view, the experiences of American colonists during and 
after the Seven Years’ War led them to take an “anti-imperial stance” that encouraged 
“active popular resistance” against the authority of the British Empire.  Colonial leaders 
combined an abiding concern for individual liberty with a fear of public authority into a 
coherent anti-imperial and republican ideology that laid the foundation for the emergence 
of a radical, democratic culture in the nineteenth-century.
3
 
Against this narrative, this chapter demonstrates that the republican foundation of the 
United States was by no means anti-imperial.  Far from rejecting the legitimacy of empire 
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as such, the revolutionaries and constitutional architects of the early republic planted the 
seeds of an independent empire that extended the dominion of Anglo colonists.  Rather 
than setting limits to the expansion of U.S. sovereignty, the Revolution catalyzed the 
development of territorial and economic expansion by wresting control of western lands 
from metropolitan authorities and placing them under the power of an imperial state 
whose authority derived from popular sovereignty.  Empire is not an aberration of an 
otherwise stable polity, but is internal to the historical construction of the American 
republic.  Republican ideals and institutions developed alongside processes of territorial 
and economic expansion.  Moreover, republican institutions were founded on the 
constitutive exclusions of slaves and indigenous polities from American citizenship, even 
as republican ideology authorized the racial violence of the colonial frontier. 
In recent years, settler colonialism has emerged as a powerful interpretive framework 
for exploring the colonial and imperial dimensions of political and cultural development 
in Anglo-settler societies.  What Veracini calls the “settler colonial situation” provides 
for a compelling interpretation of the American founding that illuminates how American 
revolutionaries affixed ideals and institutions of popular sovereignty to frameworks of 
imperial expansion.
4
  For Veracini, settler colonialism is best understood in terms of a 
triangular framework that links the imperial metropolis, the settler colony, and 
indigenous communities.  Each of these poles is best defined relationally.  The relation 
between settler colony and imperial metropolis is characterized by the massive 
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population transfer of settlers from one territory to another.  Settler communities are 
engaged in a process of importing metropolitan culture and customs to a distant territory 
and then implanting their sovereignty, culture, and jurisdiction in a new political space.  
At the same time, metropolitan authorities attempt to retain political and economic 
control over the colony, often by containing further expansion and regulating commerce 
in the colonies.  The empire-colony relation is potentially marked by a relation of 
colonial dependence wherein metropolitan authorities curtail the rights and liberties of 
colonists in order to maintain imperial power.  Such dynamics often instill in colonists 
the desire for separation, revolution, and independence. 
The indigenous-settler relation, conversely, is marked by a cycle of colonial violence 
and indigenous resistance.  Settlers seek to dispossess indigenous peoples of their native 
land through processes of purchase, labor, or conquest.  One of the most effective means 
of asserting settler land rights was disavowing an indigenous presence in the New World.  
By holding land to be uninhabited or uncultivated or by deeming indigenous modes of 
political organization to be illegitimate, settlers employed a diverse array of colonial 
strategies of disavowal all aimed at displacing indigenous sovereignties.  At the same 
time, the cycle of colonial violence and indigenous resistance spurred instability along 
the frontier, prompting metropolitan or national authorities to either contain settler 
expansion or facilitate a more orderly process of expansion that curtailed frontier 
violence.  In order to retain their authority over settler colonies, imperial authorities 
engage in war, treaties, and negotiations with indigenous communities in order to secure 
territory for settlers while offsetting the potential for indigenous resistance. 
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While exploitation colonialism seeks the extraction of value produced by indigenous 
labor, settler colonialism focuses on the expropriation of land previously occupied by 
indigenous peoples and their extermination or incorporation into a new political order.  In 
this way, settler conquest entails a form of foundational violence in which the 
construction of a new political order flowers on the decimation of prior identities, orders, 
and cultures.  Settler colonialism is thus marked by the logic of native elimination, which 
manifests itself in the form of various colonial technologies aimed at appropriating land 
and extinguishing native title.  On the one hand, settler colonialism might proceed 
through military conquest and outright physical extermination.  But on the other hand, it 
might also proceed through attempts to assimilate and incorporate natives into the 
structures of modern American citizenship.  Yet far from being diametrically opposed, 
these two technologies of elimination often proceeded alongside each other, both 
enacting the foundational violence of American democracy. 
The triangular framework of settler colonialism highlights the doubly colonial aspect 
of early American political development.
5
  On the one hand, settler colonialism in the 
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British colonies and the early republic involved efforts to create an expansive empire 
without subjecting settlers to colonial dependence and the arbitrary power of 
metropolitan authorities.  The architects of the U.S. constitutional state struggled to create 
an expansive imperial republic without reinstating hierarchical forms of rule that stripped 
settlers of their rights and sovereign capacity for self-rule.  On the other hand, the early 
U.S. republic was colonial in the sense that settlers and imperial authorities alike sought 
to eradicate the land claims of the continent’s prior inhabitants.  Although early efforts at 
empire-building attempted to transfer the ownership of land from Indians to white settlers 
through legal frameworks of purchase and treaty, U.S.-Indian relations were indelibly 
marked by the logic of native elimination.  In the development of the democratic-
republican empire, local institutions of settler sovereignty and self-rule were closely 
linked to frameworks of indigenous dispossession and land appropriation.   
The story of early American political development can largely be understood as a 
process by which a white settler colony became an expansive democratic empire.  The 
experience with settler colonialism had a profound impact on the development of the 
American political tradition, specifically regarding the link between popular sovereignty 
and settler expansion.  This chapter sets the stage for this argument by making three 
central claims.  First, I argue that one of the driving factors of the American Revolution 
was the desire of settlers to abolish constraints on territorial and economic expansion.  
During the Revolution, dominant conceptions of liberty and equality in an extended 
polity were intricately linked to struggles to realize imperial visions in the western 
territories.  Exemplified in Thomas Paine’s call for independence and the location of 
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imperium in “the people” rather than the monarchy, Americans reconciled empire with 
popular sovereignty through frameworks of settler colonialism. 
Second, I account for how American colonists developed a distinctive conception of 
empire that served as a productive force in the development of early American political 
culture.  This conception of empire had two central facets.  One central ideal was a 
conception of republican liberty in which expansion was undertaken in pursuit of the 
common good rather than for private profits.  Ideologies of market liberalism held that 
barriers to territorial expansion constituted unjustified restraints on economic freedom.  
The account offered here stands in contrast to the ongoing debates between “neo-
republican”6 and “neo-Lockean”7 interpretations of the American Revolution.  My wager 
is that American imperial ideology during the founding era is best understood not through 
attention to either republican or liberal traditions alone, but rather through their complex 
interaction.  I thus challenge both neo-republican and neo-Lockean interpretations for 
largely ignoring the conceptual role of empire in the formation of the early republic.  In 
many respects, the imperial dynamics of republican conceptions of liberty, equality, and 
popular sovereignty were rooted in the context of settler colonialism and an expanding 
political economy of agrarian capitalism in which independent farmers acquired social 
equality and economic prosperity on par with landed elites by selling surplus agricultural 
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commodities in international and domestic markets.  Viewed in these terms, ideologies of 
commercial liberalism and agrarian republicanism were equally indispensable to 
American visions of empire.
8
 
Finally, I account for how the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 institutionalized a form 
of empire without colonial dependence.  In their attempts to break free from the authority 
of the imperial metropolis, American settlers developed imperial self-conceptions that 
privileged localized self-rule and equality between the constituent units of empire as the 
hallmark of a new kind of democratic-republican empire.  In this conception of empire, 
federalism emerged as a way of reconciling imperial frameworks of expansion with 
democratic-republican ideals of self-rule at the local level.  By privileging the equality 
among states in relation to the national government, federalism also provided a means of 
reconciling conflicts between the imperial authority of the metropolis and the settler 
sovereignty of colonies and territories. Furthermore, the framework of federal 
imperialism outlined a process of expansion in which the sovereign capacity of settlers to 
found self-governing republics in the wilderness constituted the primary force of 
expansion.  Rather than an alternative to empire, federalism combined imperial 
sovereignty with popular sovereignty in a single framework of territorial expansion. 
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Colonial Conceptions of Empire in British North America 
 In the midst of escalating global conflict over control of North America in the 1750s, 
British colonists began to confront questions about imperial organization that addressed 
the balance between the provincial sovereignty of settler colonists and the imperial 
sovereignty of metropolitan authorities.  In these debates, settlers began to see the 
American colonies not simply as dependent appendages of the British Empire, but as a 
source of imperial power in their own right.  One sees this colonial mindset forcefully at 
work in Benjamin Franklin’s Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind (1751), 
which articulated a vision of an expanding agrarian republic based on a simple empirical 
observation that proved to be strikingly accurate:  the population of colonial America 
would continue to double every twenty years, ushering in a future in which “the greatest 
Number of Englishmen will be on this Side the Water.”  The central implication was that 
the abundance of open land led to the drastic increase of population in North America as 
well as to vast economic growth through the expansion of British markets.  In Franklin’s 
view, this would lead to a great “Accession of Power” to the British Empire.  Such 
assertions significantly challenged dominant conceptions of empire wherein the colonial 
periphery served the core both politically and economically.  Franklin reversed this 
formula and asserted that further colonization of the New World would make America 
and Britain equal partners in establishing global empire.
9
 
 Underlying Franklin’s argument was the idea that the expansion of colonial dominion 
ensured political stability and the durability of settler institutions.  John Adams made the 
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point explicit in his well-known interpretation of Harrington’s Oceana.  The only viable 
means of preserving “the balance of power on the side of equal liberty and public virtue” 
was to divide the land into small quantities so that the multitude may be in possession of 
landed estates.  In doing so, the multitude will be brought into the balance of power and 
will be more likely to partake in the “care of the liberty, virtue, and interest” of the 
republic.
10
  For Adams, the viability of a mixed republic rested on landed independence 
so as to keep a landless class of dependents from forming, who may seek to transform the 
structures of the prevailing order.  Political stability and the security of individual liberty 
implied territorial expansion so as to make sure there was, in Franklin’s words, “Room 
enough” for the easy subsistence of the agrarian citizenry.  Franklin praised the statesman 
that “acquires new Territory, if he finds it vacant, or removes Natives to give his own 
People Room.”11  In Franklin’s vision, the widespread distribution of cheap land 
prevented social instability and political discontent in the metropolis, which in turn 
depended upon native elimination and the disavowal of indigenous sovereignty. 
 Central for our purposes here is to understand that both Franklin and Adams affixed 
republican principles to commercial notions that embraced economic growth as an engine 
of continental expansion.  A well-known feature of the neo-republican synthesis, most 
clearly expounded by Pocock, is that republican writers pitted their ideas of virtue against 
the twin systems of commerce and empire, which were thought to necessarily lead to 
corruption.  In this view, republican thinkers privileged agrarian forms of economy 
because the independent subsistence drawn from agriculture buttressed the cultivation of 
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civic virtue.  Corruption stems from the dependence of citizens on the will of others, and 
modes of economy premised on commercial exchange that facilitate this dependence are 
at the forefront of civic decay.
12
  The continental expansion of commercial trade, 
however, was not necessarily antithetical to this agrarian vision.  For Franklin, it was 
beneficial that “a considerable commerce may… subsist between us and our future… 
inland settlements,” even though “[m]anufactures are founded in poverty.”13  While he 
found wage labor to be in violation of republican liberty, he did not think the same of 
commercial regimes of trade in which farmers sold their surplus crops to draw profit. 
 By the Seven Years’ War, due to the role of the colonies in the ascendance of British 
commerce, colonists began to see themselves not simply as equal partners in the imperial 
enterprise, but as the very foundation of British power.  Franklin wrote in 1760, “I have 
long been of opinion that the foundations of future grandeur and stability of the British 
Empire lie in America.”14  John Adams gave further voice to this sentiment.  When 
empires decline, Adams held, “the empire of the world” transfers to another location 
further west.  Based on Franklin’s calculations about its expanding population, Adams 
speculated that North America would become the last “great seat of empire.”  But if the 
seat of empire was in the process of translation, then the current seat of empire was in 
decline.  North America would not only step in to take its place, it would altogether 
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suspend the historical succession of empires, inaugurating what Bishop Berkeley 
considered the fifth and closing act of the great human drama.
15
 
 These assertions about the rise of American global power drew on a medieval, 
historical trope inflected with a modern twist.  The doctrine of translatio imperii held that 
the center of power and culture in the world was continually travelling westward.  As one 
empire fell, the seat of global rule transferred to another state further west, a dominant 
power that carried history along the path of progress.  Originating in the Orient and 
progressing through Greek, Roman, and European civilizations, the transfer of imperial 
rule would find its final resting place in Pacific Rim of the Americas, returning the seat of 
empire to its ancient origins and bringing the entire globe within its domain.  In the 
modern political imagination, America was a space removed from the laws of history –
the “land of the future,” as Hegel called it – a space unaffected by the past sedimentations 
of ancient empires.  North America was the frontier of modernity, the site of a future 
political form that would transcend the depredations of the past.
16
  The poet Joel Barlow 
gave voice to this view on the eve of the Constitutional Convention, imagining a world 
anxiously awaiting a new global order:  “Till that new empire, rising in the west / Shall 
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sheathe the sword, the liberal main ascend / And, join'd… the scale of power suspend / 
Bid arts arise, and vengeful factions cease / And commerce lead to universal peace.”17 
 Standing in the way of Franklin’s vision of imperial republicanism were the French 
and Indians who thwarted the expansion of settlers.  To secure his imperial vision, he 
tried to enact his ideas into law and policy in the Albany Plan of 1754, which sought to 
concentrate power in a colonial agency tasked with securing new lands and protecting 
settlers.  The Plan stated that a “union of the colonies is absolutely necessary” for the 
“mutual defense and security” of colonial liberty.  Securing liberty meant eliminating the 
obstacles to settler expansion that were stalling the economic progress afforded by the 
abundance of land.  Significantly presaging the federal structure of the U.S. Constitution, 
the Plan called for Parliament to establish “one general government” under which each 
colony may be subsumed while still maintaining the liberties guaranteed by its present 
constitution.  The plan was ultimately rejected by the Albany Congress, but it was one of 
the first sustained discussions of colonial unity in the colonies and it reflected the salience 
of colonial ideas about the rise of American power in the global order.
18
 
 The failure of the Albany plan proves how difficult it was to cultivate unity among 
the colonies.  While Franklin and others continually sought to argue for the centrality of 
colonial unity, a powerful discourse circulating among imperial administrators also began 
to argue for the strict separation of the colonies and increased centralization in colonial 
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governance.  Foremost among these administrators was Thomas Pownall, the governor of 
the Massachusetts Bay Colony during the Seven Years’ War.  Pownall’s conception of a 
“civil empire” reinforced the image of Britain as an enlightened force for progress in the 
world.  In the modern era, Pownall held that extensive trade relations and relations of 
equality exhibited in the settlement of the Americas were in ascendance over ancient 
empires in which “the power of the sword was the predominant spirit of the world.”  New 
forms of power arising from these global relations would replace relations of war, 
coercion, and force as the primary means of expansion:  “the spirit of commerce will 
become that predominant power.”19  This change in the meaning of empire enabled the 
emergence of new imperial visions in which the brutalities of empire – conquest and 
domination – could be avoided and replaced with freedom, equality, and consent.  
 But Pownall was not hopelessly optimistic about modern progress.  In the wake of the 
Treaty of Paris (1763), he observed a “new crisis forming” in imperial governance.  His 
basic concern was with the question of how to uphold relations of free commerce without 
diminishing British imperial power.  Contrasted with Franklin’s vision of continental 
expansion, Pownall articulated a relatively conventional view of empire based on the 
core-periphery model in which profits and people circulated back and forth between 
metropolis and colony.  What Pownall added to this model, however, is the stipulation 
that while profits were to flow back to the center, the interests and rights of colonists 
must be affirmed.  To preempt colonial revolt, Pownall advised that the colonies should 
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be considered not as “mere appendages of the realm” but as equal though dependent 
partners in the “commercial dominion of Great Britain.”20 
 The organizing concept at the center of Pownall’s program was unity.  He contrasted 
a sense of imperial unity in which the different parts of the empire were united under the 
metropolitan government to colonial unity solely among the colonists, which he thought 
would inflame resistance in the American colonies.  To adjudicate competing claims for 
legislative authority between the colonial assemblies and Parliament, Pownall called for a 
“Line of Demarcation” that separated the spheres of internal and external authority.  His 
originality here was in establishing a middle ground between Tory proponents of 
undivided sovereignty such as William Blackstone and colonists like Franklin who 
argued for a form of divided sovereignty stemming from multiple sources of imperial 
authority.  While the colonies were to retain sovereign authority with respect to internal 
matters, the metropolitan government had absolute sovereignty over all external matters 
of the empire such as war, treaties, and commerce.
21
  Commerce was doubly important 
not simply because it bound the colonies to the metropolis, but also because it kept them 
“disconnected and independent of each other.”  If the colonies were united only by 
commerce, which always flowed through the “common center” of the Empire, they were 
left with “no other principle of intercommunication” than that mediated by Britain.22 
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 If Pownall’s model of empire relied on the dependence of the colonies on the 
metropolitan center, Franklin’s model reflected a federalist conception of empire in 
which the constituent units of empire are not subordinated to a metropolitan center.  One 
also sees this notion of empire at work in the writings of Steven Hopkins, Governor of 
the Rhode Island colony.  Hopkins agreed with Pownall that the external rule of the 
empire superseded the internal rule of the colonies in matters of its proper domain.  But 
he disagreed on what the proper balance of this power should be.  For Hopkins, the 
“supreme and overruling authority” of Parliament does not trump colonial rights and 
sovereignty, which must be equal to those of metropolitan citizens.  An “imperial state” 
such as Great Britain “consists of many separate governments each of which hath 
peculiar privileges,” in which no superior part is entitled to make laws for lesser parts 
without their consent.  Hopkins’ imperial vision dispersed power among multiple centers, 
which maintained the proper balance between imperial authority and colonial liberty.
23
  
In this view, the federalist principle provided a means of constituting an empire that 




 Pownall’s fears and reservations about imperial administration were directly 
prompted by the dilemmas of colonial rule arising from British victory in the War.  
Pownall held settler expansion and self-government to be the “indefeasible and 
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unalterable right” of the colonists.25  After the War, however, Britain began to 
significantly curtail the right of expansion and consequently the right of self-government 
with the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which instituted by royal prerogative an imaginary 
line running down the Appalachians beyond which it was illegal to settle or speculate in 
lands.
26
  In spite of the rise of ideas about free commerce, the Proclamation operated on 
mercantilist logics of containment motivated by several concerns such as the desire of 
imperial administrators to retain exclusive control of western trade routes and the 
imperatives of re-imposing order on the frontier after the war.  Due to mounting 
indigenous resistance led by an Ottawa leader named Pontiac in 1763, limiting western 
lands to the near-exclusive use of indigenous tribes and tightly regulated trade was a 
more feasible policy than outright expansion, which faced forceful native resistance.
27
 
 British policy violated settler conceptions of liberty in several ways.  By reserving 
western lands for indigenous tribes, the line effectively wrote indigenous land rights into 
law by executive fiat, rejecting the primary ideological basis of settler conquest.  Because 
colonists perceived Indians as mostly wandering tribes, the Proclamation squandered the 
virgin land of the New World and defied the Lockean “common sense” that upheld the 
natural right of Anglo-colonists to add their labor to uncultivated “waste land.”  The 
policy also clashed with settler notions of freedom of exchange and social equality.  The 
mercantilist control of western trade routes required heavily garrisoned forts along the 
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frontier.  To fund colonial defense, British officials implemented a stamp tax that 
required all colonists to fund colonial security.
28
  The policy maddened colonists whose 
notions of liberty upheld the dream of property holding and the escape from feudal 
society.  In their own minds, they were being forced to pay for the restriction of their own 
freedom without their consent, and absent cheap land their own confinement to a lower 
social rank.  Modern liberty in the American context thus had an expansionist tendency 
that embraced the spatial mobility of settlers as a necessary correlate of social mobility. 
 Colonial opposition to British containment was marked by the simultaneity of liberal 
and republican conceptions of liberty.  The liberal facet of colonial opposition comes into 
direct view in consideration of the Quebec Act of 1774, one of the British policies that 
colonists referred to as the “Intolerable Acts,” which put further limits on settler 
expansion by incorporating the territory north of the Ohio River as part of the Quebec 
Province.  The Act not only further thwarted the viability of settler land claims it also 
instituted a government ruled entirely by royal prerogative and the laws of Catholic 
religion.  Doubly violating the deep links colonists drew between empire and liberty, in 
the eyes of English colonials the Act aligned the ethos of Catholic absolutism with 
discretionary limits on territorial and commercial expansion.
29
 
 In response, the First Continental Congress passed the “Declaration of Rights and 
Grievances” condemning the act.  The Declaration evinced an abiding concern for the 
active and positive liberty of popular self-rule, the “right of the people to participate in 
their legislative council.”  Participation was closely linked to a “right of representation” 
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in colonial assemblies that had full sovereignty over all matters of “internal polity.”  In 
arguing that Britain was “restrained to the regulation of our external commerce,” the 
Declaration implied that issues of expansion and commerce within North America were 
matters of internal government and could not be regulated without consent of the 
governed.  The Quebec Act thus violated the republican liberty of free and active 
citizenship and reinforced the artificial restraints imposed on the liberal freedom of 
commercial exchange and spatial mobility set in place by the Proclamation.
30
 
 At the center of these debates about the relationship between imperial sovereignty 
(imperium) and colonial liberty (libertas) was the question of “how a colony is 
constituted,” as one Tory loyalist put it.31  That is, how a colony is peopled, planted, and 
maintained matters for understanding the balance between metropolitan authority and 
colonial rights.  In engaging these questions, settlers connected their arguments for 
colonial self-rule to frameworks of settler colonialism through two key arguments.  First, 
in transplanting themselves from England to America, they argued that they carried their 
rights and sovereignty with them.  Central here was the idea of the common law, which 
settlers used to justify their claims that migration had not undermined their inherent rights 
as Englishmen.  Settlers viewed English rights as derivative of England’s ancient 
constitution and a birthright that they were entitled to regardless of their place of 
residency.  Second, colonists articulated a “labor theory of empire,” in which the energy 
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expended in settling America guaranteed not just a right to property but also political 
rights on par with those subjects who remained in England.
32
 
 Perhaps the most forceful of these arguments came from Richard Bland, a member of 
the Virginia House of Burgess and delegate to the First Continental Congress.  Against 
visions of empire united by the royal prerogative, Bland developed a federal vision of 
empire that reserved for the colonies a zone of internal autonomy not subject to royal 
prerogative.  For Bland, this internal autonomy of the colonies stemmed from the fact that 
the inherent rights of colonists could not be abrogated or alienated merely by crossing the 
Atlantic.
33
  Moreover, in the debate about the proper balance between “internal polity” 
and “external polity,” Bland argued that internal principles of government must be 
consistent with external practices of empire-building, ruling out the method of conquest 
as a just means of constituting colonies.  He then employed this idea in a sustained 
defense of colonial rights against the royal prerogative.
34
 
 Bland elaborated his argument through a critique of Sir Edward Coke’s opinion in 
Calvin’s Case (1608), which asserted the royal prerogative in territories acquired by the 
conquest of infidels.  Coke’s justification of the right of conquest drew a distinction 
between aliens and subject born people, the latter of which were entitled to the rights 
guaranteed under the English constitution.  Within the category of “alien born,” Coke 
then distinguished between “friendly aliens” and “alien enemies.”  He deemed that all 
non-Christian “infidels,” lacking the “law of God and nature,” are “perpetual enemies” 
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with whom there can be no peace.  As a consequence, all territories acquired through 
infidel conquest are necessarily subject to the king’s prerogative.  Coke’s judgment 
entailed that the very act of conquest eliminated the legal primacy of native laws and 
customs, giving the king free range to alter the laws of the conquered territory.  As a 
result, both colonists and natives were equally subject to the king’s arbitrary power.35 
Due to the migration of Englishmen across the Atlantic, Bland contested that the 
colonies were founded on the rights and liberties of the English constitution, and that any 
colony so founded is inconsistent with the right of conquest.  In making this claim, Bland 
demolished the defense of the royal prerogative by Tory jurists like Blackstone, Coke, 
and Bacon.  Just as Coke likened “savage aborigines” to English settlers, Bland 
ingeniously asserted indigenous rights in service of a defense of colonial liberties.  
Francis Bacon agreed with Coke that “A country gained by conquest hath no right to be 
governed by English laws,” barring the colonies from rights of self-government by virtue 
of the conquest of Indians.  But Bland flipped this assertion on its head by positing that 
since Virginia has historically been governed by a royal charter consistent with the 
principles of the English constitution, the colonies cannot have been objects of conquest.  
Obscuring the colonial violence inherent in English settlement, Bland buttressed this 
contention with the observation that natives “were never fully conquered” but instead 
occupied their land according to terms set by treaties of mutual consent.  By virtue of 
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peaceful settlement, Indians “now possess their native laws and customs” with the same 
right as they did prior to colonization.
36
  If native tribes were not conquered nations, the 
defense of the royal prerogative offered by Coke, Bacon, and Blackstone was void.
37
 
 Thomas Jefferson significantly expanded on Bland’s defense of colonial liberty in A 
Summary View of the Rights of British America (1774), which argued that the imposition 
of Norman feudal law in England and America had corrupted the Anglo-Saxon rights and 
liberties enshrined in the English constitution.  In Jefferson’s view, feudal property law 
was virtually unknown in the early Saxon settlement of England:  “Our Saxon ancestors 
held their lands, as they did their personal property, in absolute dominion, disencumbered 
with any superior.”  Under the Norman Conquest, William the Conqueror and the 
Norman lawyers imposed feudal land tenure on England by articulating a right of 
conquest which subjected all land to the absolute dominion of the Crown.
38
  
 Through an imaginative historical revision, Jefferson placed the mythology of the 
Norman Yoke in service of colonists’ claims for political rights against royal 
prerogative.
39
  The Anglo colonists were much like the Saxons, Jefferson wrote, who 
“left their native wilds in Northern Europe” to settle England under the auspices of the 
“universal law” of liberty.  He posited that American territory is subject to the customary 
laws of the Anglo-Saxons instituted before the Norman Conquest rather than feudal 
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  Jefferson’s indication of the error in the nature of British land holdings and the 
King’s failure to correct this error clearly echoed Franklin’s Observations.  The 
imposition of feudal land title in the colonies thwarted the settlement of new land and 
therefore checked the growth of the colonial population and economy.
41
  Jefferson thus 
asserted the primacy of individual property rights and free commercial exchange in 
opposition to the Crown’s dominion as essential to the growth of the colonial economy. 
 Perhaps more than Bland, Jefferson formulated a labor theory of empire as a means of 
opposing the royal prerogative alongside the assertion that English settlers retained their 
rights and sovereignty in settling the New World.  According to Jefferson, “America was 
conquered, and her settlements made, and firmly established, at the expense of 
individuals, and not of the British public. Their own blood was spilt in acquiring lands for 
their settlement, their own fortunes expended in making that settlement effectual; for 
themselves they fought, for themselves they conquered, and for themselves alone they 
have right to hold.”42  Like Lockean views of property, Jefferson also defended colonial 
property rights against feudal land title by highlighting the work and risk that settlers 
undertook to colonize new land.   
 As shown by these political tracts, British colonists claimed the rights of self-
government not in opposition to empire, but rather as citizens of the British Empire.  The 
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Imperial Crisis was in a basic sense, then, a disagreement over the “terms of empire.”43  
Consistent with federal visions of empire, the basis of the colonial challenge to British 
rule was that the colonies of the empire should have an equal part in parliamentary rule.  
Rejecting their status as dependent subjects, colonists claimed the rights of republican 
liberty and self-rule as imperial citizens.  As such, they did not reject the legitimacy of 
empire as a political form, but rather saw it as consistent with prevailing notions of 
commercial society, republican liberty, and popular consent.  Read in this light, the 
Revolution did not simply break the cords that bound colony to metropolis, leading to a 
new kind of anti-imperial republic.  It represented the birth of what Washington called an 
“infant empire” that would step onto the world stage to challenge its parentage for the 
seat of global rule.
44
  This new conception of empire acutely manifested itself in Thomas 
Paine’s Common Sense, which envisioned a new republic that expanded its power on the 
sole basis of popular sovereignty independent of monarchical authority. 
 Paine saw the formation of a “continental union” founded solely on republican 
authority as a cause of world-historical importance.  Like the British Empire before it, the 
rising American empire presented itself as a driving force of the global diffusion of 
liberty and equality.  As the seat of global empire was transferring to America, Paine 
thought that Britain was declining into despotism, instability, and corruption.  Rather than 
an enlightened empire, the British Empire was, like Rome, crumbling into the ruins of an 
ancien régime soon to be swept away by the winds of progress.  Unlike the Roman 
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Empire, which was founded on “plunder and rapine,” Paine asserted that America “needs 
never be ashamed to tell her birth, nor relate the stages by which she rose to empire.”45 
 The primary institutional form of the new imperial republic, for many in Paine’s 
intellectual circle, was federal in nature and operated over a great extent of territory 
through the representative principle.  Richard Price, the dissident British thinker and 
champion of the Revolution, gave substance to his younger mentee’s vision of an 
expansionist republic by drawing a distinction between an “empire of freemen” and an 
“empire of slaves.”  An “empire of freemen,” for Price, was a collection of states “united 
by compacts, or alliances, or subjection to a Great Council, representing the whole.”  An 
“empire of slaves,” in contrast, is a confederation in which “one of the states is free, but 
governs by its will all the other states.”  Like Paine, Price postulated that the spatial 
extension of republican principles would integrate “the scattered force and abilities of a 
whole continent” into a common power.  However, if the British Empire’s decline into 
despotism stemmed from its attempt to rule an extensive territory by imposing the status 
of dependency on its colonies, the American empire instituted equality among the 
constituent parts of the empire.
46
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 If the terms of empire were truly the pivot on which the drama of the Imperial Crisis 
turned, then it is essential to locate Paine’s call for independence in that context.  By 
severing the bonds between Crown and subject, Paine’s call for independence entailed 
that the people rather than the monarch be the sole wielder of imperial power.  Prior to 
the Revolution, the territorial logic of imperium was closely tied to an imperator – a 
prince, monarch, or emperor who wielded territorial sovereignty.  For Paine, however, 
imperial sovereignty inhered not in the monarchical state but was invested solely in 
popular sovereignty.  As Paine was keen to point out, the authority of the people was the 
“original fountain of power” of any government.  Alexander Hamilton nicely distilled 
Paine’s imperial vision:  “The fabric of the American empire ought to rest on the solid 
basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE.”  In this framework, settlers themselves – 
organized under the tutelage of a federal-imperial state – rather than the Crown became 
the primary agents of territorial expansion.
47
  By transferring imperium from the 
monarchy to the people, Paine’s call for independence aligned imperial sovereignty with 
popular sovereignty, both of which were grounded in the consent of settler society. 
The Federal State as Imperial State 
In certain variants of eighteenth century republicanism, liberty and empire could 
coexist, if at all, only uneasily.  Edward Gibbon, for example, attributed one of the 
primary causes of Roman decline to the avarice of the nobles and the relentless pursuit of 
private gain through conquest and expansion.  As private interest predominated over civic 
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virtue, “public freedom” was lost in proportion to the “extent of conquest.”48  One of 
Paine’s main contributions to republican ideology was to reverse this supposition by 
conceiving of empire not in terms of corruption and the private pursuit of wealth and 
glory but as an essential feature of a stable republic.  In this conception of imperial 
sovereignty, the territory of empire was the dominion of the governed rather than the 
exclusive domain of the monarch or aristocracy.  True to the spirit of the commonwealth 
vision it spawned from, Paine’s republicanism promoted territorial and economic 
expansion in pursuit of the public good. 
With the end of the war in sight and British hold weakening over western territory, 
the thorny question arose of whether Virginia’s title to the Ohio River Valley granted by 
its royal charter should be respected or if the land should be brought under the authority 
of the Continental Congress.  Paine’s pamphlet, Public Good:  An Examination into the 
Claims of Virginia to the Vacant Western Territory (1780), sought to answer this question 
by arguing that the subjection western territory to the authority of the confederation 
government was necessary for the common economic prosperity of the new nation.  
Directly referring to his position in Common Sense, Paine stated that the Northwest 
Territory should be a “national fund for the benefit of all” rather than a source of private 
profits.  At once upholding popular rights to the land and erasing indigenous sovereignty, 
the “vacant western territory of America” was the “common right of all.”  Paine was hard 
pressed to illuminate the precise nature of this “common right” and defend it against the 
partial claims of the land companies.  In doing so, he held that all rights to territory by 
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“conquest, power, or violence” are “founded in wrong.”49  The idea that America lacked 
an indigenous presence crucially supported Paine’s claim that the right of the people to 
the land was founded in justice.  In this manner, the territorial claims of the common 
people to western territory were premised on the disavowal of indigenous land rights. 
Paine’s arguments drew the ire of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, who sought 
to retain the title of the Virginia-based Ohio Company.  He also faced public humiliation 
when it was revealed that he owned three hundred shares in the Indiana Company, a 
competing land speculation corporation.  “By locating sovereignty in the federal 
government, directly representing the people, Paine ensured that the Congress, and not 
Virginia or any other state, had jurisdiction over the western lands, thereby vindicating 
the claim of the Indiana Company.”  In other words, if the Revolution initiated the 
transfer of imperial sovereignty from the Crown to “the people” (institutionalized in the 
national Congress), then it also entails the transfer of territorial sovereignty and thus 
absolute title to western land to “the people” as well.  In spite of the clear self-interest at 
work, Paine’s views on the Northwest Territory laid the ideological foundation of the 
U.S. expansionism.
50
  Less than ten years later, Madison reversed his position and stated 
that the west was a “national stock” of wealth that was essential to the economic 
prosperity, national security, and public welfare of the new nation.
51
 
One of the first steps in casting the western territories as part of a national domain 
occurred in 1784 when Congress accepted Virginia’s cession of the Northwest Territory.  
                                                 
49
 Paine, “The Public Good,” Writings, Vol. II, pp. 34-35, 61. 
50
 Tully, Strange Multiplicity:  Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge University Press, 
1995), p. 92.  John Keane, Tom Paine:  A Political Life (Grove Press, 2003), pp. 220-221. 
51
 Madison, “Federalist #38,” in The Federalist Papers (Penguin, 1987), p. 253. 
 71 
 
At this point, Jefferson also reversed his original criticism of Paine and crafted the first of 
a series of land ordinances that provided the U.S. government with a framework of 
imperial government capable of pursuing an expansionist project.  Jefferson’s first land 
ordinance outlined the process by which the territories of the northwest should become 
self-governing, republican states.  When their population reached 20,000, territories 
obtained the right to petition Congress to establish permanent constitutions and become 
part of the Union.  In the ordinance, Jefferson established an integral institutional and 
ideological feature of the early American republic.  Drawing on colonial conceptions of 
empire, Jefferson held that new states should not be subordinated to despotic rule from an 
imperial center as dependent parts of empire, but should enter the union on an “equal 
footing” with the original states.52  That Jefferson considered the land ordinances a 
program of colonization is evident enough in his assertion that “[o]ur confederacy must 
be viewed as the nest, from which all America, North and South, is to be peopled.”53  
Fixing his gaze on both the colonization of the Mississippi valley and South America, 
Jefferson envisioned the land ordinances as means of transplanting republican 
communities to distant territories.  By granting rights and liberties to new states 
commensurate with existing states, the risk of separation and independence and thus 
imperial disintegration would be minimized. 
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In June of 1787 Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance, which replaced though 
retained the spirit of Jefferson’s previous ordinance.  More than any other law of the 
time, the Northwest Ordinance laid the basic framework of American empire in the 
nineteenth century.  By integrating new states into the union on an “equal footing,” the 
Ordinance institutionalized a framework of imperial federalism that rejected the model of 
the British Empire and instead incorporated new territories into federal sovereignty as 
free and equal states rather than as dependent entities.
54
   The Ordinance “established an 
empire capable of indefinite expansion because it was conceived as a league of self-
governing republics, immune to the possibility of despotic rule from the center because… 
it was ultimately a voluntary association”55  The relations binding the constituent units of 
empire were not mediated by the circulation of commerce through the metropolis, but 
were characterized by decentralized networks of market relations.  Republican 
conceptions of liberty dictated that territorial expansion should serve the common good 
and not the interests of a ruling elite or a powerful imperial center. 
In key respects, settler colonialism was implicit in the institutional framework of the 
Ordinance.  What fundamentally characterizes settler colonialism is how the constituent 
power of settlers to establish law and sovereignty becomes the organizing feature of 
colonial expansion.  Article V of the Ordinance expressly captures this feature of settler 
colonialism in giving the settlers of the Northwest Territory the “liberty to form a 
permanent constitution and State government.”  More significantly, the Ordinance 
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mandated that these new self-constituted communities be organized as “republican” 
states, codifying a direct relationship between colonization and self-government in the 
law.  As such, the Ordinance provided a framework for the colonial replication of 
republican polities.  The Ordinance, however, does not allow settler communities to 
remain separate and independent from the federal government.  Rather, it provides for the 
incorporation of settler colonies into a larger territorial empire on terms of consent and 
equality with other states.  By unilaterally imposing the “principles of civil and religious 
liberty” on the organization of settler colonies, the Ordinance sought to preempt the threat 
of separation and independence.  The Ordinance thus wrote the sovereignty of settler 
communities into the law by allowing for the transfer of the metropolitan status of 
colonists from the Eastern seaboard to the trans-Appalachian west.  In doing so, it 
enabled settlers who emigrated to retain their standing in the civic community.
56
 
Reflecting back on the tumult of the 1770’s, James Madison explicitly articulated the 
federal conception of empire as the driving force of independence:  “The fundamental 
principle of the Revolution was that the Colonies were coordinate members with each 
other and with Great Britain, of an empire united by a common executive sovereign, but 
not united by any common legislative sovereign.”57  While the Constitution significantly 
diverted from such a formula in having both a common legislative and executive 
sovereign, what is important is the way equality among the “coordinate members” of an 
extended polity is taken as a defining feature of a new vision of empire.  The language of 
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empire here significantly reflects that of federalism.  In both, the vigor of a powerful 
executive capable of directing territorial and economic expansion co-exists alongside 
principles of popular sovereignty, equality, and liberty at the state and local level.  Insofar 
as the constituent units of empire were co-equal and held checks over the executive 
sovereign, Madison heralded a new conception of empire that rejected relations of 
colonial dependence as the organizing feature of an extended polity.  Rather than an 
“alternative to empire,”58 American federalism represented a way of organizing and 
constituting a settler-colonial empire on the basis of popular sovereignty. 
The equality among states in this federal conception of empire mirrored the equality 
among citizens.  With this conception of “federal liberty,” the process by which 
individuals relinquish some of their “natural liberty” before government in order to 
ensure just and equal protection by the laws parallels the process by which states resign 
some of their internal sovereignty for the sake of the common defense of individual 
liberty.  Just as each individual citizen is granted juridical equality and the equal rights of 
citizenship, each state is given federal equality before the national government.
59
  Both of 
these notions, however, were based on forms of exclusion and hierarchy that provided the 
material basis of the imperial republic:  the expropriation of indigenous land and the 
expansion of slave labor. 
Upon a cursory glance, the legacy of the Ordinance with regard to slavery appears 
unambiguous.  The sixth and last article of the law explicitly prohibited involuntary 
servitude in the Northwest Territory.  But as legal historian Paul Finkelman has argued, 
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the law was inherently ambivalent regarding slavery.  While it formally prohibited 
slavery in the new territories, it actually strengthened its presence in the nation.  In 
addition to providing for the return of fugitive slaves to their owners, the Ordinance 
tacitly carved out the territories south of the Ohio River for the expansion of slave 
labor.
60
  Even under the Continental Congress slavery was a vexed issue for the new 
republic.  In 1784 Congress was one vote away from passing a version of the original 
land ordinance, written and introduced by Jefferson, which prohibited slavery in all 
territories of the trans-Appalachian west after the year 1800.
61
 
In this political context, the prohibition of slave labor in the Northwest Territory 
signaled that slavery south of the Ohio River was permissible.  One year after President 
Washington signed the law into effect under the authority of the new constitution, 
Congress passed the Southwest Ordinance in 1790, which organized the territories south 
of the Ohio River under the same framework as the 1787 law, only lacking the 
prohibition of slavery.
62
  Far from being an abolitionist document, the Ordinance 
implicitly allowed the expansion of slavery within certain limits.  Perhaps more than the 
Constitution itself, the Northwest Ordinance generated the central contradiction between 
an empire of slavery and an empire of liberty at the center of nineteenth century political 
culture.  In order to uphold its promises of federal and juridical equality, the Ordinance 
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institutionalized two different processes of expansion in a single national framework:  the 
expansion of free territories and of plantation society. 
 Like the issue of slavery, the position of Indian tribes in the framework of federal 
empire was also fraught with ambiguity.  Taken at face-value, the Ordinance appears to 
extend the principles of federal equality to the state governments as well as to the Indian 
tribes occupying the western territories.  Affirming the views of Jefferson and Bland, the 
law stipulated that Indian lands shall not be taken “without their consent” and that their 
“property, rights and liberty” shall not be infringed upon except in cases of just war.63  
Reflecting a democratic imperial imaginary, expansionists held that, to maintain its 
legitimacy, the external policies of expansion must reflect the principles of consent.  To 
achieve this end, Henry Knox, Secretary of War under President Washington, sought to 
formulate a “liberal system of justice” regarding Indian tribes.64 
 In response to the mounting disorder of the frontier – a Hobbesian state of nature in 
which the greed and avarice of white settlers ruled the day – Knox articulated two 
different courses of action in an effort to instill law and order:  a policy of conquest, 
which involved the extermination of hostile tribes by physical force; and a policy of 
purchase and treaty that upheld the consent of Indians in new territorial acquisitions.  
Knox was experienced in Indian affairs and recognized the difficulties of executing 
military action in the west.  In place of military power, he sought the protection of 
Indians from white settlers by designating the federal government as the sole authority in 
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the negotiation of treaties and purchases of land.  In a 1789 report to Congress, he clearly 
echoed the Ordinance, “The Indians being the prior occupants possess the right of the 
soil.  It cannot be taken from them unless by their free consent.”  He thus eschewed the 
Lockean principle that uncultivated land constitutes a violation of natural law and 
warrants colonial settlement.  Instead, he asserted the rights of Indians to their lands and 
viewed policies of consent as consistent with the “laws of nature.”65 
 Echoing Bland’s stipulation that imperial policies must be consistent with internal 
principles of self-rule, Knox similarly asserted the rights of Indians as a correlate of 
American liberty.  Knox clearly understood what was at stake in founding the nation on 
conquest, and his Indian policy took was premised on notions of U.S. empire as a 
civilizing force that eschewed conquest for the sake of expansion through commerce and 
consent in an effort to put the new nation on a solid base of legitimacy and forestall 
corruption and decline.  Rejecting the “language of superiority and command,” Knox 
held that it was “politic and just to treat the Indians more on a footing of equality” and to 
“convince them of the justice and humanity was well as the power of the United 
States.”66  He advised Congress that a policy aimed at influencing the tribes through the 
“benefits of civilized life” will “reflect permanent honor on the national character,” 
which will add to the legitimacy of American claims on western territory against the 
Spanish and British empires.  Citing its brutalities in Mexico and Peru, Knox warned that 
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a policy of conquest would put the U.S. on the same level as Spain, ultimately leading to 
its decline.  If a peaceful policy of assimilation was not adopted, a “black cloud of 
injustice and inhumanity will impend over our national character.”67  Dispossession by 
conquest, Knox feared, would call into question the enlightened foundations of the new 
republic and subvert its status as a rising world power. 
 Nevertheless, embedded in this ostensibly liberal mode of empire was program of 
assimilation and deculturation.  By giving up their land through peaceful means, 
indigenous peoples would be more disposed to acculturate to the expanding settler culture 
through the adoption of private property and republican citizenship.  Knox and 
Washington thought the tribes would relinquish their sovereignty to the federal 
government in exchange for the “gift” of modern civilization.  Both men rooted their 
views on Indian affairs in the idea that the new American republic was the herald of 
modern civilization, and that the incorporation of the Indians into Anglo-American 
civilization was part of the progressive movement of modernity.  This mode of 
assimilation engendered profound degrees of violence and was grounded in a firm belief 
in the superiority of American culture.  It is thus a mistake to assume that the benevolent 
policy of expansion was motivated by a belief in the equality of indigenous cultures.  The 
stance Knox and Washington took toward Indians embraced the destruction of their 
customary modes of polity and property so as to transfer indigenous land to U.S. rule.
68
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 In spite of the supposition of indigenous-settler equality at the center of the Northwest 
Ordinance, the logic of native elimination crucially defined the framework of federalist 
expansion.  Clearly evidenced in one of Washington’s personal letters toward the close of 
the war with Britain, Knox’s liberal system of justice forcefully enacted the erasure of 
indigenous cultures and land claims.  Washington writes, “policy and economy point very 
strongly to the expediency of being upon good terms with the Indians, and the propriety 
of purchasing their Lands in preference to attempting to drive them by force of arms out 
of their Country; which as we have already experienced is like driving the Wild Beasts of 
the Forest which will return as soon as the pursuit is at an end and fall perhaps on those 
that are left there; when the gradual extension of our Settlements will as certainly cause 
the Savage as the Wolf to retire; both being beasts of prey tho’ they differ in shape.”69  In 
addition to relying on de-humanizing tropes, Washington’s letter here illustrates how the 
principles of purchase, treaty, and consent in early U.S. Indian policy were explicitly 
focused on eliminating the indigenous presence in the Northwest Territory. 
 At the same time that Knox and Washington’s liberal system of justice sought to 
build a model of U.S.-indigenous relations that was premised on consent, contractual 
thinking retroactively authorized the prior modes of conquest that went into constructing 
the present configuration of power in North America.  The disavowal of conquest as a 
constitutive force in the making of the early American republic is forcefully evidenced in 
Washington’s call for moderation and diplomacy in dealing with indigenous tribes.  In his 
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attempt to make consent the overriding principle of U.S.-indigenous relations, he asked 
Indians to “draw a veil over what is past.”70  As if to provide ammunition for 
contemporary criticisms of contractual thinking, Washington illustrated that the 
consensual principles at work in the treaty and purchase system in fact prevented Indians 
from making claims on U.S. sovereignty on the basis of past injustices.  That is, the 
objective of the liberal system of justice was to close off the possibility of indigenous 
contestation of settler land claims by erasing the coercive realities of conquest. 
Conclusion 
In ideology if not in practice, early U.S. expansionists rejected conquest as a 
legitimate basis for a new political order.  Because they symbolically embodied the 
violence and instability of the frontier, settlers occupied an ambiguous role in federalist 
ideology.  Insofar as figures like Knox and Washington saw settler sovereignty as a 
source of conquest and violence, the democratic sovereignty of settlers was largely 
antithetical to federalist visions of empire.  This anxiety about the role of conquest in the 
founding of a new order stemmed from classical republican concerns about stability, 
corruption, and historical decline.  In light of this anxiety, U.S. imperial ideology gave 
primacy to means of territorial acquisition like purchase and treaty that reflected the 
prevailing ideology of consent and commerce.  In order to affirm the image of an 
enlightened empire in opposition to the Spanish and British empires, U.S. expansionists 
rebuked coercive means of land appropriation through conquest. 
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The Northwest Ordinance provided a useful framework for the expansion of the 
federal-imperial state by encouraging settlers to move west and establish new political 
orders in an ordered and regulated fashion.  One of the effects of the Northwest 
Ordinance was to defuse settler demands for independence and separation from the 
Confederation government by granting settlers rights and liberties equal with eastern 
states.  The possibility of settler independence was forcefully posed to Federalists not 
only by the settler revolts and frontier conflicts such as Shay’s rebellion, but also in the 
movement of settler communities to found new, independent states on the frontier.  For 
instance, when settlers seceded from North Carolina to form the State of Franklin in 
1788, they immediately engaged in diplomatic negotiations with Spanish officials 
concerning a possible alliance, threatening the imperial sovereignty of the federal state 
over western territory.
71
  “[I]f Jefferson’s plan for the West was indeed a pre-emptive 
move designed to defuse the issue of settler independence, his articulation explicitly 
recognized that the settlers carried a foundational sovereign entitlement.”72  Just as the 
Constitution was a means of containing democratic excess in the state legislatures, the 
Northwest Ordinance offered a cure for the democratic excess of localized, settler 
sovereignty on the frontier.
73
  Indeed, the two together sought to institutionalize and 
regulate settler colonization, instituting a powerful formula for an expanding empire.  The 
Northwest Ordinance offered a new world conception of empire in which new territories 
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would be governed not as colonial dependencies but as free and equal states. The 
“principle of federative replication” institutionalized in the Northwest Ordinance 
provided a mode of expansion that occurs through the re-production of democratic-
republican polities across space.
74
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Democracy, Empire, and the American Founding 
 
“Moreover, there have been states so constituted that the necessity for conquests entered into their very 
constitution, and that, to maintain themselves, they were forced to expand endlessly.”  Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, The Social Contract; Bk. II, Ch. IX. 
 
 Although it has faced intense criticism, the “neo-republican synthesis” remains an 
influential interpretive framework of the American founding.
1
  A central assumption of 
neo-republican thought is that the American republic rests on anti-imperial foundations.  
For instance, in Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt posited that because 
republican government is founded on the doctrine of “genuine consent” its authority 
cannot be “stretched indefinitely” without negating the principles of its foundation.  
While Arendt limits her assertions to European political development, they have 
undoubtedly colored her reflections on the American founding.  For Arendt, the genius of 
the “revolutionary tradition” in the U.S. was in founding a permanent political order 
based on popular sovereignty, which provided legal stability in the absence of traditional 
forms of authority.  Extending republican rule beyond its limits, however, spurs an “inner 
contradiction between the nation’s body politic and conquest” by eroding the permanence 
and durability of political institutions that, left unto themselves, “develop stabilizing 
forces which stand in the way of constant transformation and expansion.”2   
 Arendt’s skepticism concerning the compatibility of empire and republic echoes 
J.G.A. Pocock’s notion of the “Machiavellian moment,” in which the modern world of 
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commerce, conquest, and empire posed a set of unique dilemmas to the republican 
project of establishing a durable political order.  As a response to the condition of 
temporal finitude, classical republicans envisioned a citizenry characterized by landed 
independence and civic virtue as the surest means of guaranteeing political stability.  
Because empire engendered corruption – the obverse of virtue and independence – it was 
thought to be antithetical to republican citizenship and stability. 
 Operating within this logic, Arendt emphasizes that one of the reason the American 
founders rejected the principles of democracy was because the direct “rule of the people” 
could not provide for the stability and durability of republican and representative 
institutions.  In Arendt’s mind, democracies rise and fall, and the genius of the founders – 
who were driven by the desire to create an “Eternal City on earth” – was that they were 
able to reconcile factional strife by constructing “lasting institution[s]” based on 
republican principles.
3
  Implicit in Arendt’s affirmation of neo-republican accounts of the 
American Revolution is the idea that the founding generation privileged republican over 
democratic idioms of politics because the latter were inadequate to the temporal 
imperatives of governing an extended republic. 
If Arendt emphasizes the impracticality of democracy for republican rule from the 
temporal perspective of institutional durability, Gordon Wood notes that the American 
founders positioned the language of “republic” over “democracy” because the latter was 
inadequate to the spatial imperatives of governing an extended polity.  In this perspective, 
American constitutionalists opted for federal and representative principles that ensured 
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citizens could remain free without popular participation or the direct exercise of power at 
the national level.
4
  Governing through representative rather than participatory 
institutions at the national level would facilitate the effective administration of popular 
government over a vast territory. 
Against the backdrop of these conventional accounts, this chapter draws on the 
framework of settler colonialism to recast the relationship between democracy and 
empire in the constitutional debates of the American founding.  By the time of the 
Constitutional Convention, it was clear that Federalist visions of empire necessitated the 
consolidation of state power in order to provide for the defense of individual liberty, 
maintain national security and domestic stability, promote economic growth, and direct 
territorial expansion.  Indeed, as Gareth Stedman Jones has argued, “The [U.S.] was… 
already structurally an imperialist state at the moment of its foundation.”5  Nevertheless, 
the question of empire was the source of much contention during the constitutional 
debates between Federalists and Anti-Federalists.   
During the first years of the republic, democratic notions of popular sovereignty 
cultivated in settler communities lead to intense frontier rebellions that posed a threat to 
national stability.  In response, Federalists argued for a consolidated imperial state that 
would guarantee not only political and economic stability but also continued wealth and 
prosperity through territorial and economic expansion.  Far from the direct agents of 
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empire, “citizen-settlers” posed serious obstacles to the realization of Federalist visions of 
empire in the west.  “Years of experience had shown [that settlers] could be fiercely 
independent, intent on defending their economic interests and their notions of local 
identity, often in direct defiance of external authority.”6  Because they associated 
democracy with provincial conceptions of popular sovereignty embodied in settler 
institutions, Federalists opted for republican principles in constructing the U.S. imperial 
state.  In other words, Federalists privileged republican over democratic idioms of power 
because the latter were inconsistent with ingrained conceptions of empire. 
Conversely, Anti-Federalists drew on democratic notions of popular sovereignty in 
order to privilege the local authority of the state and local assemblies against the 
encroaching power of the national state.  For Anti-Federalists, democratic self-rule was 
necessarily incompatible with the consolidated national powers required for realizing 
Federalist visions of empire.  Although Anti-Federalists were not necessarily opposed to 
settler expansion, they were skeptical that it could proceed through a unified, national 
framework without sacrificing public liberty and popular sovereignty.  Thus, like the 
debates between imperial officials and settlers during the Imperial Crisis, the 
constitutional debates can also be understood as an ideological conflict over the terms of 
empire.  At the time of the founding, democracy and empire were considered antithetical 
by Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike. 
Upon Jefferson’s election to the Presidency in 1800, however, democratic ideas 
assumed a central role in imperial ideology.  The chapter then narrates the process by 
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which Jefferson fused democracy with imperial rule, best exemplified by the phrase 
“empire of liberty,” which envisioned a process of expansion through the democratic 
force of popular sovereignty rather than the power of a consolidated state. 
 In elaborating this narrative, this chapter makes three theoretical points.  First, it seeks 
to further lay the foundation for the ensuring analysis by conceptually mapping the 
relationship between democracy and empire in early American political culture.  For 
many involved in the constitutional debates and beyond, democracy represented the 
primacy of settler sovereignty, which threatened the stability and durability of republican 
order, thus undercutting rather than reinforcing imperial sovereignty.  In the 
constitutional debates, democracy was considered incompatible with empire largely 
because it was seen as incommensurate with a strong and centralized state that Federalists 
deemed necessary to direct and promote territorial and economic expansion.  Insofar as 
political stability and economic prosperity rested on imperial expansion, democracy ran 
counter to the project of building a stable though expansive republic. 
Second, to the extent that democracy emerged as a salient feature of U.S. political 
culture after the 1800 election, it emerged from within the discursive horizon and 
material conditions of settler expansion.  For many constitutionalists, settlers were at 
once the bane and the bedrock of the federal republic.  It was Jefferson (along with the 
Democratic-Republican societies) that first linked settler visions of democratic 
participation with imperial visions of economic and territorial expansion.  As democracy 
became a more prominent feature of American identity, settlers became the vanguard of 
American expansion, which further obscured the role of state power.  As a result, 
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Americans located popular sovereignty less in the power of the state than in the 
democratic spirit of the people.  At the same time, popular sovereignty and imperial 
sovereignty became closely aligned, with the demos rather than the state acting as the 
primary agent of expansion.  In the process, the very meaning of democracy underwent a 
dramatic transformation.  No longer constricted to the time and space of the Greek polis, 
democracy became expansive and progressive in its spatial and temporal connotations. 
Third, this chapter highlights the central role of conquest in the construction of 
American political culture.  In spite of their ideological attempts to cast the federal 
republic as a new form of empire that expanded through commerce and culture rather 
than force and coercion, conquest and constitutionalism were locked in a dialectical 
relationship.  I define conquest as a form of foundational violence in which the 
obliteration of old cultures, customs, and identities makes way for the consolidation of a 
new political order.  Indeed, conquest is a necessary element of settler colonialism in the 
American grain.  In this modality of empire, the foundation of a new political order 
necessitates the eradication of an old order that precedes it.  What stands out in need of 
historical interpretation is an account of how democratic notions of popular sovereignty 
acquired their meaning in relation to processes of settler colonialism, conquest, and 
native elimination. 
Democracy and Empire in Constitutional Debates 
If there is a single document that lays out the institutional architecture of U.S. 
imperialism, it was the Northwest Ordinance as much as the Constitution itself.  The 
Northwest Ordinance was one of the few laws of the Confederation government retained 
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by the 1787 settlement, and it established the institutional logic by which the Constitution 
itself would become a powerful instrument of empire in the modern world.  One of the 
most pervasive assumptions uniting the participants in the Constitutional Convention was 
that the expansionist framework set out by the land ordinances would be retained in the 
new government.
7
  Thus, when James Madison and John Dickinson praised the virtues of 
the “extended republic” and the “extensive republican empire,” respectively, or when 
Luther Martin spoke disparagingly of an “extensive federal empire,” they did not simply 
mean a polity encapsulating the vast territory of the original thirteen colonies.
8
  They 
meant a large republic that would continue to expand over distant territories and 
incorporate more states into its framework of federal sovereignty.   
Indeed, the language of empire permeated the constitutional debates of the 1780s.  In 
his journals of the federal convention, Madison approvingly recorded the common 
sentiment that the men present had convened for the purposes of “laying the foundation 
for a great empire.”9  Hamilton similarly opened the first of the Federalist Papers by 
observing that the new union concerned the “fate of an empire in many respects the most 
interesting in the world.” According to Hamilton, there were three ways of constituting a 
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republic:  chance, conquest, and consent and reason.  He thought the U.S. was of this 
third type, perhaps the first in the world.  As is clear with Hamilton’s conception of 
constitution, the Federalists sought an empire without conquest, a new form of “empire” 
in which “power is lodged in the mass of the people.”  To many, such a conception of 
empire represented a method of short-circuiting instabilities and paradoxes generated by 
a state and society founded on force and conquest.
10
 
The centrality of empire to the constitutional debates forces us to dramatically 
reconceive the whole debate about the viability of small versus large republics.  What 
was at stake in these debates was not simply the static size of the republic.  It was more 
significantly about the question of whether the principles of political liberty and popular 
sovereignty on the one hand and notions of imperial sovereignty on the other could be 
combined into a single constitutional framework.  It is only with this in mind that we can 
accurately understand the debates between Federalists and Anti-Federalists and the place 
of democracy in this ideological conflict. 
While the state constitutions of 1776 were largely based on democratic principles, the 
end of the war led to a series of disturbances on the frontier when cash-strapped state 
governments imposed new taxes and commercial restrictions to pay for debt incurred 
under the war.  Shay’s Rebellion, the most significant of these episodes, shook western 
Massachusetts from 1786 to 1787.  But the Articles of Confederation provided no 
concerted federal response to the debtors’ rebellion.  Lacking both the military power to 
quell the rebellion and the fiscal power to redress the rebels’ grievances, Massachusetts 
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was left to deal.  The frontier rebellion led many delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention to espouse openly anti-democratic views.  For Edmund Randolph, the 
primary danger to the stability of the new union was the “democratic parts of our 
constitutions.”  A common assumption among those who favored an energetic state was 
that republican liberty was incompatible with democracy.  Madison, for example, held 
that a “republican system” was the only remedy to the “inconveniences of democracy.”11 
Shay’s rebellion and the individual state constitutions represented to Federalists an 
alternative tradition that counteracted republican ideology.  Upon witnessing the frontier 
violence of the rebellion, Knox wrote that the “creed” animating the rebels held western 
land to be the “common property of all” rather than the domain of the federal state.12  In 
their empire-building efforts, the Federalists had to balance competing conceptions of 
equality:  a democratic conception motivated by the “leveling spirit” and that threatened 
the primacy of individual property rights; and a republican conception that respected 
differences in property but nevertheless promoted widespread property ownership as the 
best assurance of political stability and economic progress.  In reaction to the democratic 
conception of equality, Madison put republican principles in service of the containment 
of democratic power in an effort to uphold revolutionary visions of empire.  His vision of 
constitutionalism was one which had the “stability and energy of a government, capable 
of protecting the rights of property against the spirit of democracy.”13 
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The distinction between democratic and republican equality was underlined by a 
larger distinction between two conceptions of popular sovereignty, those that focused on 
popular authorization suitable to representative government and those that entailed the 
direct and popular rule of the masses.  In the former, the state draws its legitimacy and 
authority from the masses regardless of whether they exercise power, while the latter 
means that “the people” have a meaningful part in the exercise of political power.  The 
distinction saliently captures the fundamental difference between the language of 
“democratic republic” (popular rule) and “representative” or “federal” republic (popular 
authorization) in the constitutional debates.
14
 
Consider Benjamin Rush’s well-known speech on the American Revolution delivered 
in Philadelphia.  The occasion of Rush’s speech was of course the perceived deficiencies 
of the Articles of Confederation and their replacement by a new constitution proposed by 
the Annapolis Convention in 1786.  Drawing on the arguments that would dominate 
Federalist calls for a strong, constitutional state, Rush named the primary defects of the 
present constitution as a deficiency of coercive and fiscal power.  In calling for what 
would have been recognized as a “fiscal-military state” not too different from that of the 
British Empire, Rush had to convince his fellow citizens that a consolidated state was 
consistent with political liberty and at the same time address growing fears about the 
dominant power of the state legislatures.
15
  To address both sides, he drew a distinction 
between two forms of popular sovereignty.  While common sense held that “the 
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sovereign and all other power is seated in the people,” Rush argued that this should be 
revised to say that “all the power is derived from the people.”  For Rush, the people only 
exercise power though elections, after which it leaves their hands and becomes the 
“property of their rulers.”16  In Rush’s view, the state gained its legitimacy through the 
consent of the governed, but was at the same time insulated from popular control. 
Like Rush, Publius held that the streams of authority that provided the foundation of 
the imperial state are to flow from the people, even if they do not directly exercise power.  
Publius was here reacting to rising fears about the legislative despotism exercised in the 
state and local assemblies.  For Madison, the democratic power of the legislature is of an 
“encroaching nature” and is “everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing 
all power into its impetuous vortex.”  The “principle of representation” provided a vital 
means to ensure stability and order.  The real distinction between the constitutions of the 
ancient republics and that of the American republic, Madison posited, “lies in the total 
exclusion of the people in their collective capacity” from having any share political 
power.  But by including the representatives of the people, the imperial state retained its 
legitimacy in the consent of the governed.  Organized in such a manner, Hamilton held 
that “civil power” would be able to encapsulate an extensive sphere of authority and then 
“reproduce itself in every part of a great empire.”17 
Federalist elites thus relied on the fiction of the people in order to ground the 
authority of the imperial state in the consent of the governed.  In accordance with the 
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republican ideal of mixed government, democracy, inasmuch as it had any role in the 
federal republic, was one organizing principle among others.  The purpose of a mixed 
republic was to secure the advantages of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, while 
rejecting their disadvantages.  Proponents of the constitutional plan for a strong, 
centralized state equipped with expansive fiscal and military powers were fond of citing 
Montesquieu’s dictum that a “federal republic” is the form of government best suited to 
securing “all the internal advantages” of a democracy (i.e. liberty) “at the same time that 
it maintained the external dignity and force of a monarchy.”18  This entailed that the 
internal principles of individual liberty and could be combined into a constitutional 
framework that institutionalized a strong, consolidated state.  The democratic element 
was necessary in the constitutional schematic of the mixed republic so as to provide a 
legitimate foundation for state power.
19
  But it is important to remember that the 
Federalists largely rejected democracy as a form of popular self-rule, which they 
associated with its disadvantages. 
The conventional interpretation offered by neo-republican theorists is that Publius and 
others rejected “pure democracy” because it was impractical for any large state and 
because the rule of the demos could not provide for the institutional durability that the 
Founders sought.  In this view, the founding generation privileged republican over 
democratic principles because the latter were inadequate to the temporal and spatial 
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imperatives of governing an extended republic.  For instance, John Adams wrote, “In a 
large society, inhabiting an extensive country, it is impossible that the whole should 
assemble to make laws.”  Madison similarly feared the “confusion of a multitude” and 
instability that arises from institutions of popular self-rule.
20
  For both, democracy was 
understood in archaic terms:  it was the time and space of the unruly Greek mob.  It was 
an ancient political form relegated to small political units such as colonies, townships, 
and city-states, and was thus unsuited to new forms of imperial rule envisioned by the 
founding generation.  Ancient democracies, for Madison, were “spectacles of turbulence 
and contention” incompatible with “personal security or the rights of property.”21 
But if we take seriously the notion that empire was of paramount concern in early 
American thought, the issue of democracy gets cast in a slightly different manner not 
entirely captured by the problem of its impracticability.  In a real sense, democracy and 
empire were contradictory forms of rule for many of the founders.  This was not, 
however, because empire negated democratic principles.  Rather, it was because 
democratic self-rule was not consonant with empire.  In addition to the operative 
principle of representation in Madison’s system, the other great difference between 
democracy and republic was the “greater sphere of country over which the latter may be 
extended.”  That Madison meant by this an expanding republic is evident in his early 
advocacy of gaining control of the Louisiana Territory from Spain.  In 1784 he asserted 
that the “free expansion of our people” and the “settlement of the Western country” 
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depended on the “free use of the Mississippi.”22  Madison aspired to a stable though 
expansive polity that promoted economic growth and the protection of private property 
rights as necessary for a republican political economy based on individual liberty and 
social equality.  Democracy ran counter to these principles insofar as it was aligned with 
a form of despotism animated by the leveling spirit of radical equality, leading to disorder 
and a weak state incapable of directing economic and territorial expansion, subverting 
America’s position as a “flourishing empire.”23   
Against Arendt’s notion that political stability and empire were antithetical 
imperatives, Madison believed that the durability of republican order depended upon 
territorial expansion.  To mitigate the instability brought about by democratic politics, 
Madison’s imperialism combined the classic republican concern for civic virtue with 
principles of commercial liberalism.  To accommodate an expanding population and stall 
the corruption that attends the rise of industry, which further inflames the leveling spirit 
of democratic equality, Madison viewed territorial expansion as a vital concomitant of a 
stable republican order.  Lacking the basic means of subsistence, republic citizens quickly 
lose sight of the public good and civic virtue, and instead pursue their own their private 
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interests.  If a republican constitution rested on the social base of an agrarian citizenry, 
then the goal of widespread property ownership necessitated expansion in order to 
maintain the property rights of the landed gentry in the east and deliver on promises of 
social equality.  Like Jefferson, Madison realized that the benefits of territorial expansion 
would accrue only if settlers were linked into larger commercial networks, which allowed 
yeomen to draw profit from trade in surplus agricultural commodities.
24
   
Madison’s imperial vision received additional support in arguments for a “federal 
republic” based on the representative principle.  Such a republic would acquire an 
“expanding quality” that was ideally suited to the unique geographic conditions of North 
America:  the lack of any immediate territorial threats, an abundance of land and natural 
resources, and a network of navigable waterways capable of facilitating trade in 
agricultural goods.
25
  All of these conditions provided the material basis for the equality 
of citizens free of aristocratic distinction.  Such views significantly presaged central 
democratic themes concerning the social basis of popular rule later enumerated by 
Tocqueville.  Federalist defenses of the Constitution envisioned a “vast extent of 
unpeopled territory” and “uncultivated lands” which “opens to the frugal and industrious 
a sure road to competency and independence.”  In such a view, the disavowal of 
indigenous sovereignty marks the “equality of condition which so eminently 
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distinguishes us.”26  Resting upon ideological frameworks of native elimination and 
indigenous disavowal, social equality and freedom from aristocratic hierarchy also 
depended upon an abundance of land, which ensured a sense of independence among the 
citizenry and an egalitarian distribution of power.  Federalists held that “A general and 
tolerably equal distribution of landed property is the whole basis of national freedom.”  
Through the diffusion of property ownership, the inequalities generated by modern 
commerce would be mitigated, instilling “virtue” and “patriotism” in the “very soul of the 
republic.”27  In the context of an expanding political economy, agrarian independence 
required territorial and commercial expansion.   
The benefits of these social conditions, however, were not immediately exploitable.  
They required an imperial state capable of governing an extended territory and exerting 
military force to secure and expand borders.  As a model for this imperial state, Publius 
drew on the Whig tradition of commercial statism associated with the development of the 
British fiscal-military state to argue for the necessity of an energetic constitution.
28
  Like 
the Bank of the United States, the chartering of the Bank of England after the 1688 
settlement granted the Crown-in-Parliament a credit mechanism in order to pursue its 
economic and military interests, namely, the defense of British commerce in international 
trade routes.  Hamilton was clear that one of the primary duties of government – the 
prosecution of “Indian expeditions” – also depended upon a centralized bank to provide 
loans for military projects and expansion.  Madison also held that the fiscal and military 
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powers of the modern state were inextricably linked.  The “power of levying and 
borrowing money,” Madison insisted, was the “sinew of… national defense.”29  
Madison’s vision of political order embraced a centralized power capable of vigorously 
pursuing new land for a political economy that combined republican liberty with the 
commercial relations of market society.  Without the economic opportunity enabled by 
diffused property ownership, society would degenerate into anarchy, undercutting the 
ideal of a durable though expansive republic. 
In contrast to the Federalist program, the Anti-Federalists argued against the 
consolidation of state power, territorial expansion, and the containment of popular rule.  
Their political vision, which was underwritten by the fear of an expansive and centralized 
state, upheld equality in property as the social basis of a confederation of small, 
democratic republics united in pursuit of the common defense of liberty.  The first thing 
to note about the Anti-Federalist objection to the Federalist program was that almost all 
of the major opponents of the Constitution assumed that imperial expansion could not 
effectively promote the public good.  For instance, many held that “by reason of the 
extensive territory of the United States” and the “dispersed situation of its inhabitants,” 
the federal constitution would be unable to control and counteract the interests of a select 
faction of men who “possess all the powers of government.”  No government can pursue 
the public good over such a vast and expanding extent of territory without privileging the 
rights and interests of a select class.  It was precisely this idea that Madison responded to 
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in Federalist #10 when he argued that the extension of territory would mitigate rather 
than exacerbate the evils of faction.
30
 
This skepticism concerning the consistency of empire and the public good largely 
derived from the lessons of Montesquieu.  The central pillars of this view rested on two 
key notions:  that civil liberty could only exist in a small territory and that despotic 
government was necessary to maintain order in a large territory.  Anti-Federalists thus 
charged their opponents with creating a despotic, imperial government that would subvert 
the liberty of its citizens.  While they agreed with Montesquieu that political liberty 
consists in a sense of security that all citizens are entitled to, they disagreed that the 
defense of liberty should be invested solely in a consolidated power with control over a 
standing army.
31
  Such a framework engendered an expansionist tendency for war and 
conquest that eroded the foundations of public liberty.  Upholding the viability of small 
republics, Brutus wrote, “History furnishes no example of a free republic, anything like 
the extent of the United States.  The Grecian republics were of small extent; so also was 
that of the Romans.  Both of these, it is true, extended their conquests of large territories 
of country, and the consequence was that their governments were changed from free 
governments, to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world.”32  Like his 
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Federalist counterparts, Brutus rejected conquest as a legitimate foundation of political 
society, and he aligned the rule of democratic principles with small republics. 
For these and many other reasons, several Anti-Federalists explicitly argued that the 
Constitution was founded on anti-democratic principles.  Departing from the Federalist 
language of a “federal republic,” Anti-Federalists fused democratic and republican 
idioms of power in their defense of popular self-rule:  “In democratic republics the people 
collectively are considered as the sovereign – all legislative, judicial, and executive 
power is inherent in and derived from them.”33  Contrary to Rush, such a view held that 
in a democracy power must be invested in and directly exercised by the masses.  A 
republic encapsulating an extensive space, however, cannot be governed on “democratic 
principles.”  Any plan other than one of small republics retaining full internal sovereignty 
but united in foreign concerns would devolve into despotism, with the individual states 
being “melted down into one empire.”34  In the Anti-Federalist objection, the Constitution 
instituted a “consolidated empire” that displaced the democratic sovereignty embodied in 
the state and local assemblies.
35
   
In spite of their opposition to empire, Anti-Federalists were not opposed to expansion 
per se.  They took it for granted that their agrarian-republican vision would require the 
acquisition of new territory as the population grew.  While they also looked forward to 
the expansion of the American people across the continent, they largely held that newly 
founded states could not be adequately governed as anything other than independent 
                                                 
33
 Cato, “Letter #2;” Complete Anti-Federalist, Vol. II, pp. 107. 
34
 Centinel, “Letter #1;” Complete Anti-Federalist, Vol. II, pp. 139.   
35
 See the Anti-Federalist dissent at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention; Documentary History of the 
Ratification of the Constitution, Vol. XV, p. 21. 
 102 
 
entities in a loose confederation.
36
  As such, expansion directed by a centralized state was 
inconsistent with democratic principles.  “The Anti-Federalists… believed that only small 
communities organized as self-governing polities would uphold a genuine form of 
(settler) popular sovereignty.”37  In contrast to Federalist visions of expansion, Anti-
Federalists generally held to a de-centralized mode of settler expansion marked by the 
founding of loosely connected communities in the wilderness. 
A key component of the Anti-Federalist defense of small republics concerned the 
habits, customs, and values – i.e. the political culture – necessary for the government of a 
free and democratic republic.  On this point, the Anti-Federalists drew inspiration from 
Montesquieu, who asserted that in extensive republics, “the common good is sacrificed to 
a thousand views,” eroding the civic intimacy necessary for democratic self-rule.38  
Imperial republics simply could not produce and sustain the kind of citizens suitable for 
republican self-government.  By extending political space across the vast expanse of a 
territorial empire, the Anti-Federalists feared that the free manners and customs that 
sustained political liberty would be destroyed.  A national constitution would impose a 
national culture in North America that would eviscerate local political cultures of their 
substance, eroding the basis for democratic self-rule. 
Since part of the constitutional project entailed establishing a new political culture, it 
often clashed with the robust, democratic forms of civic life that preceded the 
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Convention.  These “political life-forms,” as Wolin calls them, were in key ways extra-
constitutional, residing in the political cultures and self-governing communities 
surrounding the state and local governments as well as the voluntary associations which 
Tocqueville contrasted with the abstract thinking of constitutionalism.
39
  To assert its 
plenary authority over the totality of political life, the Constitution sought to incorporate 
these forms of civic identification into its framework.  But the rise of new settler 
collectives on the frontier threatened to undermine the federal state’s imperial 
sovereignty.  Squatters clamoring for land had their own ideas about rights and liberties 
that involved the unbridled right to expansion.  Reflecting common notions of terra 
nullius, which disavowed indigenous dominion and sovereignty over western territory, 
one squatter spokesman confidently proclaimed that “all mankind… have an undoubted 
right to pass into every vacant country, and there to form their constitution” independent 
of Congressional authority.
40
  In a similar manner, the right to remove oneself from one’s 
country of birth and settle new communities in the western territories was a central 
element of democratic republicanism.  Two state constitutions – Pennsylvania and 
Vermont – upheld the “natural inherent right” of settlers to emigrate and establish new 
communities in “vacant countries.”41  In spite of claims about western land being 
“vacant” and “unpeopled,” settlers and political officials alike were fully aware that 
indigenous communities claimed sovereignty over such land.  Assertions of vacant land, 
therefore, did not reflect genuine ignorance about an indigenous presence in the New 
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World but were rather ideological assertions aimed at obscuring the colonial violence 
inherent in settler land claims by disavowing indigenous sovereignties. 
A common point against Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase hinged on the fear that the 
alienation involved in the imposition of great distances between west and east will result 
in settlers forming political identifications with other imperial states or forming 
independent republics.
42
  Others controverted this argument by asserting that there is very 
little substance to this risk so long as western settlements are governed within the same 
federal and egalitarian framework as the eastern states.  For instance, the geographer 
Jedidiah Morse wrote, “The emigrants will be made up of citizens of the United States.  
They will carry along with them their manners and customs, their habits of government, 
religion and education.”43  As Morse made clear, expansion would undermine its own 
foundations without a political and cultural framework capable of containing the power 
and force of localized, settler sovereignty. 
Similar to Shay’s Rebellion, the tenuousness of imperial rule on the frontier acutely 
manifested itself in the Whiskey Rebellion, which was partially driven by the emergent 
democratic culture arising out of the democratic-republican societies of the early 1790s.  
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Just as the American Revolution can be understood a settler rebellion against the imperial 
metropolis of Britain, both the Shaysites and the Whiskey rebels represented a vigorous 
form of localized settler sovereignty that stood in opposition to the federal authority of 
national elites.  The significance of the democratic societies was in taking the Anti-
Federalist emphasis on democratic self-rule and active citizenship and attaching it to 
settler visions of territorial expansion.  While the Democratic Society of Philadelphia was 
the largest in the country, the frontier societies of Washington County, PA and 
Lexington, KY are the most interesting for our purposes.  Washington County, in fact, 
heard the first shots of the Whiskey Rebellion, the insurrection that broke out in western 
Pennsylvania after Congress implemented an excise on whiskey and distilled spirits in 
1791 to help fund the federal government’s debt from the War and build its credit.  Many 
of those affected by the excise were landless persons and smallholders who were stricken 
with poverty on the frontier, and lacking propertied independence, they epitomized the 
democratic threat to the stability of republican order.
44
 
For the Washington County Society, the west was a source of economic opportunity 
and a way out of poverty.  Joined by a chorus of citizens from the Lexington Democratic 
Society, they pleaded with the federal government to expand settlements to the 
Mississippi River and wrest control of its navigation from Spain.  For members of both 
societies, the free navigation of the Mississippi and the right of “colonizing this distant 
and dangerous desert” was a “natural right” inseparable from the cause they had fought 
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for in the Revolution.
45
  It is not far from there to argue that a violation of this right 
constitutes a just reason for insurrection, posing the acute problem of settler revolt and 
the threat of the separation and independence of settler collectives.  In this mode of 
reasoning, the individual right to the commerce and prosperity of western lands was 
closely connected to the collective right of settler communities to govern themselves.  
Much like the colonial settlers for whom British containment policy violated both 
individual and republican liberty, the frontier societies asserted the right of settler 
expansion as a vital element of popular self-rule. 
In making such arguments, the frontier societies affixed the freedom of commercial 
exchange to republican visions of propertied independence and active, participatory 
citizenship.  Similar to the imperial visions of Paine, Madison, and Jefferson, commerce 
facilitated the peaceful intercourse of republics throughout the world.  The western 
country’s “unparalleled fertility” and “navigable streams” was evidence of a providential 
plan “to unite by this exchange of their surplus, various Nations and connect the ends of 
the Earth, in the bands of commerce and mutual good office.”  Federalist economic 
policy at the time, predominantly crafted by Hamilton, did not necessarily reject the 
imperative of gaining control of the Mississippi, but was more concerned with fostering 
industry and overseas trade relations with Britain.
46
  Democratic-republicans like 
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Jefferson more resolutely pursued the expansion of commerce and the establishment of a 
political and economic foothold in the region.  Both of the frontier societies repeatedly 
faulted the Federalists for their diplomatic failure to secure the river from Spain, who 
barred Americans seeking the export of agricultural commodities from access to the Port 
of New Orleans.
47
  In order to make the federal government more responsive to their 
demands for land, free trade, and economic opportunity, the societies sought the 
cultivation of democratic capacities and exercise of popular power.   
While their rhetoric undoubtedly shaped the actions of the Whiskey rebels, none of 
the societies condoned their actions.  Nevertheless, several Federalists faulted them for 
the rebellion.  President Washington charged the “self-created societies” – meaning extra-
constitutional and therefore seditious – with responsibility for the insurrection.  
Regardless of the fairness of these allegations, the democratic societies represented the 
first stage of a veritable shift in the discourse of modern democracy.  Insofar as the 
societies emerged from civil society, they signified a democratic culture taking root on 
the frontier that exceeded the constitutional framework of the federal republic.  Jason 
Frank astutely observes that the societies sought to create a “cultural environment that 
would produce very different kinds of politics and citizens.”48  By developing new 
customs, values, and habits, they cultivated new practices of active citizenship that 
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conflicted with the passive conceptions of citizenship offered by Federalists.  The fusion 
of popular self-rule and active citizenship with visions of settler expansion inaugurated a 
new vision of empire in the early republic.  Drawing on the tradition of democratic-
republicanism, settlers along the trans-Appalachian borderlands posed a “new ideology, 
and a new organizing principle, of empire.”  In this imperial vision, the Revolution set in 
motion a “powerful new engine of imperial expansion:  the liberty of its people, freed to 
act outside older constraints of public authority.”49 
Empire of Liberty:  Jefferson and the Foundations of Democratic Empire 
“We should have such an empire for liberty as… never surveyed since the creation; and I am persuaded no 
constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire and self-government;” 
Jefferson to Madison, April 1809. 
 
Jefferson envisioned an “empire of liberty” that expanded through the de-centralized 
power of settler sovereignty free from the dictates of an absolutist state.
50
  This notion of 
empire rhetorically established distance between his democratic expansionism driven by 
the power of the people and Hamilton’s federalist imperialism in which expansion was 
directed by a centralized state rather than by the force of the people.  Although both 
Federalists and Republicans desired full control over the port city of New Orleans and the 
Louisiana Territory, the former pursued this goal through a process of military conquest 
while the latter favored mechanisms of treaty and purchase consistent with the 
democratic imperial imaginary of consent and commerce.  Further posing an antagonism 
between U.S. imperialism and the despotic empires of Europe, the phrase also carried 
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connotations of liberating the western territories from the yoke of Spanish, British, and 
French rule.  Reflecting the imperial imaginary embedded in the Northwest Ordinance, 
the democratic element of the empire of liberty arose from the fact that westward 
expansion would result in the democratic autonomy of new states instead of their 
subjection to a colonial administration or centralized government.
51
 
Against the British Empire, Jefferson privileged continental over maritime 
conceptions of empire because he thought the preponderance of naval power made a state 
prone to aggressive war and conquest, which conflicted with his vision of America as a 
peaceful empire of liberty.  But in spite of this, it would be a mistake to assume that 
Jefferson entirely rejected the legitimacy of global empire in favor of a more limited 
continental and isolationist power.  He emphatically wrote to Robert Livingston, the U.S. 
minister to France, of the necessity of gaining control of the Louisiana Territory, “There 
is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy.  
It is New Orleans, through which the produce of three-eighths of our produce must pass 
to market.”52  Jefferson was not opposed to global trade and commerce, for he saw it as a 
vital feature of a healthy republican economy.   
In spite of its commercial and consensual connotations, racial violence and military 
conquest were at the center of Jefferson’s vision of an “empire of liberty,” a point 
captured by looking to the obstacles that indigenous communities and the British Empire 
posed to democratic expansion during the War of 1812.  Beyond a persistent military 
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presence on the frontier, British officials angered democratic expansionists by supplying 
Indian attacks on settlers along the frontier.  The limits Britain imposed on settler 
expansion compounded conflicts over international trade.  “American farmers were 
commercial farmers, ambitious for foreign markets, and for them to reach those markets, 
ocean commerce had to be unimpeded.”  The British thus limited both the acquisition of 
western lands and access to global markets that allowed small farmers to draw profit from 
those lands.
53
  The War of 1812 was an imperial war driven by the republican ideals and 
economic interests of western politicians and their constituencies’ desires for cheap land. 
Beyond striking the British presence from the frontier, the 1812 War also afforded the 
opportunity to eradicate the barriers Indian tribes posed to settler expansion.  In its 
official ideology, U.S. expansion proceeded by means of assimilation, purchase, and 
mutual consent first enacted by Knox and Washington.  Jefferson’s ideas about 
assimilation were prefigured by the factory system first inaugurated by Washington in 
1795, a system of “trading houses” designed to facilitate commercial relations among 
Indians and settlers.  Driven by a philanthropic spirit, the factory system also facilitated 
the inculcation of Indians into the arts of Western civilization, specifically, agricultural 
commerce.  Jefferson continued this policy upon inauguration, and he pioneered new 
mechanisms of assimilation focused on convincing Indian tribes to adopt private property 
institutions and agrarian social forms in the hopes that they would sell tribal land 
holdings to the government.  Imposing an agricultural lifestyle on Indians would further 
force them into commercial dependence on trade with white Americans, allowing the sale 
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of land to appear as a choice even if it was compelled by “market forces” and economic 
necessity.
54
  His policy of expansion by purchase was designed to facilitate the process of 
deculturation by bringing Indians within the domain of Anglo social relations. 
Jefferson’s Indian policy relied less on genuine consent, however, than it did on a 
fiction of consent, and it was backed by a profound degree of coercion and violence.  It 
was predicated on a process of spatial colonization that normatively condoned the spread 
of democratic cultural forms and republican civilization across the western frontier.  And 
it directly implied temporal colonization, shown in Jefferson’s remark that the 
assimilation of the Indians engendered the “termination of their history.”55  The 
extermination of indigenous cultures was closely tied to his notion of agrarian citizens as 
the “chosen people of God” and the progressive assumptions it implies.  The future was 
democratic, and Indians with archaic customs had no place in that future unless they 
assimilated to the democratic way of life and subjected themselves to the force of 
republican government.  In a letter to Colonel Benjamin Hawkins, the Creek agent of the 
federal government, Jefferson wrote that the incorporation of the Indian tribes into U.S. 
citizenship was the “natural progress of things.”56  Those who resisted the spread of 
republican society and its assimilative force were thus resisting the laws of history. 
Accordingly, the only option in dealing with Indian tribes who posed obstacles to the 
progressive march of American democracy was extermination.  In 1807, when President 
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Jefferson learned that some tribes were preparing war against the federal government, he 
called for the wholesale genocide of those tribes, affirming that “if ever we are 
constrained to lift the hatchet against any tribe, we will never lay it down till that tribe is 
exterminated… we shall destroy all of them.”  With the Creek Nation mounting a 
sustained opposition to American expansion, Jefferson similarly comforted himself in the 
fact that “barbarities justified extermination.”57  Not too dissimilar from Pontiac’s War, 
the Creek Wars were subsumed into the 1812 War when the Shawnee leader Tecumseh 
united the two tribes to resist assimilation and settler encroachment.  Like Pontiac, 
Tecumseh was motivated by the teachings of his half-brother, Tenskwatawa, who 
initiated a “recivilization movement” calling for the revitalization of traditional Shawnee 
and Creek culture in opposition to the spread of white civilization.
58
  But to Jefferson, 
Indian resistance was merely a barrier standing in the way of civilization and progress. 
The policy of purchase thus ran into a set of obstacles that undermined its ideological 
consistency when Indians refused to sell their land and integrate into the expanding 
American order.  The imperial ideology articulated by Jefferson turned on the assumption 
that Indians wanted to sell their lands to the federal government and desired their 
acculturation to national citizenship so as to enjoy the benefits of republican civilization.  
There is thus a form of cultural superiority that undergirds the legal supposition of 
equality and consent enacted by federal Indian policy.  Indian resistance and refusal to 
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sell lands represented to Jeffersonian democrats a challenge to this notion superiority and 
as a result to the progress of modern democracy. 
We miss something crucial about the burgeoning discourse of American democracy if 
we chalk these comments up to the individual views of an overzealous politician.  The 
dual policy of assimilation-extermination directly stemmed from Jefferson’s progressive 
view of history that by the Jacksonian era shaded into the discourses of “democratic 
providence” and “manifest destiny.”  Moreover, it was compatible with his republican 
views and desire for an expanding, homogenous society.  The mode of conquest 
embedded in Jefferson’s Indian policy, in both its civilizing and violent forms, represents 
a clear instance of foundational violence, which involves the decimation of pre-existing 
identities and modes of culture in order to make way for the constitution of a new 
political order.
59
  Jeffersonian democracy not only rested on forms of conquest aimed at 
the eradication of indigenous modes of political life, its embrace of a providential 
discourse directly authorized the foundational violence enacted by Revolution.  Indian 
resistance, however, exposed the limitations of U.S. imperial ideology by calling into 
question liberal narratives of expansion. 
It is in this context that we must reconsider the radical aspects of Jeffersonian 
democracy.  It is no secret that Jefferson was obsessed with the coming of a new, modern 
political order, and that his penchant for radicalism and revolution stemmed from his 
disdain of aristocratic society.  In his well-known argument that no generation has the 
right to bind future generations to their laws and constitution, Jefferson famously 
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declared, “The dead have no rights.  They are nothing and nothing cannot own 
something.”60  Richard Drinnon has shown that Jefferson’s assertions here, read 
contrapuntally, apply to white aristocrats and their social systems of privilege as well as 
to the native civilizations of the ancient American past.
61
  For Jefferson, Indians who 
sought to retain their customary modes of politics clung to the dead weight of tradition.  
Native polities constituted vanishing civilizations, and so their customs and traditions 
inherited through time ran counter to the historical progression of American democracy.  
The resurgence of ancient tradition meant the return of ancestral privilege that Jefferson 
deemed antithetical to democratic equality.  Maintaining a free and equal United States 
thus entailed the assimilation-extermination of Indian tribes seeking the regeneration of 
their customary forms of politics. 
We also see evidence for this interpretation in the President’s inaugural addresses, 
often taken jointly as a classical statement of democratic-republican principles.  In his 
first inaugural address, Jefferson expounded a classic vision of American empire:  “A 
rising nation, spread over a wide and fruitful land, traversing all the seas with the rich 
productions of their industry… advancing rapidly to destinies beyond the reach of the 
mortal eye.”  Reflecting a progressive understanding of history, Jefferson viewed the 
United States as the forefront of the democratic movement, and a central feature of this 
movement was the eradication of religious intolerance.  By his second inaugural address 
Jefferson turned the principle of tolerance into a justification of Indian extermination.  
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While the majority of native peoples were rightly convinced of the superiority of white 
civilization, there still existed the “action and counteraction of good sense and of bigotry” 
among some “anti-philosophers who find an interest in keeping things in their present 
state.”62  Jefferson was clear that Indians who insist on retaining their traditional cultural 
forms and identities are enemies of progress, and therefore intolerants deserving of 
eradication.  To legitimize conquest, he constructed Indian resistance as the exception to 
the rule of commercial expansion and the civilizing force of republican society. 
In the midst of the “Revolution of 1800,” which saw the democratic-republican 
coalition of Jefferson assume the seat of government, Federalists retained the assumption 
that democracy and empire were incompatible.  For instance, on the eve of his death 
Alexander Hamilton wrote, “[T]he dismemberment of our empire will be a clear sacrifice 
of great positive advantages without any counter-balancing good, administering no relief 
to our real disease, which is democracy.”63  In this view, the emergence of a new, 
democratic creed in American society threatened to undermine the power of the rising 
American empire.  Hamilton’s fear was that democracy’s emergence as the prevailing 
principle of government would lead to instability, undermining federalist visions of 
empire and national unity.  Jefferson, on the other hand, began to incorporate democratic 
values squarely within his vision of an empire of liberty.  The active self-rule of the 
demos, in this vision, constituted the basis of American imperial power. 
Perhaps more than any thinker of the time, Jefferson played a pivotal role in 
integrating settler ideologies into national frameworks of settler-colonial expansion.  In 
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an essay envisioning the prospective course of settler expansion across the continent, 
Jefferson invited a “philosophic observer [to] commence a journey from the savages of 
the Rocky Mountains” toward the eastern seaboard.  In this journey, our philosopher 
would observe the earliest stage of civilization, composed of savage Indians living in a 
lawless state of nature.  Next, he would find Indians on the “frontiers in the pastoral state, 
raising domestic animals to supply the defects of hunting.”  Then he would witness “our 
own semi-barbarous citizens, the pioneers of the advance of civilization,” blazing the 
path of progress westward from the most developed state of “our seaport towns.”  
Jefferson’s account of historical development here transformed the stadial view of history 
marked by the cyclical rise and decline of empires into a linear model of progress.  In this 
view, the course of settler expansion maps onto the “progress of society from its rudest 
state to that it has now attained.”  As the primary agents of expansion, imperial authority 
rested in the settlers that blazed the path of civilization.  In the face of this relentless 
expansion, barbarism and savagery have retreated before the “march of civilization.”64 
Through the simultaneous processes of territorial expansion and civilizational 
progress, settlers become more refined in their manners as the process proceeds, and thus 
more directly integrated into the republican order.  Benjamin Rush directly expressed this 
idea in reviewing “three different species of settlers,” which also represent “regular 
stages” in the “progress from savage to civilized life.”  In the first stage, the settler is 
nearly identical to the savage Indian in his customs, habits, and manners.  And like the 
Indian, the settler “revolts against the operation of the law.”  Although these manners 
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become more diluted in the second stage, the chief preoccupation of the second species of 
settler is improving the land to draw profit.  Like the first species of settler, the second is 
also “indisposed to support civil government.”  It is only in the third stage of settlement 
(when agricultural modes of production gain precedence over hunting and land 
speculation) that “republican virtue” comes to define the citizenry.  Like Paine’s vision of 
expansion for the public good, the third species of settler transforms the process of 
territorial expansion from one driven solely by private or class-based interests to one that 
embraces a civic component.
65
 
Consistent with this vision of settler expansion, Jefferson developed an image of 
empire that operates through the “democratization of the total institutional framework of 
the Union, and the dispersion of political power downward from the federal government 
to the self-governing community of the ward and the township.”66  After his presidency, 
he wrote extensively on the centrality of retaining and augmenting the role of local 
sovereignty in the federal system.  He proposed a plan that would further divide the 
counties of each state into “wards of five or six miles square,” each with their own local 
institutions of self-rule.  Wards, or townships as they were called in New England, were 
the “vital principle” of democratic rule and provided for the “perfect exercise of self-
government.”  By promising democratic participation at the local level in a federal 
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system of government, Jefferson hoped that his system of “ward republics” would be the 
“key-stone of the arch of our government.”67   
Conclusion 
While Jefferson never overtly articulated ward republics as a program of colonization, 
his work on the land ordinances of the Revolutionary period suggests that the union of 
settler sovereignty and popular sovereignty in a federal system provided for a democratic 
model of imperial expansion.  Viewed in this context, the ward and the township were 
settler-colonial institutions of self-rule that rested on the displacement of indigenous 
communities.  We thus see with Jefferson and the Democratic-Republican societies the 
early seeds of democratic empire, of a vision of empire that spreads through the active 
power of the demos. 
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The Tocquevillean Moment:  Settler Expansion and the Democratic 
Social State 
 
“In the United States, it is not only legislation that is democratic; nature itself works for the people…  
Everything about the Americans is extraordinary, their social state as well as their laws; but what is more 
extraordinary still is the soil that supports them.”  Tocqueville, Democracy in America. 
 
The period between 1800 and 1828 witnessed a profound transformation in the 
discourse of modern democracy.  During the Revolutionary era, the U.S. constitution was 
overlaid on top of a political culture of deference and social hierarchy.  While there were 
islands of democratic culture in the Anti-Federalists and Democratic-Republican 
Societies, democratic idioms of power occupied an ambiguous place in the emergent 
national culture dominated by Federalist ideology.  Jefferson’s election of 1800 in many 
ways catalyzed the development of democratic culture and played a direct role in 
conjoining democratic values with imperial ideology.  In these developments, democracy 
signaled less a constitutional form of government than it did a form of culture and 
society.  Indeed, Jefferson’s assertion that the election of 1800 “was as real a revolution 
in the principles of our government as that of 1776 was in its form” suggests that a polity 
can undergo radical transformation without a formal change in its constitution.
1
  The 
source of this change is to be understood not as a revision of the constitutional form of 
the republic but rather as a shift in the political culture and social condition of Americans. 
Anyone familiar with antebellum politics will readily note that this basic division 
profoundly colored Alexis de Tocqueville’s reflections in Democracy in America.  
Indeed, he explicitly distinguished a democratic form of government from a democratic 
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  The unprecedented degree of social equality in America – the 
leveling of social rank that Tocqueville associated with the absence of a landed 
aristocracy – is a function of the social condition of Americans rather than an effect of 
government.  Insofar as U.S. political institutions embraced the principle of popular 
sovereignty and the democratization of political power, as J.S. Mill would put it, 
“changes in political institutions are the effects of previous changes in the condition of 
society.”3  To register this profound shift in American society, Tocqueville used the 
language of the “democratic social state” as a way of foregrounding the social relations, 
cultural mores, and geographic conditions that define American democracy. 
For Tocqueville, the origins of democracy in America are naturally rooted in the 
geographic conditions of the New World.  In this regard, Tocqueville naturalizes 
democracy as an essential feature of American society, placing it outside of the dynamics 
of historical development.  But rather than a natural or essential feature of U.S. political 
identity, the emergence of democracy in antebellum political culture was a profoundly 
contingent development that rested on a variety of factors.  Michael Schudson, for 
instance, argues that the early nineteenth century witnessed a “democratic transition in 
political life.” The egalitarian gains of the Revolution notwithstanding, the Constitution 
“had not altered assumptions of deference and social hierarchy” that defined eighteenth 
century American political culture.  The early nineteenth century gave rise to a “new 
egalitarian ethos [that] provided a framework for American politics so much more 
                                                 
2
 Tocqueville, Democracy in America (University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 12. 
3
 Mill, “Essay on Government,” Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. XVIII (University of Toronto 
Press, 1977), p. 151. 
 121 
 
democratic than that of the Federalist era.”4  More than a change in constitutional form, 
the democratic transition was a change in society, culture, and collective identity. 
Political theorists, historians, and historical sociologists have all accounted for this 
shift in the meaning of democratic discourse in the antebellum period by emphasizing a 
variety of factors, most saliently the expansion of suffrage and the rise of mass parties.  
By placing almost exclusive focus on these factors, however, these accounts overlook the 
central role of settler expansion in shaping democratic thought and culture.  Simultaneous 
with the ascendance of democratic idioms of power in U.S. political discourse was the 
vast expansion of market society and the American state westward, which also entailed 
the imposition of colonial hierarchies on indigenous polities, conquered African slaves, 
and Mexican farmers.  What stands out in need of systematic explanation in the 
democratic transition of antebellum political culture is how conceptions of social 
equality, political liberty, and popular sovereignty were calibrated to the historical and 
spatial dynamics of settler expansionism.  In understanding this process, it will become 
clear that the structures and hierarchies of settler expansion were not conjoined with 
democracy in a fortuitous association, but grounded its very conceptual meaning. 
If settler colonial regimes are fundamentally characterized by the logic of native 
elimination, then processes of indigenous dispossession and land appropriation have had 
a formative impact on the construction of what Tocqueville called the democratic social 
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state.  For Tocqueville, modern American democracy is defined by the collapse of social 
hierarchies that grounded feudal authority in European society.  In the colonization of the 
Americas, the feudal order defined by rigid hierarchies of social rank and inherited status 
gave way to a social order grounded in radical principles of social and economic equality.  
As the crumbling ruins of feudal society were swept away by the winds of the democratic 
revolution, principles of popular sovereignty came to stand in for aristocratic systems of 
rule.  The settlers of the New World created a new egalitarian social order on a territorial 
ground marked by the absence of feudalism.  Yet what is unspoken in Tocqueville’s 
account though tacitly thematized is that the democratic social state rests upon settler 
colonialism.  American democracy was defined by a double absence – the absence of 
feudalism and the absence of indigenous sovereignties.  This double absence is pivotal in 
the making of U.S. democratic culture insofar as it removes that which is vitally present 
from critical scrutiny:  the foundation of American democracy in settler conquest.  In this 
regard, the absence of feudalism in Democracy ideologically obscures the constitutive 
role of settler conquest in the creation of democratic society. 
This chapter develops the framework of the “Tocquevillean moment” to understand 
the relationship between democracy and settler colonialism at three levels of analysis:  
the historical, the conceptual, and the ideological.  At the historical level, I refer to the 
Tocquevillean moment as what Schudson and others have called the democratic 
transition in American political life.
5
  At the conceptual and more significant level, it 
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provides a way of understanding how settler expansion and land appropriation have 
vitally shaped the conceptual meaning of modern American democracy.   If Pocock’s 
theory of the “Machiavellian moment” posits that imperial expansion threatened 
institutional stability of republics, the “Tocquevillean moment” holds that territorial 
expansion provided the vital conditions for the development of democratic equality, 
popular self-rule, and national stability.  In other words, settler colonization not only 
provides the material and symbolic foundation for the emergence of modern democracy.
6
  
It also sustains the democratization of power in American society by maintaining an 
egalitarian socio-political order based on popular self-rule through continued territorial 
expansion.  Simply put, it captures the dynamic by which settler expansion has 
constituted and continues to structure the democratic social state.  Put together, the 
conceptual and historical levels of the framework illuminate how the central values of 
American democratic culture developed in relation to settler expansion.
7
 
At the ideological level, the Tocquevillean moment treats the distinction between 
state and civil society in Jacksonian America as an ideological rationalization of how the 
democratic social state is produced through settler conquest.  It is only by obscuring the 
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contingent origins of American democracy in state projects of colonial conquest that 
democracy appears as a natural byproduct of New World geography.  In its ideological 
self-conception, democratic empire expands through the migratory force of the demos 
who seek freedom and equality through landed property ownership.  Because the state is 
absent, according to the ideology of democratic empire, territorial expansion is not only 
consonant with modern notions of political liberty and social equality but is in fact driven 
by the force of their appeal.  Imperial expansion therefore appears not as the product of 
an imperial state bent on expanding its boundaries but as the result of the demands of 
citizens for land, liberty, and equality.  In this way, the demos rather than the state 
became the primary agent of territorial expansion.  By constructing a mythology of a 
stateless civil society as the primary force of imperial expansion, ideologists of 
democratic empire in effect concealed the central role of war, conquest, and state 
coercion in shaping antebellum democracy. 
My point here is not to say that colonial violence only resided in state policy and not 
in the initiative of individuals acting in civil society.  Foregrounding the role of the state 
in driving settler expansion, however, does more to expose the contingent origins of 
American democracy in settler colonialism.  If state policies of military conquest and 
land appropriation produced the democratic social state, then it becomes impossible to 
claim, along with Tocqueville, that democracy naturally inheres in the geographic and 
cultural conditions of the New World.  By diverting attention to the role of politically 
organized colonial violence in securing the material conditions of democratic rule, we see 
that the constitution of democratic society in the U.S. is itself a form of conquest. 
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Settler Colonialism and the Democratic Social State 
 To the extent that both involve the constituent power of the governed to constitute a 
new society, American democracy and settler colonialism are closely aligned.  In 
explaining the distinctive character of American democracy, Tocqueville began his 
account with the colonial settlements of New England.  What made English colonial 
society unique stemmed from the system of colonial organization by which settlements 
were founded.  While imperial authorities elsewhere in Europe “subjected… the New 
World” to rules legislated in the metropolis, the English system of colonization gave 
“emigrants the right to form themselves into a political society under the patronage of the 
mother country, and to govern themselves in everything that was not contrary to its 
laws.”8  The English colonial system was thus marked by the authority it granted settlers 
to organize and constitute themselves as a self-governing society.  As a result, “The new 
settlers did not derive their incorporation from the seat of empire, although they did not 
deny its supremacy; they constituted a society of their own accord.”  As a form of 
constituent power involving the authority to constitute a new social order, settler 
sovereignty is also a form of foundational violence that enacts the eradication of prior 
identities to make way for the new democratic order. 
 In spite of his sympathetic lament about the conquest of Native Americans, the 
disavowal of indigenous sovereignty and the logic of native elimination fundamentally 
grounds Tocqueville’s account of the foundation of democratic society.  As a descriptive 
matter, he notes that European settlers generally thought that “the lands of the New 
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World belonged to the European nation that had first discovered them.”9  Yet on a 
conceptual level, the doctrines of discovery and terra nullius play a pivotal role in 
Tocqueville’s account.  While both doctrines have a complex and convoluted legal 
history in Western political thought, they both claim that European states were justified in 
making sovereign claims to New World without native consent because indigenous 
peoples lacked political institutions analogous to modern European sovereignty.  As a 
result, indigenous communities lacked legitimate claims to property and territorial 
sovereignty in America.  While the doctrine of discovery was more concerned with 
justifying territorial sovereignty in relation to competing European powers, it combined 
with the doctrine of terra nullius to rationalize the expropriation of indigenous land.  The 
doctrine of terra nullius held that the territories of the New World were empty and 
uncultivated wilderness without property or government.  As such, they were not political 
societies but were literally states of nature.  Settlers planted themselves in lands 
designated terra nullius, replacing states of nature with civil societies through the 
creation of new governing institutions that by definition excluded natives.
10
   
 The doctrine of terra nullius significantly shaped Tocqueville’s understanding of 
New World geography and its effect on the democratic social state.  One of the defining 
features of the democratic social state was the distinctive geographic conditions that 
provided the material basis for a stable and self-governing democratic society.  A brief 
overview of Tocqueville’s New World geography illustrates how the American landscape 
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was emptied of an indigenous presence.  Outlining the “external configuration of North 
America” in the first chapter of Democracy, Tocqueville’s landscape portrait of North 
America is littered with the “traces of an unknown people.”11  Observing the pyramidal 
mounds of the Mississippi valley, Tocqueville entertains the notion that at one point 
America may have been occupied by large, flourishing societies.  Yet in their present 
state indigenous Americans comprise a “few small tribes” in an “immense wilderness,” 
and they “cannot give any information about the history of that unknown people.”  One 
can only conclude, then, that indigenous societies in North America represent declining 
and vanishing civilizations:  “A strange thing!  There are peoples who have so completely 
disappeared from the earth that the very memory of the name has been effaced; their 
languages are lost, their glory has vanished like a sound without an echo.”12  
 Because they constitute a declining civilization, Tocqueville considered indigenous 
peoples to be occupants of a savage and degraded social condition.  He reiterated 
Lockean theories about the inability of indigenous peoples to properly cultivate the land, 
further reinforcing the disavowal of indigenous land claims:  “The Indians occupied it, 
but they did not possess it.  It is by agriculture that man appropriates the soil, and the first 
inhabitants of North America lived from products of the hunt.”13  But perhaps the 
defining feature of the Indian was that “he had grown up in the savage independence of 
his nature.”  The fierce independence of the Indian prevented him from occupying a 
social state characterized by common habits and moral bonds that united individuals in a 
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larger community, which established the authority of liberal property arrangements.  In 
this way, Tocqueville’s version of terra nullius operates less through the disavowal of 
indigenous forms of political organization than the disavowal of indigenous social forms.  
In other words, Indians lack legitimate title to the land not because they lack a state but 
because they lack a civil society.  Absent legitimate forms of social organization, North 
America at the time of colonization was the “still-empty cradle of a great nation.”  On top 
of this land, “civilized men were to try to build a society on new foundations.”14 
 It is much too simple to suggest that Tocqueville here simply ignored or was unaware 
of an indigenous presence in America.  Evidenced by the chapters on the “external 
configuration” of North America and the three races, it is clear that he undertook 
painstaking efforts to understand the place of indigenous societies in the American 
democratic order, all in spite of his repeated assertions that Indians were a vanishing race 
that had no place in the New World.  His own intentions notwithstanding, Tocqueville’s 
conceptual framework erases the indigenous presence and ideologically obscures the 
modes of native elimination that provide the foundation for the democratic social state.  
Yet it is much more than a simple misrepresentation.  Insofar as it produces salient social 
meaning for settlers, it is a “performative representation”15 that constitutively enacts the 
erasure of indigenous cultures as a precondition for the establishment of democratic 
equality.  His attempt to root democratic society in the geographic conditions of the New 
World thus works to conceal the contingent origins of modern democracy in settler 
conquest, making democracy appear as a natural byproduct of New World geography 
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rather than as a hierarchical process of empire and expansion. 
 In his account of “the principle causes tending to maintain a democratic republic in 
the United States,” Tocqueville affords special importance to the material and geographic 
conditions that define the democratic social state.  In doing so, he draws a crucial 
comparison between the Spanish colonization of South America and the Anglo 
colonization of North America.  In the former, Spanish conquistadors found concentrated 
civilizations that, in spite of being “less enlightened,” had “already appropriated the soil 
by cultivating it.”  Thus, to “found their new states, they had to destroy or enslave many 
populations.”  If violence and coercion played a central role in the founding of South 
American states, the social state of North American settlers allowed them to pursue a 
course of expansion that was without conquest.  Composed of “wandering tribes,” North 
America was “properly speaking, an empty continent, a wilderness land, that awaited 
inhabitants.”16  With minimal effort and violence, by merely nudging indigenous peoples 
off the map, Anglo-settlers could take swift control of the continent. 
 The geographic conditions that make the sovereignty of the people possible thus 
imply the disavowal of an indigenous presence.  The importance of geography in 
explaining the character and stability of American democracy is so pronounced that 
Tocqueville considers a democratic-republic to be the “natural state of the Americans.”  
He further writes, “In the United States, it is not only legislation that is democratic; 
nature itself works for the people.”  Due to the material abundance of land, the perceived 
absence of native inhabitants, and the virtual lack of immediate territorial threats, the 
                                                 
16
 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, pp. 264, 267. 
 130 
 
“boundless continent” of North America has allowed Americans to “remain free and 
equal.”17  Political liberty and social equality have a material basis in the geographic 
conditions of democratic society, granting a degree of stability to democratic institutions 
that keeps them from degenerating into anarchy. 
 The geographic conditions of North America work to directly shape the formation of 
democratic society.  The state of “material well-being” and economic prosperity of 
Americans exerts a profound influence on the actions, opinions, and habits of citizens.  In 
giving a “certain direction to the public spirit,” the “equality of conditions” has unleashed 
the “surge of the spirit of enterprise,” which has in turn driven Americans to the 
“frontiers of the Union.”18  Material conditions also intersected with property law to 
establish the general condition of equality characteristic of the democratic social state.
19
  
Such a social condition consists of two features:  institutionalized forms of civic equality 
that enable social mobility and abolish inherited structures of privilege; and the historical 
absence of a landed aristocracy that perpetuates this privilege through the inheritance of 
landed property.  Material conditions such as the abundance of readily exploitable land 
allowed for property law to be made in a manner such that land was distributed relatively 
equally, at least to the extent that it impeded the formation of a landed aristocracy.  
Tocqueville’s conception of social equality meant not that Americans were without 
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economic inequality, but that the distinct configuration of law, culture, and geography 
prevented the formation of an aristocratic ruling class that guards its social privilege 
through the generational transmission of landed wealth. 
 Echoing Turner’s frontier thesis, Tocqueville intimates that frontier conditions 
catalyzed the spread of egalitarian principles across North America that had already been 
set in motion by legal reforms in property law concerning the distribution of landed 
property.  Although such laws and customs first established the equality of conditions in 
the eighteenth century, Tocqueville notes that settler expansion resulted in the egalitarian 
movement becoming “more rapid as time advanced.”  Tocqueville saw in the rapid 
colonization of the west “democracy reaching its furthest limit,” allowing settlers to 
further escape the aristocratic hierarchies that accrue from “the influence of great names 
and great wealth.”20 
 Out of this fusion of geographic conditions and property law emerges the defining 
feature of the democratic social state:  the democratic culture of citizens.  Two central 
values in democratic culture coalesce together to produce a social condition and 
ultimately a political system premised on the principle of popular sovereignty.  First, 
conceptions of social equality in which the economic pursuit of wealth is divorced from 
social hierarchies of aristocratic privilege fundamentally defined the egalitarian principles 
at the heart of democratic culture.  As in classical republican themes, Tocqueville’s 
notion of the democratic social state signaled that “only relative equality of condition 
could promise the necessary foundation for an informed and active citizenry that would 
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not permit its government either to exploit or dominate one part of the society or to 
become its instrument.”21  Equality in civic status and social rank were necessary barriers 
to the resurgence of the feudal system and aristocratic rule in America.   
 Like Jefferson, Tocqueville believed that democratic stability required a form of 
equality in which each citizen had a sufficient amount of property to guarantee their own 
subsistence.  In conjunction with reforms in estate law, the reservoir of frontier land 
ensured that each citizen would have sufficient property in spite of the distribution of 
wealth in the metropolitan east.  To deliver on its promises of social equality, democratic 
ideals of equal citizenship required reservoirs of cheap land.  In the context of an 
emergent market economy that required continuous growth and development, territorial 
and economic expansion was a vital correlate of social equality.  In addition to ensuring 
social equality, the material expansiveness of democracy stabilized private property 
institutions by casting the West as a “safety valve” that diffused class conflict and 
ensured social stability through the promise of economic opportunity.  The promise of 
American democracy was the promise of social mobility, personal independence, and 
ultimately the power that came from individual ownership of landed property.
22
  When 
equal access to land is no longer possible, the promise of democracy vanishes. 
Second, just as social equality rested on economic dynamics that provided 
opportunity and shared prosperity, Tocqueville’s conception of political liberty also 
found its material basis in the geographic conditions of North America. At the center of 
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dominant narratives of U.S. democratic development was an idea about the wide scale 
availability of cheap land independent of any consolidated form of oligarchic power or 
territorial threats from indigenous people and rival imperial powers.  In the republican 
tradition, political freedom depended upon the individual ownership of property, which 
ensured one’s independence from the will another.  As democratic ideology in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth-centuries began to diffuse sovereignty throughout society 
in individuals, citizenship was seen to require the material resources of landed property to 
exercise political freedom.  To be in a position to rule, the democratic citizen also 
required the independence that came with landed property as a means of cultivating the 
values, practices, and habits necessary for the effective exercise of political power. 
For Tocqueville, social equality enabled by widespread property ownership ensured 
political stability and public order in democratic societies.  As a means of preventing 
forms of poverty and pauperism that cultivate a spirit of dependence and servility, 
“widespread diffusion of property ownership among citizens” establishes the basis of an 
egalitarian community.  Whether it is dependence on the government for public relief or 
on a landed aristocracy, personal dependence must be minimized if political liberty is to 
be maintained.  The personal independence granted by the diffusion of property and 
territorial expansion gives citizens a “stake in the social order” and provides the “material 
basis of citizenship.”  As with the republican conceptions of liberty, participation in 
public life required a set of habits and attitudes that derive from landed independence.
23
  
Democratic citizenship thus aligns with imperial citizenship not just in an interpretive 
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sense but also in a material sense.  If the ideals of landed independence at the heart of 
democratic citizenship were attained through processes of settler expansion, then in a 
certain sense democracy’s material reality resides in a settler-colonial-social formation. 
Like Aristotle, Tocqueville divided society into three classes:  the rich, poor, and the 
middle class.  In an ideal social state, both the poor and rich should be few and impotent 
while the middle classes who stand between these two extremes should “possess 
sufficient property to desire the maintenance of order.”  To ensure such a state of affairs 
and mitigate the political instability, Tocqueville believed that measures must be taken to 
ensure that the people acquire “share of property” that enables the spirit of liberty to take 
root.
24
  Organized in such a way, the democratic social state guarantees a “political form 
that equally favors the development and prosperity of all the classes of which society is 
composed.”25  Although reforms in property law helped in this regard, Tocqueville surely 
understood that granting the poor a stake in society required the settlement of western 
lands.  The trope of the frontier symbolized not only the expectation of social mobility 
and economic advancement but also the promise of free and equal self-rule.  Settler 
expansion thus maintains a bourgeois class order that places sovereignty in civil society 
rather in the aristocracy of the rich or the socialism of the poor. 
The two central values of U.S. democratic culture during the Jacksonian period – 
social equality and political liberty – combined to create a distinctively democratic 
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conception of popular sovereignty in U.S. political culture.  Tocqueville writes, “In 
nations where the dogma of the sovereignty of the people reigns, each individual forms 
an equal portion of the sovereign and participates equally in the government of the 
state.”26  What sustains participatory equality is less the institutional structure of the state 
than the values of individual citizens in civil society, which themselves are created and 
maintained through processes of settler colonization.  Sovereignty then inheres not in the 
imperial state but in civil society.  In transferring the sovereignty of the monarch to the 
sovereignty of the people, democratic-republican discourses located imperium in the 
power of the demos, in the power and capacities of sovereign individuals in civil society 
acting together as a “social force” to expand their sovereignty and dominion westward.27 
 Tocqueville clearly recognized an expansionist capacity in the American people, and 
in doing so he imbued democratic notions of popular sovereignty with an imperial 
dimension.  The assertion of the sovereignty of society over the sovereignty of the state 
actuated by democratic discourse profoundly shaped the imperial imaginaries that 
legitimized expansion and conquest.  Indeed, Tocqueville argued that the equality of 
conditions characterizing the democratic social state run directly counter to the “spirit of 
conquest” and “warlike passions.”  Because the democratic social state diffuses property 
ownership, democratic citizens will be more “friendly to peace” so as to preserve political 
stability and their own material interests.
28
  In making these claims, Tocqueville 
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constructed an imperial identity for the American people wherein expansion occurs 
through the soft power of law, culture, and commerce instead of war and conquest. 
 In constructing such an imperial identity, Tocqueville compared American processes 
of expansion with the Russian and Spanish empires, both of which were vying for 
imperial control of North America.  He closed Democracy in America with a discussion 
of American expansion across the western frontier and into the Pacific.  While the U.S. 
already occupies a vast degree of territory, he notes that however “extensive these limits 
are, one would be wrong to believe that the Anglo-American race will always be 
contained within them.”  It is impossible to “stop the surge of the English race in the New 
World.”  Despite the powerful presence of a Comanche Empire that destabilized Spanish 
rule in the Southwest, enabling Anglo-settlers to gain a foothold in Texas, Tocqueville 
claimed, “Beyond the frontiers of the Union toward Mexico extend vast provinces that 
still lack inhabitants.  The men of the United States… will appropriate the soil, they will 
establish a society on it, and when the legitimate proprietor finally presents himself, he 
will find the desert fertilized and foreigners sitting tranquilly on his inheritance.”29  What 
is important in this portrait is that settlers are appropriating land from the Spanish and 
Russian empires, and not from indigenous communities already inhabiting that territory.  
Anglo settlers in Texas acquire territory not through dispossession but by cultivating the 
empty land and planting their culture and society in the soil. 
 Such a characterization of American expansion acquired its conceptual coherence 
through an opposition to the Russian empire of Tsar Nicholas I.  While both empires 
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were “advancing toward the same goal,” Tocqueville insisted that they have different 
principles of expansion. If American expansion represented the triumph over “wilderness 
and barbarism,” Russian expansion opposed the advance of “civilization.”  Tocqueville 
further writes, if “the conquests of the American are made with the plowshare of the 
laborer, those of the Russian with the sword of the solider.  To attain his goal, the first 
relies on personal interest and allows the force and the reason of individuals to act, 
without directing them.  The second in a way that concentrates all the power of society in 
one man.  The one has freedom for his principal means of action; the other servitude.”  
He thus portrayed U.S. expansion as a process executed through the enterprise of 
independent farmers operating under a form of enlightened self-interest, which then 
coalesced into a broader social force.  By casting agrarian citizens as the driving force of 
expansion rather than military conquest, Tocqueville constructed an image of a 




 One gets a further sense of this image of empire in the work of another French visitor 
to the U.S., the engineer Michel Chevalier.  Like other European visitors to America such 
as Frances Trollope, Chevalier was struck by the peculiar conception of democratic 
sovereignty dominant in American political culture.  Accounting for how the “principle 
of the sovereignty of the people” became predominant over aristocratic principles, 
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Chevalier observed that democracy established its empire not by “plundering its 
neighbors [and] pillaging provinces… but by the sweat of its brow, by its own resolute 
industry.”  By placing sovereignty in the people and expanding their dominion in 
accordance with this principle, Americans rejected “military power founded on conquest” 
as a legitimate basis of democratic order.
31
 
 For Chevalier as for Tocqueville, American liberty is also marked by an individualist 
ethos in which settlers cherish the freedom to move people, capital, and culture across 
territory unhampered by “excessive centralization.”  Chevalier writes, “But American 
liberty is not a mystical, undefined liberty; it is a practical liberty, in harmony with the 
peculiar genius of the people and its peculiar destiny; it is a liberty of action and motion, 
of which the American avails himself to spread himself over the vast territory that 
Providence has given him.”32   Two things are striking about this formulation.  First, 
Chevalier illustrates how modern American liberty has an expansionist tendency that 
treats social mobility and equality as a function of the spatial mobility of settlers.  
Second, the meaning of American liberty conceptually coheres in direct relation to the 
migration of settlers across the continent, who retain their rights and sovereignty as they 
establish new communities on expropriated land. 
American Primitive Accumulation 
If, in the prevailing national ideology, the U.S. was founded on rational principles of 
popular consent and not conquest, incipient notions of democratic identity required the 
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rationalization of the coercive realities of settler expansion.  One of the primary means by 
which settler expansion acquired legitimacy was to obscure the primary role of state 
power in empire-building and instead locate imperial sovereignty in “the people.”  
Democratic ideologies sustained American expansion by reconciling the violence of the 
market revolution with incipient notions of national identity.  The ideological dimension 
of “the Tocquevillean moment,” in which the authority of civil society supersedes the 
authority of the state, conceals the centrality of the coercive power of the state in the 
process of settler expansion.  The shift in American political culture to locate both 
popular sovereignty and imperial sovereignty not in the authority of the imperial state but 
in the popular habits and customs of civil society thus had an ideological effect that 
masked the role of settler conquest in producing the democratic social state. 
The idea of a weak American state occupies a central place in scholarly 
interpretations of Jacksonian politics.  In exceptionalist narratives of U.S. democratic 
development, the absence of a centralized state has served as one of the primary factors 
explaining the distinctiveness of U.S. conceptions of democracy.  For example, 
Skowronek has noted that the “exceptional character of the early American state” resides 
in its lack of administrative capacity to effectively rule and establish political authority in 
the western territories.  These characterizations and the tensions they generated were 
acutely exemplified in the writings of influential foreign observers of the American 
political scene such as Hegel, Tocqueville, and Marx.
33
 
                                                 
33
 Although my account departs from Skowronek’s portrait of American statelessness in the antebellum era, 
the following discussion draws heavily from his book, Building a New American State: The Expansion of 
National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 5-8. 
 140 
 
For Hegel, America lacked even the semblance of statehood characteristic of 
European modernity.  In Europe the modern state exists to mediate class conflict in civil 
society.  The market economy (i.e. civil society as distinct from the state) necessarily 
produced class contradiction through the vast accumulation of both wealth and poverty.  
In mediating these opposing forces, the modern state gives civil society an ethical form 
through the realization of universal freedom and the cultivation of public attachment that 
allows individuals to locate their particular interests in the general interest of society.  Put 
differently, the market economy that results from the formal differentiation of politics 
and civil society is a fragmenting force, which produces social divisions impeding 
political unity that only a centralized state can ensure.  The development of the modern 
state, therefore, arises in response to the social conflicts generated in the market economy 
characterized by the generalization of exchange relations.
34
   
In America, Hegel observed a different path of political development in which the 
alleviation of social conflict in civil society ends not in a fully ripened administrative 
state but rather in a stateless civil society.  Hegel saw American democracy as 
distinctively shaped by the condition of democratic equality, which impeded the 
formation of a centralized state.  He noted that “a real State… [will] arise only after a 
distinction of classes has arisen when wealth and poverty become extreme.”  While this 
condition accurately characterizes European development, America is “hitherto exempt 
from this pressure, for it has the outlet of colonization constantly and widely open, and 
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multitudes are continually streaming into the plains of the Mississippi.”  If vast economic 
inequality spurred the development of the modern European state, the promise of social 
equality through settler colonization ensured the virtual absence of the American state.
35
 
In a similar way, Tocqueville also distinguished the U.S. by the absence of an 
administrative state.  While the U.S. had a form of “governmental centralization,” it 
lacked the bureaucratic capacity necessary to execute military conquest and direct 
economic expansion across the west.  Whereas governmental centralization consisted in 
the federal execution of the national interest, primarily in the domain of foreign policy, 
administrative centralization entailed overseeing domestic affairs at the state and local 
level.  The effects of administrative decentralization acutely manifested themselves in the 
process of settler expansion:  the lack of a directing power forces the individual to rely on 
their own initiative in colonizing the west.  The lack of an administrative state led to the 
cultivation of the “spirit of liberty” that enabled citizens to align the common interest 
with their individual liberty:  “The inhabitant applies himself to each of the interests of 
his country as to his very own.”  In this, “the action of individual forces is joined to the 
action of social forces,” which further drove the “triumphant march of civilization across 
the wilderness.”  Individual action thus becomes social action.36  Like Hegel, Tocqueville 
thought that one of the distinctive factors shaping American national character was the 
abundance of natural resources and the lack of any rival imperial powers with which to 
compete for scarce resources.  Due to the absence of immediate territorial threats and 
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barriers to the expansion of market society, he observed that Americans lacked a 
centralized or consolidated state that directed settler expansion. 
If Hegel and Tocqueville imagined America as a stateless civil society, Marx had a 
more realistic and critically informative view of the American state and its relationship to 
civil society.  He held that the U.S. was “the most perfect example of the modern state” 
because it had successfully combined political democracy in the form of a free 
constitution with the emancipation of the private sphere of civil society from the power of 
the absolutist state.  In his early writings on democracy, undoubtedly inspired by his 
reflections on Jacksonian politics, Marx asserted that America’s republican institutions 
were the “mere state form” of society, with the real “content of the state” lying outside of 
its political constitution.
37
  Read against Marx’s insights here, Tocqueville and Hegel 
offer less an empirical account of U.S. (non)state development than an ideological 
narrative that conceals the contingent origins of American democracy in settler conquest. 
For Marx, modern political discourses that celebrated the transfer of sovereignty from 
government to civil society ideologically concealed how state power operated for the 
interests of a particular social group (in this case, settlers).  Indeed, social scientists have 
tacitly drawn on Marx’s insights to challenge the myth of the “weak American state.”  
Young and Meiser have shown how American racial order in the antebellum U.S. rested 
on the creation of a “dual American state:  a contract state, premised on the rule of law, 
that promoted the growth of a prosperous… democratic society of Anglo-Americans, and 
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a predatory state that financed white liberal society through its ruthless exploitation of 
Indian lands and African American labor.”38  If the contract state was characterized by a 
severely curtailed form of power premised on popular consent and limited to the 
enforcement of contracts among white citizens, the predatory state was a coercive form of 
power aimed at the expropriation of Indian land and slave labor. 
The contract state and predatory state were closely connected.  The demand for more 
land by settlers and Southern demands for the expansion of slavery coincided with the 
democratization of popular suffrage.  As the political system democratized, the pressure 
for Western land from Northern settlers and Southern slave owners increased.  Animated 
by the dual emergence of new conceptions of social equality and political liberty 
unmoored from aristocratic hierarchies, the coercive violence of the imperial state 
granted these ideals a solid material basis through the expropriation of slave labor and 
Indian land.  Together, these two dynamics were among the primary factors driving 
American economic development, ensuring material prosperity for North and South alike.  
“Put simply,” Young and Meiser write, “the Anglo-American state successfully 
redistributed wealth from Native Americans and African Americans to white males and 
their families.”39  The enslavement of blacks and the dispossession of Indians thus co-
existed with economic prosperity, the development of institutions and ideals of popular 
self-rule, and the enhanced security of individual liberty and property rights for white 
citizens, further forestalling class conflict in the increasingly industrialized east. 
                                                 
38
 Novak, “The Myth of the ‘Weak’ American State,” American Historical Review, 113, 3 (2008), pp. 752-
772.  Young and Meiser, “Race and the Dual State in the Early American Republic,” Race and American 
Political Development, edited by Lowndes, Novkov, and Warren (Routledge, 2008)p. 32. 
39
 Young and Meiser, “Race and the Dual State,” p. 31. 
 144 
 
Insofar as it was a clear reaction to the “social question” (which concerned general 
question of equality between social classes), settler colonization was a form of social 
policy avant la lettre.  The U.S. developed a vast administrative apparatus and set of 
public policies designed to transfer indigenous land to white ownership.  Such policies 
were often underwritten by implicit assumptions about the social basis of democracy.  In 
the American democratic tradition of the nineteenth century, political liberty required 
social equality so as to provide a buffer against the resurgence of aristocratic privilege 
and feudal social relations.  Drawing from republican arguments about the necessity of 
property ownership for civic virtue, democratic ideology upheld propertied independence 
as a prerequisite for a stable political order based on popular self-rule.  In the context of 
vast economic and population growth, such democratic discourses necessitated territorial 
and economic expansion to deliver on their promises of equality and liberty.  The 
promise of widespread property ownership, in this theory, thwarted class conflict in the 
east by siphoning off settlers to the west.  Social policies designed at solidifying white 
ownership of the land can thus be seen as a form of welfare state policy.  Put differently, 
the aim of the predatorial state of the antebellum period was to redistribute wealth and 
resources from blacks and Indians to white settlers. 
While they do not explicitly state the problem in this language, Young and Meiser 
suggest that the coercive power of the predatory state played a large part in the “primitive 
accumulation” igniting the market revolution.  Marx described “primitive accumulation” 
thusly:  “The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and 
entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and 
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looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting 
of black-skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic 
proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation.”40  The process of land 
and labor expropriation thus characterized is “primitive” in two primary senses.  In the 
first and most basic sense, it constitutes the original form of capital accumulation that 
spurred the development of modern capitalism through the colonial violence of slavery, 
coerced labor, and indigenous dispossession. 
In the second sense, this original form of capital accumulation is primitive to the 
extent that it did not fall within the classical model of capitalist social relations in which 
the two moments of exploitation – the expropriation of surplus land and labor and the 
coercive power that enforces this process – are formally distinct.  If the modern market 
economy is defined by the functional differentiation of state and civil society, primitive 
accumulation combines economic power with political domination in a single moment of 
expropriation.  In American capitalism, likewise, the coercive power of the state spurred 
the “market revolution,” which established enduring patterns of national economic 
development.
41
  Marx states that the various methods of primitive accumulation depend 
on the “brute force” of the “colonial system.”  He further writes, “But, they all employ 
the power of the State, the concentrated and organized force of society, to hasten… the 
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process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode.”42  In 
America, the transition to agrarian capitalism entailed not the forceful decimation of the 
feudal system but the coercive dispossession of indigenous societies. 
Democracy’s Savage 
One clearly sees the ideological dimension of the Tocquevillean moment at work in 
the Indian Removal Act of 1830.  In his influential book, Fathers and Children, Michael 
Rogin argued that the politics of Indian removal provided the interpretive foundation of 
American national identity.  The dichotomy of savagery and civilization offered a vital 
interpretive trope in the construction of American democratic values.  President Jackson 
noted in his first annual message, “Our conduct toward these people is deeply interesting 
to our national character.”  Jackson saw in the removal of the Southern Indian polities an 
unparalleled example of civilization over-coming savagery.
43
  By conjoining Jackson’s 
psychology to the nation’s ideology, Rogin highlighted how Jackson’s imperialistic urges 
to assert superiority over Indians paralleled attempts by national policy-makers to 
hypostasize “the bounded ego” of the American citizen.44  Although Rogin does not 
thematize the issue in this way, what I add to his account is attention to how Jackson 
justified Indian removal on the basis of what I have called the Tocquevillean moment, the 
predominance of the authority of civil society over that of the state. 
Passed by Congress in 1830, the Indian Removal Act authorized the President to 
“provide for an exchange of lands with the Indians residing in any of the states or 
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territories, and for their removal west of the river Mississippi” to land administered by 
the federal government as Indian territory.
45
  As a means of reconciling territorial 
disputes between Indian nations and Southern states, the Act sought to eliminate 
indigenous territorial claims.  To justify removal, Jackson harnessed the mythology of the 
weak state.  He pronounced, “The arm of the government is not sufficiently strong to 
preserve [the Indians] from destruction.”  Indian removal was justified, for Jackson, 
because the federal government was powerless to stop settler expansion.
46
 
Although the Congress authorized the President to carry out removal, the 
implementation of the policy required additional negotiation with the affected nations.  
Indian removal was also backed by treaties carried out by the federal government.  
Diplomatic negotiations such as those institutionalized in the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit 
Creek (1830) essentially gave the Choctaw an ultimatum:  Indians could take individual 
ownership over separate parcels of land, at which point each person was free to sell their 
plot and remove westward or settle the land and remain under state laws.  Adopting 
liberal practices of private property and commercial agriculture through the settlement of 
individual plots of land was the only means by which Indians could remain east of the 
river.
47
  Insofar as indigenous cultures are materially bound to the land, the eradication of 
their land claims necessarily implied the extinction of indigenous cultural forms. 
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Jackson articulated the primary ideological justification behind the removal treaties in 
the language of democratic consent:  “This emigration should be voluntary, for it would 
be as cruel as unjust to compel the aborigines to abandon the graves of their fathers and 
seek a home in a distant land.  But they should be distinctly informed that if they remain 
within the limits of the States they must be subject to their laws…  Submitting to the laws 
of the States, and receiving, like other citizens, protection in their persons and property, 
they will ere long become merged in the mass of our population.”48  For Jackson, Indians 
may enter into American citizenship as a matter of democratic consent, even if this 
choice was compelled by market forces and coercion in civil society.  In one regard, 
Jackson justified Indian removal by constructing the paternalist authority of the 
contractual state as a benevolent power whose objective was to protect Indians from the 
predations of white settlers.  But he also saw settlers as bearers of civilization who would 
welcome Indians once they adopted Anglo cultural norms.  In either case, the movement 
of the masses clamoring for land and freedom resided beyond political control, freeing 
the federal government from responsibility for injustice committed against Indians. 
The whole ideological edifice of Jackson’s justification of Indian removal turned on 
the distinction between state and civil society.  To uphold democratic visions of a new 
American empire, concealing state coercion was essential.  In nineteenth century thought, 
the state, which was the source of coercion and political domination, stood in contrast to 
civil society, which if left alone was orderly and harmonious.  Thus, a stateless society 
was an integral feature of the ideology of democratic empire.  To construct such a 
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narrative, ideologists of American empire construed the people acting in civil society 
rather than the state as the active agent of expansion. 
In hegemonic narratives of Jacksonian democracy, “coercion emanated only from the 
government and not from the economy or the society.”  Nevertheless, there is a peculiar 
form of force and coercion in civil society that forces Indians to sell their land and 
remove west through market mechanisms and local sovereignty.  In outlining such a form 
of “democratic control” in opposition to “totalitarian coercion,” Rogin writes, “The 
principle was to structure the environment so that the dice were loaded strongly in favor 
of a single alternative and then to give the target of social planning the onus of the choice.  
If Indians were coerced by their situation to choose to sell their land, they were not 
coerced at all.”49  In the ideology of democratic empire, the force that compels Indians to 
enter into market transactions occurs through the internalization of market liberalism and 
derives its authority from civil society rather than the federal state. 
Such an ideological schematic went a long way in reconciling the coercive reality of 
westward expansion with idealistic self-conceptions of American democratic identity.  
Although he was mildly critical of Indian removal, Tocqueville clearly reflected this 
reconciliation in his comparison of North American colonization with Spanish 
colonialism.  While the Spanish “pillaged the New World… without discrimination and 
without pity,” the “conduct of the Americans of the United States toward the natives, on 
the contrary, breathes the purest love of forms of legality.”  Rather than expropriating 
land directly by force and conquest, Americans “do not permit themselves to occupy their 
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lands without have duly acquired them by means of a contract.”  If the Spanish have 
committed the most “monstrous deeds” in settling the New World, Anglo-Americans 
have achieved the same results “without spilling blood” and “without violating… the 
laws of humanity.”  In spite of the clear dispossession at work in Indian removal, 
Tocqueville saw the contractual mechanisms driving American expansion as consistent 
with the spread of civilization across the western frontier.
50
 
Underpinning Jackson’s removal policy was the binary of civilization/savagery. 
Jackson proclaimed that removal will “place a dense and civilized population in large 
tracts of country now occupied by a few savage hunters.”  Instead of inflicting violence 
on Indians, removal will free them from “immediate contact with settlements of whites,” 
enabling them to “pursue happiness… under their own rude institutions.”  Criticizing 
opponents of removal, Jackson asserted that “true philanthropy reconciles the mind” to 
the fact that progress requires removal.  As “waves of population and civilization are 
rolling to the westward,” it would violate the laws of humanity to keep the continent in 
“the condition in which it was found by our forefathers,” in an undeveloped, savage 
state.
51
  Insofar as citizens acting freely in civil society drove the civilizing process, 
democratic ideals of political liberty and social equality came to represent a higher stage 
of civilization.  Nevertheless, the savagery of Indian tribes prevented them from entering 
into the course of civilization.  In a speech aimed at persuading the Cherokee to remove 
west in 1835, Jackson proclaimed, “Circumstances that cannot be controlled and which 
are beyond the reach of human laws render it impossible that you can flourish in the 
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midst of a civilized community.”52  Jackson thus resigned himself to a position of 
powerlessness in the face of the inevitable surge of democracy and civilization westward. 
The ascendance of democracy as a form of civilization necessitated the displacement 
of savagery.  In modernist conceptions of time, human societies are arrayed along a linear 
process of historical development stretching from savagery to civilization.  As civilized 
society advances westward, savagery must inevitably retreat:  “The law of nature and of 
progress requires that those unsuited for civilization either give way to those who bear the 
germs of progress or be destroyed.”  In this theory of history marked by the steady 
modernization of American civilization, each stage of historical development witnessed 
the dominance of a single class/race, which is supplanted by the hegemony of another 
class as a new stage of development arises.  Just as Indians gave way to the trappers who 
gave way to the yeoman farmers as the dominant class of the West, the primacy of 
agriculture was giving way to the primacy of industry.
53
   
The distinction between savagery and civilization, then, was built into the conceptual 
architecture of modern American democracy.  The actual practice of Indian removal and 
the colonial discourses used to justify it fundamentally shaped the spatio-temporal 
dimensions of democracy, transforming it from an archaic political form to a modern 
political culture.  In the inaugural issue of the United States Magazine and Democratic 
Review, the unofficial political and cultural journal of the Democratic Party, John 
O’Sullivan expressed the new spatio-temporal dimensions of modern democracy in terms 
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that would become Manifest Destiny.  For O’Sullivan, the “principle of democratic 
republicanism” entails an “abiding confidence in the virtue, intelligence, and full capacity 
for self-government of the great mass of our people.”  Like Tocqueville, O’Sullivan held 
that democratic rule depended on broader cultural values such as the “voluntary 
principle” of democratic consent and the “pervading spirit of democratic equality” that 
abolishes social rank as the basis of political power. 
Distinct from prevailing conceptions of democracy during the Revolutionary period, 
O’Sullivan saw the democratic principle in terms of a modern imaginary that was 
progressive and expansive in its spatial and temporal form.  O’Sullivan proclaimed that 
the “democratic principle” was “borne onward by an unseen hand of Providence,” which 
was leading “our race toward the high destinies” of human progress.54  Under the 
guidance of divine Providence, the “great nation of futurity” occupied a “magnificent 
domain of space and time.”  Recalling radically democratic conceptions of popular 
sovereignty, O’Sullivan held that the modern principles of “individual equality and 
political liberty” were produced through the “onward march of the multitude… through 
the present and the future.”55  What O’Sullivan’s conjunction of messianic history and 
laissez-faire view of government suggests is that democracy is a stage of civil society 
marked by the virtual absence of a state.  The highest stage of civilization, in other words, 
was marked not by the development of the modern state but by the precedence of civil 
society over the authority of the state. 
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O’Sullivan’s notion that democracy represents a stage of civilization exemplified a 
broader trend in antebellum political culture.  George Bancroft, a Democratic historian 
with close ties to Jackson and O’Sullivan, also saw democracy as a stage of civilization.  
Drawing on Hegelian conceptions of history, the premise of Bancroft’s epic History of 
the United States was that “at any point in time there is a civilization or nation that is 
commissioned by the movement of history to bring into being the next chapter in the 
development of the spirit.”56  One of the distinctive features of Bancroft’s history was to 
make the democratic masses in America rather than states or heroic men the primary 
agent of historical progress.  In constructing a democratic conception of history, Bancroft 
cast the ascendance of the principle of popular sovereignty in terms civilizational 
progress:  “the measure of the progress of civilization is the progress of the people.”  In 
art, politics, and economics alike, “every great reform… has sprung from the power of 
the people.”  In this way, the “conceded axiom” of the “sovereignty of the people” is not 
simply a new political principle.  It is also a force of progress that will extend beyond its 
American origins to embrace “all the civilized nations of the earth.”57 
Bancroft’s conception of the demos as the force of history had an explicit imperial 
dimension.  Casting the American Revolution as divinely ordained, Bancroft asserted that 
the “indestructible elements of freedom in the colonies asked room for expansion and 
growth.”  Unable to fully exploit the providential bounty of the New World under the rule 
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of a declining empire, Americans sought to lay “the foundation of so noble an empire” 
that would develop the continent and take its place among the supreme powers of the 
world.
58
  Bancroft’s history showed how American power arose not from the authority of 
the state but from the commitment of citizens to democratic virtue.  Westward expansion, 
for Bancroft, was nothing more than the workings out of the historical laws of modern 
progress.
59
  The progress of democracy, however, required the triumph of civilization 
over savagery.  Bancroft wrote that the Indian, “equaling the white man in the sagacity of 
the senses,” is “inferior in reason and the moral qualities,” a quality that extends from 
individuals to the political organization of the race.  In this manner, the superiority of 
democratic society stood in explicit contrast to the inferiority of indigenous forms of 
social and political organization.
60
 
The conception of history at work in these democratic discourses turned on the notion 
of translatio imperii that stood at the center of the imperial republicanism of the 
Revolutionary era (see chapter one).  According to Anders Stephanson, translatio imperii 
expressed the idea “that civilization was always carried forward by a single dominant 
power or people and that historical succession was a matter of westward movement.”61  
The historical development of civilization has a spatial direction:  human progress moves 
westward.  In order to extend themselves in time, empires expand in space. 
                                                 
58
 Bancroft, History, Vol. VII, pp. 21, 23. 
59
 Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth About History (Norton, 1995), p. 113. 
60
 Quoted in Pearce, Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1967), p. 162.  Bancroft, History, Vol. III, p. 302. 
61
 Stephanson, Manifest Destiny, p. 18.  Tuveson similarly defines translatio imperii as the idea that “that in 
any given period one nation or people will exercise the imperium of civilization, culturally and 
politically…  After some centuries, ‘empire’ will move to another state;” Redeemer Nation:  The Idea of 
America’s Millennial Role (University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 95. 
 155 
 
Central to the idea of translatio imperii was the affirmation of the U.S. as playing 
pivotal role in the course of human history.  According to this idea, the seat and power of 
civilization was continually moving westward, from the Orient to Greece and Rome to 
Britain and now, at the height of the modern world, to the Americas.  North America was 
the frontier of the world-historical process, which found its consummation in a new order 
of the ages when the civilizing process of history had traversed the entire globe, bringing 
the entire planet into the domain of its rule.  In other words, the expansion of the United 
States to the Pacific would result in the “end of history” because North America was 
considered the space of the final phase of history before modernity engulfed the globe.  
As U.S. expansion stretched to the Pacific, the seat of empire approached the ancient 
origins of civilization.  Because this process was ordained by God and nature, the U.S. 
was the vanguard of universal peace and modern commerce.  Along with this unique role 
was the sense that democratic empire did not follow the same historical laws as previous 
empires, both ancient and modern, wherein the flow of historical time was marked by the 
cycle of rise and decline.  Democratic empire was, in this sense, an eternal empire. 
The translatio concept partakes in an exceptionalist discourse that “placed the new 
nation outside of time, and so exempted the United States from the cycle of rise and 
decline, or foundation and decay.”  Combined with the “providential bounty” of western 
land that made boundless expansion seem inevitable, democratic empire “provided a 
spatial solution to the problem of republican temporality” by suspending time and 
forestalling the threat of decline and social decay.
62
  The Tocquevillean moment thus 
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promised institutional stability and temporal duration by suspending history through a 
democratically organized mode of expansion.  It was the expansion of American 
democracy through space that compelled its progression from one stage of civilization to 
another.  The triumph of American democracy promised to end the cycle of republican 
temporality marked by the continual rise and decline of earthly empires. 
The doctrine of translatio imperii signified a limitless form of expansion that required 
the historical movement of Western civilization to return to Asia, encapsulating the 
whole globe.  In this historical understanding, “the progressive westward movement of 
civilization” culminated in the triumph of civilization over savagery and the ascendance 
of a universal form of empire.  Progress thus implied the conquest of empire over 
indigenous nations and rival imperial powers.  In classical republican models of 
temporality, societies pass through several stages of growth:  in the earliest stages 
societies are primitive; in the middle stages societies are agricultural and pastoral; and in 
the later stages societies become luxurious and corrupt.  Exceptionalist discourses of 
translatio imperii in essence conjoined stadial history to modernist conceptions of linear 
time as a means of breaking the imperial cycle of rise and decline.  Through settler 
expansion, American democrats could forestall the inevitable decline into social decay, 
corruption, and class conflict.
63
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Like O’Sullivan and Bancroft, Tocqueville also held democracy to be the final stage 
of civilization in the drama of human history.  Although he wrote to a predominantly 
French audience, Tocqueville’s book offered a romantic portrait of democracy to 
American citizens that reinforced their own idealistic self-conceptions about the 
superiority of American civilization.  Tocqueville’s contention that modernity was 
tending toward democracy and that the “equality of conditions” was a “providential fact” 
thus partakes in the same discourse that Bancroft, O’Sullivan, and Jackson all used to 
justify democratic expansion.  The degree to which he replaces the “divine right of kings” 
with the “divine right of the people” and locates a religious element in the movement of 
democratic equality significantly presaged if not prefigured the discourse of Manifest 
Destiny.  Tocqueville wrote, “In this gradual and continuous advance of the European 
race toward the Rocky Mountains, there is something providential; it’s like a flood of 
men ceaselessly swelling, drawn on each day by the hand of God.”64  In placing a divine 
power to expand across the American landscape in the sovereignty of the people, 
Tocqueville provided an image of expansion that is without conquest. 
What is at stake here is less Tocqueville’s normative judgment about the superiority 
of Euro-American civilization than his descriptive judgment about the relentless advance 
of democratic civilization through space and time.  The expansion of American 
democracy meant the inevitable retreat of savagery.  Tocqueville writes, “I believe that 
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the Indian race of North America is condemned to perish, and I cannot prevent myself 
from thinking that on the day that the Europeans will have settled on the coast of the 
Pacific Ocean, it will have ceased to exist.”  Tocqueville posed two possibilities to 
indigenous communities for salvation:  “war or civilization; in other words, they had to 
destroy the Europeans or become their equals.”65  Paradoxically, however, equality here 
does not entail that indigenous peoples retain their cultural autonomy, but that they 
succumb to the civilizing tendencies of American democracy.  That is, the spread of 
egalitarian norms operated in democratic society as a form of native elimination.  In a 
sort of perverse logic, the process of civilization becomes one of extermination.   
The binary of savagery and civilization is inscribed into the operative terms of 
modern American democracy as registered in the Tocquevillean imagination.  
Democracy constituted a civilized form of society insofar as the concept of liberty at its 
center was hemmed in by the moral boundaries of Christian religion and the enlightened 
self-interest of market liberalism.  The moderate ethos of democratic liberty allowed 
Americans to simultaneously embrace the individual freedom of commercial liberalism 
and the republican liberty of civic humanism.  Democracy worked for Tocqueville 
because Americans neither inherited nor constructed walls between their private lives and 
public authority.  Inhabiting an extreme form of liberty that lacked the moderation of 
Protestant religious norms and the ethos of market liberalism, Indians were cast outside 
the pale of civilized society and thus democratic community. 
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What is most significant in Tocqueville’s characterization of democratic equality as a 
“providential fact” is that his thinking reflected a broader discursive shift from republican 
models of history characterized by the cycle of imperial rise and decline to a modernist 
conception of time in which history represents the progressive surge of liberty and 
equality toward a final stage.  Although this conception of time and space was already 
present in the republican discourse of the founding era, Tocqueville’s contribution to 
American ideology was to integrate democratic self-conceptions into this broader system 
of national signification.  Dominant understandings of democracy as they emerged in the 
modern political imagination were thus indelibly shaped by the politics and discourse of 
settler-colonial empire.  In the American version of translatio imperii, history was not 
simply transformed from a cyclical to a linear process, but a linear process that was 
progressively tending toward a final end.  The temporality of the American democratic 
ethos represented an escape from historical time that ensured institutional stability in the 
face of modernist forces that threatened to tear the fabric of social order.  As such, 
obstacles to expansion posed by Mexico and Indian polities were seen as existential 
threats to the health and vitality of American democracy. 
The so-called “march of equality,” as Francis Fukuyama puts it, operates through 
settler colonization.  Driven by modern ideals of equality and self-rule, Tocqueville 
thought American settlers were destined to establish dominion over North America and 
commercial supremacy in the Pacific:  “At a period which may be said to be near – for 
we are speaking of the life of a nation – the Anglo-Americans alone will cover the 
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immense space contained between the polar regions and the tropics, extending from the 
coasts of the Atlantic to those of the Pacific Ocean.”66  The march here operates in both a 
metaphorical and literal sense:  as the steady progression of democratic equality, 
signaling the rise of modernity; and as the steady march of settlers across the western 
landscape, which offered citizens the promise of social mobility and economic 
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The Imperial Self:  Individualism, Equality, and Manifest Destiny 
 
“The American people are, then, now advancing, victoriously to plant democratic empire co-equal with the 
area of the continent.”  William Gilpin, Mission of the North American People (1873) 
 
“The warlike proceedings of the Americans in Mexico were purely exceptional, having been carried on 
principally by volunteers, under the influence of the migratory propensity which prompts individual 
Americans to possess themselves of unoccupied land.”  John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative 
Government (1861) 
 
As we saw in the last chapter, the construction of Jacksonian democratic culture 
relied on the colonial binary of savagery and civilization that underpinned institutions of 
Indian removal.  Yet the pervasiveness of this binary extended even to critics of removal 
policy.  In a letter to President Martin Van Buren, Ralph Waldo Emerson provided a 
critique of Indian removal then being imposed on the Cherokees in 1837.  Beneath 
Emerson’s critique of removal, however, was a subtle assumption about the superiority of 
Anglo civilization:  “In common with the great body of the American people, we have 
witnessed with sympathy the painful labors of these red men to redeem their own race 
from the doom of eternal inferiority, and to borrow and domesticate in the tribe the arts 
and customs of the Caucasian race.”1  For Emerson, Indian removal constituted an 
injustice because the Cherokee had already begun to enter into American civilization.
2
  In 
the shadow of an expanding empire, Emerson posed two choices to Indians:  either be 
civilized by the Anglo-Americans or be destroyed by them.  Rather than opening up the 
space for the recognition of radical difference, the choice between the two affirmed the 
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cultural superiority of American civilization and the justice of democracy’s inexorable 
expansion.  In spite of his criticism of removal policy, Emerson forced Indians into a 
“modernizing pattern” that mimicked the development of white settlers, partaking in the 




While scholars tend to celebrate Emerson’s criticism of Indian removal as a 
counterpoint to the coercion of American empire, this perspective ignores the cultural 
hierarchies embedded in his criticism of federal Indian policy.  The impulse to celebrate 
his denunciation of Indian removal exemplifies what Jean Paul Sartre calls a form of 
“colonial mystification” that underwrites imperial order.  At the center of this 
mystification is a distinction between good colonizers and bad colonizers, to which Sartre 
responds that there are only colonizers.
4
  Viewed as a political system, settler 
colonialism, even in its civilizing modalities, constitutes a hierarchical form of imperial 
order.  Emerson’s discourse on Indian removal thus exemplifies a point succinctly made 
by Charles Mills:  “[O]pposition to the ill treatment of indigenes is not the same thing as 
opposition to European expansionism.  One can sincerely condemn cruelty to those 
viewed as less than equal while continuing to think of them as less than equal.”5 
As scholars of American literature and political thought have long established, the 
American political tradition constructs a “boundary condition” around reformist modes of 
politics that restrict the enactment of their emancipatory and inclusive visions.  Following 
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this perspective, I argue that it is precisely in his idealistic vision of settler expansion that 
Emerson reinforces the ideology of democratic empire.
6
  While he was mildly critical of 
U.S. expansionism, his idealistic faith that the antebellum order was built on the anti-
statist foundations of commercial liberalism kept him from understanding how settler-
colonial violence formed the very ideological and material basis of American democracy. 
 By placing Emerson’s thought in the broader context of U.S. expansion, it becomes 
apparent that the central categories of Emersonian democracy were not only shaped in 
reference to the politics of settler colonialism but also significantly reinforced the 
ideological structure of democratic empire.  Emerson’s democratic thought served an 
ideological function that legitimated the modes of cultural conquest enacted by the 
expansion of U.S. sovereignty and the market economy westward.  Moreover, like 
Tocqueville’s conception of civil society, implicit in Emerson’s view of U.S. democratic 
culture was a contrast between American civilization on the one hand and the savagery 
and barbarism of Indians and Mexicans on the other.  To understand these ideological 
dynamics, I use the concept of the “imperial self” to capture how the cultural ethos of 
individualism and radical conceptions of democratic equality circulating in the political 
culture of the 1840s not only invited a politics of settler expansion but were themselves 
constructed in through the prism of imperial ideology. 
 The idea of the “imperial self” first emerged when literary critics following the 
Vietnam War criticized Emerson as standing for the “embodiment of the irresponsible 
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frontier mentality.”7  For literary critics like Quentin Anderson, Emerson’s replacement 
of communal life with an emphasis on atomistic individualism obviated the possibility of 
a critically engaged and socially conscious politics.  The prevalence of the “imperial self” 
in the nineteenth century initiated a “flight from culture, from the institutions and 
emotional dispositions of associated life.”  Emerson’s atomistic individualism drove 
territorial expansion by allowing citizens to flee politics and retreat into an irresponsible 
ethos of material acquisition.
8
  My aim in drawing on the “imperial self” is not to 
resurrect these criticisms of Emerson’s atomistic individualism.  Rather, I follow 
contemporary scholars in viewing Emerson’s thought as signified by a notion of 
democratic individuality that locates the individual in the political community.  Emerson 
was deeply engaged in the project of constructing an American democratic identity that 
would bind citizens together in a single community.  Even in its embrace of democratic 
community, however, Emersonian democracy was founded on a politics of settler 
colonialism that drove the spatial extension American power. 
 While I want to retain the “imperial self” as a way of characterizing U.S. democratic 
culture, I reject readings of the idea as a retreat from politics and culture.  I conceptualize 
the imperial self not as an attempt to flee the political but as a cultural complement of the 
institutional architecture of the U.S. imperial state gearing up for expansionary conquest 
in the 1840s.  I thus employ the term not in Anderson’s sense to name the process by 
which the atomistic individual flees society, but rather as a means of characterizing the 
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process by which the powers of the self-reliant individual to settle vacant land come to 
stand in for the sovereignty of the imperial state.
9
  Emerson’s individualist cultivated his 
sense of self through the process of colonizing the west, an inherently political process 
that involved the construction of settler-colonial hierarchies.  The idea of the imperial self 
explicitly located imperial sovereignty in the sovereignty of the individual, ideologically 
masking the role of conquest in shaping antebellum democracy. 
 This chapter illustrates how democratic theories of popular sovereignty in the era of 
Manifest Destiny were constitutively shaped by the process of settler expansion and the 
conquest of Mexico.  To explore this dynamic, I turn the writings of John O’Sullivan to 
provide the ideological contours of Manifest Destiny and how it reinforced the ideology 
of democratic empire.  I then examine Emerson’s conceptions of individualism and 
equality in relation to the discursive contexts of Manifest Destiny and the economic and 
political contexts of settler colonialism.  To further outline the ideology of democratic 
empire, I juxtapose O’Sullivan and Emerson conceptions of democratic empire to Whig 
ideology.  My objective is less to present an original argument about Emerson and 
O’Sullivan’s thought than it is to show how the broader political culture they represented 
developed in relation to processes of settler expansion and conquest. 
Young America and Manifest Destiny 
 To understand how Emerson’s conceptions of individualism and democratic equality 
both reflected and reinforced the burgeoning discourse of Manifest Destiny, it is 
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necessary to first understand the broader political and cultural context of the 1840s 
United States.  Although the Jacksonian period saw a flurry of mass movements taking 
root in American civil society, the period is perhaps best defined by the political and 
cultural movement called “Young America.”  As a broad current of political and cultural 
discourse, Young America represented a democratic awakening in the American political 
imagination to the possibilities of popular self-rule.  In an effort to actualize democratic 
ideals, Young America advocated for free trade, expanded political participation, 
universal suffrage, limited government, economic development, land reform, and 
territorial expansion.  What uniquely characterized Young America, however, was its 
fusion of politics and culture in service of national development. 
 At the center of this broad movement was the journalist, John O’Sullivan, who in 
1845 coined the term “manifest destiny.”  After some help from Jackson and Van Buren 
in recovering a family fortune, O’Sullivan started the United States Magazine and 
Democratic Review in 1837 to give the Democratic Party a cultural base in mass society.  
In an attempt to politically recover from crippling economic depression, President Van 
Buren sought a broad base of popular support, which the journal aimed to provide. In 
spite of the persistent illusion of formal independence from the Democratic Party, Van 
Buren helped O’Sullivan’s vision of a democratic journal of thought and culture come to 
fruition and ensured its continued success by promoting it among the Democratic Party 
ranks. Having shared O’Sullivan’s vision for a literary and political journal promoting 
democratic principles, Andrew Jackson himself was among the first subscribers.  
Through his position in networks of political and cultural elites in New York and 
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Washington, O’Sullivan’s journal published leading voices of the antebellum period such 
as Walt Whitman, Orestes Brownson, George Bancroft, and Ralph Waldo Emerson.
10
 
 On the literary side of Young America, radical ideals of popular self-rule and the 
formation of a national literature represented two sides of democratic nationalism.  First 
coined by author and frequent contributor to the Democratic Review, Cornelius 
Matthews, Young America symbolized the ideals of popular democracy along with a 
conception of national literature in which “the people” were at once subject, author, and 
audience.
11
  For Mathews, the formation of a democratic literature signified not only 
national glory, but also provided vital support for popular rule by instilling democratic 
values and habits in the citizenry.  In a similar vein, the literary editor of the Democratic 
Review, Evert Duyckinck, held that a national literature would both reflect and inform the 
political institutions of the nation.  Paraphrasing the French intellectual Germaine De 
Stael, he wrote that “the form of government, the laws, the private manners and pursuits, 
and the religion of a people, are reflected by… their literature; and… these 
circumstances, in their turn, re-act upon the form of the government.”12 
 Beyond its literary dimensions, Young America also had a political component in a 
group of Democrats who promoted the market revolution, economic expansion, and 
radical land reform.
13
  As a correlate of its literary dimension, George Henry Evans, a 
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radical reformer and leader of the workingmen’s movements that took root in New York 
and Philadelphia during the 1830s, created a journal of radical workerism that also went 
by the name “Young America.”  As the founder of the National Reform Association 
(NRA), a civic organization that actively lobbied Congress for land reform, Evans 
published a tract, “Vote Yourself a Farm,” which was originally distributed as a handbill 
for the NRA.  The central principle of the tract was that social equality, and hence 
political democracy and equal citizenship, required the cheap availability of public land 
in order to ensure the economic independence necessary for popular self-rule and the 
cultivation of civic virtue.  More than a means of eliminating economic inequality, Evans 
saw land reform as a way of transforming society through the diffusion of wealth and the 
democratization of power.  Key to such a program was the acquisition and reservation of 
western land for settlement by independent farmers.
14
 
 While the idea of Young America represented a distinct current of thought and 
culture, it was also part and parcel of a broader trans-Atlantic movement of republican-
nationalism.  In Europe, self-consciously national movements first emerged in the form 
of “youth movements” that were modeled on Giuseppe Mazzini’s cry for Italian 
unification under the banner of “Young Italy.”  Mazzini hoped that the cultivation of a 
national consciousness replete with a national literature would free Italy from foreign 
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control and instill national unity.  In response, similarly inspired movements took the 
form of Young Germany, Young France, and Young Ireland.
15
  Whereas these European 
movements were revolutionary in their commitment to the overthrow of monarchical 
rule, the American counterpart was more moderate in its defense of democratic principles 
in opposition to aristocratic currents in American politics and imperial geo-politics.  In 
both cases, the trope of youthfulness captured an optimistic faith in new beginnings 
generated by political and economic modernization, which promised to break the bonds 
of ancient fetters and replace them with democratic institutions. 
 Settler expansion stood at the center of Young America and was a key component of 
its optimistic faith in modern democracy.  The progressive ethos of Young America 
directly engendered an imperial ideology that promoted territorial and economic 
expansion.  For the Young Americans, Priscilla Wald notes, “the essence – and the 
destiny – of the nation is expansion.  And an expanding nation implies the triumph of the 
democratic principles.”16  Empire and democracy were firmly linked in the discourse of 
Young America.  One editor of the Democratic Review wrote that the term “Young 
America” was a symbol of “sympathy for the liberals of Europe, the expansion of the 
American Republic southward and westward, and the grasping of the magnificent purse 
of the commerce of the Pacific.”17 
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 Although little appreciated as a political thinker, John O’Sullivan distilled many key 
aspects of the ideology of democratic empire throughout the late 1830s and 1840s in a 
series of editorials for the Democratic Review.  In his introductory editorial for the 
inaugural issue, O’Sullivan established democracy as the central interpretive trope of 
American national identity by showing the importance of the “democratic principle” to 
“our political system and literature.”  On a simplistic level, democratic liberty for 
O’Sullivan consisted in the individual freedom of what he called the “voluntary 
principle,” which encapsulated skepticism of concentrated power and a focus on 
individual consent.  But O’Sullivan’s voluntary principle was much more than merely an 
anti-statist argument for a laissez-faire economic order.  He remained committed to a 
participatory system which affirmed the “full capacity for self-government [in] the great 
mass of our people” and the “republican principle of the supremacy of the will of the 
majority.”18  O’Sullivan was less concerned with curtailing the size of the federal 
government than he was with ensuring that the objective of federal policy remained the 
pursuit of res publica rather than the elite interests of the few.  In this liberal-republican 
schematic, the raison d’etat of the federal state was the protection of individual freedom 
as well as the guarantee of equality in social rank through the redistribution of land to the 
masses not from the white economic elite but from Indians and Mexicans. 
 In justifying settler expansion, O’Sullivan drew on a civilizational discourse that 
divided North American political space into savage and civilized.  His concept of 
civilization entailed a progressive notion of time in which history tended toward a 
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singular point of convergence – “the ultimate perfection of man.”  In this fashion, the 
“course of civilization is the progress of man from a state of savage individualism to that 
of an individualism more elevated, moral, and refined.”  If “savage individualism,” 
exemplified by indigenous peoples, represented individual freedom from tyranny, it was 
also an anti-communal liberty in which respect for individual property rights was not 
sacred.  Beyond the “savage individualism” of the Americas, O’Sullivan constructed the 
democratic principle in opposition to the feudal stage of history in which the “spirit of 
exclusive rank or class” prevailed.  Thus, when he claims that American land “separated 
from the influences of ancient arrangement” ensured the “free spirit of the new-born 
democracy,” he tacitly juxtaposes civilized democracy to feudal Europe, Mexican 
barbarism, and indigenous savagery.
19
 
 While the push toward the Mexican War was clearly geared toward the expropriation 
of Mexican and indigenous land, it also had a significant anti-aristocratic element that 
was directed against the re-colonization of North America by Britain.  As early as 1844, 
President James K. Polk had declared that Britain was a “foreign power” that was 
violating the Monroe Doctrine by attempting to establish colonial settlement in Texas.
20
  
Without having fully established a claim to both Texas and the Oregon territory, 
democratic expansionists feared that a British presence in the Southwest and Northwest 
would provide a foothold for the return of feudalism in America.  British principles of 
feudal and aristocratic rule served as a constitutive though negative reference point for 
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the democratic imperial imaginary.  If the British Empire expanded to establish inequality 
and servitude, the American democratic empire embraced a civic dimension in expanding 
to establish the political and economic independence of citizens. 
 O’Sullivan fully developed these themes in an editorial on what he called one of the 
great “problems of the age” – i.e. property.  In contrasting an American empire based on 
social equality and self-rule to the British Empire, O’Sullivan mocked and satirized a 
“civilized nation” who “cannot afford bread and meat to the men who produce these.”  
The source of this embarrassment was the fact that although Britain possessed a vast 
extent of “colonies and dependencies,” British officials restricted the democratic part of 
the population to the home territory for the sake of providing a steady stream of industrial 
labor.
21
  Whereas the U.S. acquired territories in an effort promote social equality through 
widespread property ownership, Britain restricted its people from establishing settlements 
and acquiring property in the colonies.   
 The consequence was that British society was buckling under the duress of its 
industrial contradictions, in which the suppression of industrial wages fanned the flames 
of festering class conflict.  In contrast, American political development was spared such a 
fate.  O’Sullivan located such a possibility in the “safety-valve of the public lands… the 
free woods and rich lands of the far West.”  Through settler colonization, the nation could 
economically develop while still ensuring the propertied independence of the vast 
majority of citizens and consequently the very principles of popular sovereignty and 
majority rule.  To this end, O’Sullivan championed a series of policies of preemption 
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passed through Congress, which granted settlers the right to occupy land that has not 
been settled and then purchase that land at a low price when it went on the market.  Such 
a policy, in O’Sullivan’s eyes, would keep the nation from descending into chaos and 
anarchy in light of industrialization in the East.
22
 
 In the ideology of democratic empire, regimes of land-appropriation provided a 
barrier against feudalism in the Americas and ensured the viability of the democratic 
social state.  In America, empire became the single most vital bulwark of democracy’s 
eclipse by the creation of a trans-Atlantic aristocracy brought about by the potential 
resurgence of British rule in Mexico.  In the conflict between democratic and aristocratic 
forms of expansion, O’Sullivan introduced the concept of Manifest Destiny into 
American political discourse.
23
  In response to British designs for the acquisition of Texas 
as a colonial dependency and its refusal to relinquish claims to the Oregon territory, the 
notion of Manifest Destiny established the superiority of democratic institutions in 
opposition to the feudal aristocracy of Britain.  If Britain sought to subject Texas to the 
status of a colonial dependency, the democratic connotations of Manifest Destiny 
signaled a conception of empire in which the acquisition of new territories were 
integrated into the federal union on equal terms with existing states.  In accordance with 
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the idea of federalist imperialism laid out in the Northwest Ordinance, democratic empire 
expanded according to principles of federal equality and federalist replication. 
 After the U.S. annexed Texas in 1845, O’Sullivan introduced the language of 
Manifest Destiny as a means of asserting American territorial claims in North America 
against the British Empire.  In reaction to both Whigs and British diplomats who sought 
to check American expansion, O’Sullivan railed against those who remained intent on 
“limiting our greatness and checking the fulfillment of our manifest destiny to overspread 
the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our multiplying 
millions.”24  In an editorial for the New York Morning News, O’Sullivan similarly 
asserted that America’s “True Title” to Oregon derived from the superiority of its 
democratic way of life.  The claim to Oregon, O’Sullivan pronounced, “is by the right of 
our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which 
Providence has given for the development of the great experiment of liberty and 
federative self-government entrusted to us.”  Although O’Sullivan was unaware that his 
term would coalesce into a powerful political symbol, it became a potent expression of 
America’s “providentially or historically sanctioned right to continental expansion.”25  
 Manifest Destiny, however, was not simply a clever ideological ploy used to 
extinguish the territorial claims of Britain, Mexico, and indigenous polities.  Rather, it 
represented a whole new way of interpreting the time and space of democracy.
26
  It thus 
shaped the very conceptual logic of the democratic imagination by casting democracy not 
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as a political form confined to the restricted space of the polis and the ancient temporality 
of cyclical instability but as a form of culture that was progressive and expansive in its 
scope and duration.  Portraying democracy as the highest stage of modernity, O’Sullivan 
proclaimed that “our country is destined to be the great nation of futurity” because “the 
principle upon which a nation is organized fixes its destiny.”27  Such changes in dominant 
conceptions of time as a progressive process of universal history served radical purposes 
by challenging the authority and legitimacy of feudal order.  By casting the history of the 
American nation in terms of a telos of expanding democratic equality, a nation whose 
destiny represented the highest stage of historical development, imperial democrats 
demonstrated the frailty of feudal hierarchies. 
 Although less directly concerned with questions of space than political time, the 
parallels between the language of “futurity” and Manifest Destiny suggests that the 
institutional durability of democratic-republics in time depends upon expansion in space.  
The progressive extension of democracy into the future was a function of empire. If the 
“Machiavellian moment” represented the problem of institutional and political duration in 
response to the temporal finitude of all republics, the discourse of Manifest Destiny 
reversed its polarity by seeing empire not as the limit but as the precondition of 
democratic-republican politics (i.e. the Tocquevillean moment).  As such, Manifest 
Destiny enacts the “spatialization of time:”  time is subordinated to space, or rather 
derived from space such that progress implies expansion and the division of political 
space according to imperial hierarchies of race and nation.  The spatio-temporal 
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dimensions of American democracy and its constitutive ideals of individualism and 
equality are thus simultaneously hierarchical and expansionary:  hierarchical because 
individualist society is a higher stage of development, and expansionary because this 
hierarchy authorizes native elimination and settler conquest.
28
 
 Although Manifest Destiny is most significantly associated with the dynamics of 
continental expansion, the impulses driving settler colonization encapsulated a much 
wider spatial scope that embraced commercial expansion into the Pacific.  In response to 
the recession caused by the Panic of 1837, democratic expansionists sought the 
acquisition of new territory in order to expand foreign markets and diffuse domestic 
economic distress.  In order to provide for domestic political stability, democratic 
politicians sought to transform the United States into the world’s preeminent economic 
power.  Part of this entailed control of overseas export markets in an effort to deal with 
commodity surpluses and economic depression in the domestic economy.  Even as he 
was gearing up for continental conquest, President Polk saw the expansion of overseas 
trade as a vital means of promoting equality at home and relieving economic burdens on 
the agrarian class:  “The home market alone is inadequate to enable them to dispose of 
the immense surplus of food and other articles which they are capable of producing.”29  
Developing the West was necessary not only to provide agrarian farmers with propertied 
independence, but also to open up export markets in the Pacific, which were equally 
necessary to the commercial-agrarian ideal.  By giving independent farmers the 
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opportunity to sell their surpluses on global markets, the free flow of capital prevented 
the resurgence of aristocratic interests and feudal hierarchies. 
 For O’Sullivan, supremacy over international trade went hand-in-hand with the 
project of settler colonization.  Championing both preemption policies that granted 
settlers cheap land and policies of free trade that opened Asian markets to American 
exports, O’Sullivan asserted “the general policy of the democracy is to favor the 
settlement of the land, spread the bounds of the future empire, and to favor, by freedom 
of intercourse and external commerce, the welfare of the settler.”  As such, settler 
colonization encapsulated a commercial dimension in the promotion of free trade in the 
Pacific, which was then incorporated into the agrarian-republican ideal.  By conquering 
the continent, the “laborious cultivators of the soil [will] have the road to market opened 
before them.” In the same breath, O’Sullivan rejoiced that such developments will guide 
the irresistible “progress of liberal principles throughout the world.”30 
Conquest and Consent in Mexico 
 In spite of confident rhetoric about the divinely sanctioned right of Americans to 
conquer Mexico, the centrality of war and conquest to the settler colonial project 
generated profound anxieties in the democratic-imperial imaginary, forcing democratic 
expansionists to reconcile their egalitarian and democratic ideals with the exigencies of 
colonial conquest.  When President Polk and his cabinet began pushing for war with 
Mexico, they agreed with the democratic press that the war should not be fought for 
conquest and that Mexico should not be dismembered or absorbed into the union without 
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the consent of Mexicans.  That is, the United States could fight to annex Texas, a 
democratic people who sought to enter the union of their own accord, but they could not 
annex Mexico against the will of the Mexican people.  The coercive annexation of a 
conquered territory represented a threat to the very foundations of American freedom.  
Since Texas entered the Union through the consent of the state legislature, the Texas 
annexation exemplified “the American method of expansion,” which was consistent with 
federal conceptions of empire institutionalized in the Northwest Ordinance.
31
 
 In spite of the processes of conquest forcefully at work, Polk insisted that settler 
expansion was a democratic process:  “Foreign powers should therefore look on the 
annexation of Texas to the United States not as the conquest of a nation seeking to extend 
her dominions by arms and violence, but as the peaceful acquisition of territory once her 
own, by adding another member to our confederation, with the consent of that member.”  
In accordance with the “great principle of our federative union,” he claimed that the 
annexation of Texas was a “bloodless achievement.”32  Peaceful acquisition involved not 
the coercive annexation of territory, as in the British method of expansion, but the 
“consensual agreement of both participants (colonizer and colonized) to join the union.”  
In this regard, the American method of expansion was consistent with the ethical and 
moral principles that defined the essence of American democracy.
33
 
 Yet Polk’s confidence did not allay the concerns of democratic expansionists who, as 
the War became imminent, began to confront the question of what to do with potentially 
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conquered territories.  O’Sullivan himself expressed ambivalence about whether Mexico 
could be incorporated into the union in a manner consistent with “our national honor.”  
One immediate option would be to incorporate Mexican states into the union on equal 
terms in accordance with the federative principle of the Northwest Ordinance, which 
granted equality to the constituent units of empire.  Yet such a position required that 
Mexicans already exhibit the requisite capacities for democratic government.  Presaging 
Social Darwinist arguments about the fitness of racialized subjects for democratic self-
rule, O’Sullivan held that Mexicans were unaccustomed to the habits of democracy.  Yet 
conquest and outright legal exclusion (e.g. in the form of colonial dependencies) was not 
the solution because it would contradict American national character:  “Democracies 
must make their conquests by moral agencies.  If these are not sufficient, the conquest is 
robbery.”  In allowing the “missionaries of our political science” to spread to “every 
quarter of the globe,” Mexicans would be led into the domain of American civilization.34  
O’Sullivan’s notion of moral conquest without coercion saw the assimilation of Mexicans 
into American citizenship as the moral elevation of conquered subjects. 
 In the discourse of moral conquest, the racial rhetoric used to justify the assimilation 
of Mexicans bore striking similarity to the rhetoric used to justify Indian civilization and 
removal.
35
  Reflecting common sentiment of the time, O’Sullivan drew an explicit 
equivalence between Indians and Mexicans in their inability to establish democratic 
                                                 
34
 O’Sullivan, “Territorial Aggrandizement,” Democratic Review, Vol. XVII (Oct. 1845), pp. 243, 245-246. 
35
 Quoted in Kagan, Dangerous Nation, p. 132.  An article from the New York Evening Post (Dec. 24, 
1847), expressed a similar notion in proclaiming, “The Mexicans are Indians – Aboriginal Indians…  They 
do not possess the elements of an independent national existence…  The Mexicans are Aboriginal Indians, 
and they must share the destiny of their race;” quoted in Merk, Manifest Destiny, p. 158. 
 180 
 
government and rationally cultivate the land.  He admonished that the “Mexican race” 
must “amalgamate and be lost, in the superior vigor of the Anglo-Saxon race,” meeting 
the same fate as the Indians.  Since Mexicans lacked the individualist capacities for free 
trade and democratic government, the “great problem” following the war was to 
“inoculate Mexico with the commercial spirit.”  The method of inoculation involved the 
unrestrained spread of American settlers westward:  “A strong infusion of the American 
race would impart energy and industry gradually to the indolent Mexicans.”36  The racial 
dimensions of imperialist ideology thus led to the assimilation of Mexicans into the 
norms of democratic citizenship, which itself constituted a form of native elimination. 
 This racial discourse was institutionalized in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which 
ended the Mexican-American War in 1848.  Article V of the Treaty fixed the boundary 
between the Mexican and American Republics at the Gulf of Mexico, which extended to 
the mouth of the Rio Grande River.  But more than this, the Treaty governed the process 
by which Mexicans would be incorporated into American citizenship.  Much like the 
Indian treaties, Article VIII granted conquered Mexicans an ultimatum:  either they could 
retain their property and “continue where they now reside,” or they could relinquish their 
land claims and “retain the title and rights of Mexican citizens.”  In other words, 
Mexicans could choose either American or Mexican citizenship.  Article IX of the Treaty 
reinforced this provision:  “The Mexicans who, in the territories aforesaid, shall not 
preserve the character of citizens of the Mexican Republic… shall be incorporated into 
the Union of the United States and be admitted… to the enjoyment of all the rights of 
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citizens of the United States.”37  As David Kazanjian has aptly put it,  “[I]n promising to 
recognize Mexicans annexed by the United States as fellow citizens equal on the national 
stage, [Article IX] offers them a formal and abstract equality whose universality is 
conditioned upon assimilation to white nationality.”38  Although it concluded a prolonged 
process of military conquest, the Treaty reinforced consensual narratives of democratic 
empire by granting Mexicans equal citizenship. 
 In spite of formal equality, however, incorporated Mexicans were met with rampant 
discrimination and land appropriation in their new position as U.S. citizens.  As 
Kazanjian has deftly shown, the legacy of discrimination following the Treaty did not 
represent a “broken promise” but rather the fulfillment of its assimilative objectives.  If 
Article IX promised Mexicans the “enjoyment” of formal equality, this grant of 
citizenship also implied the negation of the “character of citizens of the Mexican 
Republic” and full assimilation into the norms of American democracy.  Moreover, in 
imposing a division between Mexican and American nationalities, the Treaty deliberately 
cast the relationship between the two in hierarchical terms.  As a result, it instituted a 
hierarchical regime of international relations that to this day underwrites the neocolonial 
order of the Western hemisphere.  Much more than a border war, the Mexican War thus 
entailed the hemispheric transformation of the transnational American order.
39
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 The erasure of Mexican norms of property and citizenship is further evidenced in the 
U.S. Senate’s extrication of Article X from the final version of the Treaty.  Article X held 
that “All grants of land made by the Mexican government or by the competent 
authorities, in territories previously appertaining to Mexico, and remaining of the future 
within the limits of the United States, shall be respected as valid, to the same extent that 
the same grants would be valid, if said territories had remained within the limits of 
Mexico.”40  Together with Articles VIII and IX, the deletion of Article X enacted the 
imposition of imperial citizenship on Mexicans by preventing previous practices of land 
tenure (which often involved communal land holdings) from having any authority in the 
newly annexed territories, giving individualized settler land claims legal priority over 
communal Mexican claims.  Like the treaties authorized by the Indian Removal Act, the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo commits a form of foundational violence that grounded 
settler sovereignty on expropriated land by replacing prior political identities with Anglo-
democratic culture.  By also granting Mexicans an ostensible choice to enter into 
American citizenship, the fiction of consent at work in the Treaty operates to augment the 
assimilative power of American society. 
Emerson, Individualism, and Equality 
Although O’Sullivan is often interpreted merely as an aggressive expansionist that is 
largely anomalous to broader currents of antebellum democratic thought, his own 
thinking and that of the Young America movement in general exhibits profound parallels 
with the thought of Ralph Waldo Emerson.  Perhaps more than O’Sullivan himself, 
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Emerson illustrates the close connection between democracy and ideologies of settler 
expansion.  Indeed, a review of Emerson’s essays in the Democratic Review pronounced, 
“No man is better adapted than Emerson to comprehend the spirit of the age and to 
interpret its mission.”41  What is at stake here is not Emerson’s own political position on 
the Mexican War.
42
  Rather, two other central claims are in play.  First, in elaborating his 
notions of individualism and democratic equality, Emerson drew on the public 
hermeneutic of Manifest Destiny that in turn reinforced the ideology of democratic 
empire.  Second, an engagement with his political writings reveals how the values 
individualism and democratic equality acquired their meaning in relation to processes of 
settler conquest and the statist imposition of colonial hierarchies. 
To grasp these points, it is first necessary to dispel a few simplistic interpretations of 
Emerson’s thought.  For many scholars, Emerson represents the paragon of the atomistic 
and self-interested liberal individual who flees society, culture, and politics.
43
  Recent 
accounts have instead emphasized that Emerson’s thought is defined by notions of 
democratic individuality that emphasize an ethics of citizenship rather than atomistic 
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  Emerson’s liberalism is less possessive and self-interested than it is 
virtuous and responsible, stretching back to a political tradition established by the 
Scottish Enlightenment.
45
  Nevertheless, this blend of liberalism and republicanism into a 
broader democratic ideology is conceptually linked to and itself engenders the 
construction of settler hierarchies based on civilizational categories.  Thus, my point is 
not simply to highlight how an amoral and atomistic individualism authorized an 
acquisitive commercial ethos that in turn drove settler expansion; it is to emphasize how 
the moral bonds that tie individuals together in a democratic community themselves 
cohere around regimes of land appropriation and ideologies of settler expansion. 
These dynamics are best illustrated in Emerson’s 1844 speech, “The Young 
American.”  Delivered before a Boston audience, Emerson articulated the foundational 
values of the political movement that bore the namesake of his speech.  Separated by a 
generation from the founders of the American republic, Emerson sought to instill in the 
American public a commitment to the renewal and regeneration of democratic principles.  
As a means of continuing and strengthening the spirit of 1776, Emerson sought not only 
independence from the political institutions of Europe, but also a cultural declaration of 
independence from European traditions.  In pursuit of both collective and individual 
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autonomy from feudal authority, Emerson emphasized the vast economic development of 
the North American continent, which he thought provided the foundation for both 
political self-rule and the intellectual autonomy of the American mind. 
In exploring the ideologies of settler expansion at work here, it is important to put 
Emerson’s speech in the context of what James Belich calls the “settler revolution” – the 
longue durée transformations that led to the global ascendance of Anglo-settlers from the 
eighteenth to twentieth centuries.
46
  During this time period, the efforts of Anglo-settlers 
to create new societies based on English values and institutions in the colonial periphery 
of the British Empire led to social changes that constituted nothing short of a revolution 
in the global political and economic order.  By transferring metropolitan social structures 
to distant lands, settlers constructed new societies based on modern political ideals, which 
entailed the elimination of old political forms and the ascendance of Anglo-inflected 
social systems.  To the extent that Emerson praised the North American version of this 
broader dynamic, “The Young American” represents a particular instantiation of a more 
general process of Anglo-settler-colonization sweeping not just the U.S. but also the 
colonial hinterlands of Australia, South Africa, Canada, and New Zealand. 
In affirming the political and cultural significance of North American colonization, 
Emerson attached particular importance to the economic transformations associated with 
the expansion of market society.  Based on the supposition of the natural equality of men 
in morality and intellect, Emerson proposed that “every American should be educated 
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with a view to the values of land.”47  In one regard, Emerson here clearly meant the 
economic value of the land in its provision of individual wealth and national prosperity.  
But the “values of land” operate in both a moral-cultural and political sense as well.  
Politically, Emerson is clear that open land and boundless opportunity ensures social 
equality among citizens and freedom from feudal authority.  Based on republican ideals 
of landed independence, the settlement and economic development of the land would 
ensure that democratic institutions prevail over feudal land title.  On the cultural side, the 
land instills in citizens a respect for individual property and thus a notion of moral 
restraint that curtails the destructive and appropriative impulses of atomistic 
individualism.  The public morality and civic virtue necessary for political life directly 
derives from the experience of cultivating the land.   
The cultivation of the land itself shapes American national character, granting citizens 
the habits and manners that sustain the life of the democratic community.  In spite of his 
skepticism of base materialism, Emerson saw capitalist exchange as central to the 
regenerative potential of American democracy.  Clearly reflecting the discourse of 
Manifest Destiny and processes of commercial expansion, Emerson wrote, “The 
American people are fast opening their own destiny.  The material basis is of such extent 
that no folly of man can quite subvert it.  Add, that this energetic race derive an 
unprecedented material power from the new arts, from… the railroad, steamship, steam-
ferry, steam-mill.”  Settler expansion provided more than simply material benefits; it 
provided the “material basis” for a higher moral purpose.  Emerson proclaims, “[W]e are 
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persuaded that moral and material values are always commensurate.  Every material 
organization exists to a moral end, which makes the reasons of its existence.”48  The 
ultimate end of expansion was not simply economic development, but also the moral 
development of the American citizenry.  Far from antithetical principles, commercial 
wealth and public morality were not only compatible but were mutually necessary. 
Commercial expansion directly led to the democratization of power and destruction 
of feudal land title.  Whereas the economic organization of land in Europe adheres to an 
“aristocratic structure,” American land is democratically organized.  In spite of the role of 
slavery and conquest in American economic and political development, Emerson 
maintains that the historian of the future “will see that trade was the principle of Liberty; 
that trade planted America and destroyed Feudalism… and it will abolish slavery.”49  
Commercial expansion and the settlement of American land thus prevented the 
resurgence of feudal institutions.  It is in this way that Emerson speaks of the “anti-feudal 
power of Commerce.”  Rather than the land of aristocrats and monarchs, American land 
is the “land of the laborer, of the democrat.”50 
In Emerson’s thought, the boundlessness of the modern mind was importantly 
connected to and drew its energy from the boundlessness of the land.  If feudal society 
was characterized by the confinement of individuals to their inherited social rank, which 
at the same time suppressed the powers of the individual imagination, the material 
boundlessness of North American land led to a democratization of both intellectual 
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creativity and political power.  Perhaps more than any factor, it was the appropriation and 
development of the land that encouraged the cultural and moral autonomy of democratic 
individuals, which in turn prevented the resurgence of Old World political traditions from 
taking root in America.  As Emerson writes, “The land is the appointed remedy for 
whatever is false and fantastic in our culture.  The land, with its tranquilizing, sanative 
influences, is to… bring us into just relations with men and things.”  Insofar as the 
colonization of the land instills a new “habit of living” in citizens, it also morally purifies 
them so as to make them suitable for community life.
51
  
Emerson’s individualism, therefore, did not simply entail the atomization of citizens 
and their separation from civic life.  Rather, it was fundamentally predicated on a form of 
intellectual and moral equality that much like the safety valve theory of democratic 
expansion coheres around regimes of settler colonization and commercial expansion.  
The doctrine of democratic individuality, Emerson wrote, affirms that “there is imparted 
to every man the Divine light of reason, sufficient not only to plant corn and grind wheat, 
but also to illuminate all his life, his social, political, religious actions…  Democracy, 
Freedom, has its root in the sacred truth that every man hath in him the divine Reason…  
That is the equality and the only equality of all men.”52  For Emerson, the appropriation 
and enclosure of land lays the basis not only for democratic practices but also for moral 
equality.  Reason allows men the economic independence to “plant corn and grind wheat” 
as well as political and moral autonomy from the will of others.  It is through the 
colonization of the land that individuals become free and equal citizens. 
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The moral virtue of citizens, insofar as it is cultivated through the acquisition of 
private property, depends upon settler colonialism.  By grounding material and spiritual 
independence in the value of individual labor, the cultivation of the soul is one in the 
same process as the cultivation of the land.  More precisely, individuals develop a sense 
of morality and community through the colonization of the land.  The individual becomes 
a virtuous citizen by engaging in the process of colonization.  Emerson writes, “Any 
relation to the land, the habit of tilling it, or mining it… generates a feeling of 
patriotism.”53  The moral and cultural bonds that tie together self-reliant individuals thus 
psychologically emerge in relation to regimes of land-appropriation. 
In the context of an expanding political economy, social equality and individual 
autonomy necessitate territorial expansion to provide the material basis for democratic 
self-rule.  Read in this context, Emerson gave the safety valve theory of democratic 
expansion a romantic twist by envisioning the cultivation of nature and settler expansion 
as a source of democratic virtue.  Extending the old discourses of “western planting” set 
in motion by figures like Richard Hakluyt, Emerson envisioned the process of western 
settlement as a process of colonization, of transforming the fierce wilderness into a 
civilized society.  By encouraging “active young men” to “withdraw from cities and 
cultivate the soil,” the colonization and “conquering of the soil” produces a democratic 
order marked by political as well as intellectual and moral equality.
54
  The land, for 
Emerson, is the sole source of democratic virtue and moral equality, which is achieved 
only by ensuring that there is enough for everybody through expansion. 
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While Emerson did not seem to explicitly endorse the radical-workerist wing of the 
Democratic Party and its land reform program, his conceptions of a radical form of 
spiritual and cultural equality clearly resonated with democratic expansionism.  At once 
drawing on Tocquevillean and Emersonian language, George Henry Evans pronounced 
that radical workerism represents a “revolution in embryo” whose aim is the creation of 
“that equality of condition which can only arise from a substantial equality of property 
and an equal cultivation of the intellectual and physical capacities of men.”55  Just as 
equality in moral capacities paralleled equality in property, so too did the spiritual 
independence of the soul rely upon economic independence.  The intellectual and moral 
equality of men in nature, for both Emerson and Evans, must mirror a relative degree of 
equality in property, both of which sustain democratic self-rule in opposition to the feudal 
hierarchies.  For Emerson as for Evans, the necessity of landed property to the cultivation 
of democratic virtue dovetails with the commercial ethos of liberal individualism. 
Emerson saw settler expansion as a democratic process that would be sustained 
through the soft power of culture and commerce.  The moral ethos derived from the 
cultivation and colonization of free soil ensures that democratic expansion will be a 
liberal process that proceeds through the spread of culture and commerce rather than war 
and conquest.  For Emerson, “cheap land” and the “arts of agriculture” invite a “pacific 
disposition of the people.”  Yet despite his emphasis on the moral dimensions of 
democratic expansion, it is clear that Emerson’s conception of democracy was closely 
connected to the construction of imperial hierarchies based on ascriptive categories of 
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race and nation.  Freed from its ancient confines in England, Emerson wrote that the 
“imperial Saxon race” will continue to acquire a “hundred Mexicos.”  Upon witnessing 
the prodigious expansion of American settlers, Emerson confidently pronounced that the 
“first and worst races are dead” and the “second and imperfect races are dying out, or 
remain for the maturing of the higher.”56 
While these assertions appear to be aggressive proclamations not too distant from the 
more abrasive ideologies of herrenvolk democracy, Emerson pursued native elimination 
and the cultural conquest of Mexicans not through physical extermination but through 
assimilation.  He praised the ability of expanding commercial networks to tie together 
“various threads of national descent” in “one web” through an “hourly assimilation.”57  
This process of cultural absorption was closely tied to processes of land appropriation.  
Emerson pronounced, “The Anglo-American is a pushing, versatile, victorious race… it 
has wonderful powers of absorption and appropriating.”58  The connection between 
assimilation and land appropriation becomes especially acute when we consider 
Emerson’s claim that the American settlers have “reached into the Indian tribes of North 
America, and carrie[d] the better politics of Democracy among the red men.”59  
Democracy, for Emerson, enacts both the spatial and temporal colonization of indigenous 
Americans and Mexicans, subsuming their political and cultural identities into the 
progressive surge of the Anglo-American race across the continent. 
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The political ethos of self-reliance and democratic equality, therefore, is 
comprehensible only in relation to the regimes of land appropriation and settler 
colonization exemplified by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Indian removal.  
Although Emerson never outright promoted either policy, the forms of expropriation and 
cultural assimilation at work in these institutions of settler conquest grounded his 
attempts to root American cultural identity in the land.  In emphasizing how democratic 
individualism existed alongside Emerson’s Anglo-Saxonism, the point is not to suggest 
that one necessarily contradicted the other.  Rather, it is that his portrayal of the 
civilizational demise of Mexican and indigenous cultures represents a normative position 
concerning the superiority of American democracy.  Cultural independence involved not 
simply autonomy from the cultural influence of foreign agents, but also the right to 
impose one’s way of life on peoples deemed inferior, so long as this was done through 
liberal regimes of power and not conquest and coercion. 
 Emerson also justified colonization by minimizing the role of the imperial state in 
settler conquest.  Much like O’Sullivan, he ideologically obscured the coercive and 
hierarchical implications of democratic empire by imagining colonization as a process of 
commercial and cultural expansion that occurs through the initiative of individuals acting 
together in civil society rather than a centralized state.  In Politics, Emerson wrote that 
“the state must follow and not lead the character and progress of the citizen.”  The key to 
the progress of American civilization, for Emerson, lay in the moral and creative force of 
its individual citizens.  Although Emerson’s Politics disavows the role of the state in 
public life, we should not conclude with Diggins that this entails a refutation of the very 
 193 
 
premise of civic republicanism.
60
  Rather, what we see here is a democratic community 
without a state.  Insofar as the moral ethos acquired through settler colonization reaches 
its apex with the territorial control of North America, the state withers away when 
democratic virtue is achieved among the citizenry.  Democratic virtue, then, comes to 
govern relations among individuals in the absence of a state. 
It is precisely in his disavowal of the state as having any part in colonization that 
Emerson is able to also disavow the role of settler conquest in shaping the cultural 
dimensions of American democracy.  As a means of ideologically obscuring the 
contingent origins of modern democracy in land appropriation and dispossession, 
Emerson constructed the individual as the primary agent of empire rather than the 
centralized power of the imperial state.  Quite similar to Tocqueville and Hegel’s 
reflections on the American state, Emerson thought that once man had reached a state of 
transcendence through the colonization of nature, the state would wither away, allowing 
democratic individuality to reach its highest potential.  In a sense, American 
individualism was characterized by a form of statelessness even as it was the state itself 
that established the conditions of possibility for individual liberty to take hold. 
Democracy and Empire in Whig Political Culture 
Although scholars often advise against reducing Emerson’s democratic thought to the 
partisan politics of the Jacksonian era, we can understand the ideological formation of 
democratic empire at work in O’Sullivan, Emerson, and the Young Americans by 
juxtaposing it to the conceptual relationship between democracy and empire in Whig 
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political culture.  Emerson’s commitment to the futurity American democracy 
represented a clear departure from Whig conceptions of empire.  In drawing a distinction 
between the Party of Hope and the Party of Memory, Emerson posited that while the 
Democratic Party (Hope) represented a commitment to progress, innovation, and reform, 
the Whigs (Memory) remained a party of conservatism and tradition.  In his 1841 speech, 
“The Conservative,” Emerson resolutely condemned Whigs for their lack of a 
commitment to “self-help, renovation, and virtue.”  He further criticized the conservative 
Whig Party for undermining the democratic ethos of futurity at the center of the Young 
America movement:  “Its social and political action has no better aim [than] to sink the 
glory of a new and more excellent creation [in] the memory of the past.”  For Emerson, a 
commitment to the possibilities and promise of the American future requires a disavowal 
of the past, which was marked by processes of dispossession and conquest. 
Yet while Emerson might criticize the Whigs for failing to realize the moral and 
reformist potential in westward expansion, the Whigs did not reject empire and expansion 
as such. Rather, they proposed a different conception of empire that emphasized internal 
economic development over territorial expansion.  Moreover, Whigs proposed a vision of 
the U.S. as a model republic that would shape world order through moral influence rather 
than an aggressive democratic empire.  In this ideological schematic, republican values 
would be upheld solely through the economic development of the west and projects of 
national improvement rather than through the safety valve theory of democratic 
expansion that imagined the west as a sort of American lebensraum.  At stake for the 
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Whigs was less the acquisition of new territory than the spread of American markets and 
the solidification of commercial networks of capitalist exchange. 
Although Whigs clearly criticized the Mexican War, none employed democratic 
principles in this effort.  Rather, Whigs “repudiated the assertion that expansive republics 
made possible and secured equality and free government.”  Like Madison’s argument for 
extending the sphere of government, democratic expansionists adhered to the idea that 
liberty and expansion mutually sustained each other.  But where Madison (at least in the 
Federalist Papers) was hostile to the principles of equality and democracy, democratic 
expansionists found both ideals to be dependent on territorial expansion.
61
  Whigs, 
conversely, blamed expansion on democratic excess, which they thought would lead to 
the decline of the republic and subvert America’s moral status as a model republic in the 
world.  For instance, Whig leader Joshua Giddings attributed the war to the “democratic 
doctrine,” which prioritized the “arbitrary will of an irresponsible majority” over the 
more moderate principles of balanced government.  For Giddings, democratic principles 
drove Americans to wage a war against an “unoffending people for the purpose of 
conquest.”62  The error of democratic principle, in this line of thinking, was to conflate 
the will of the people with the will of the government, which must be based on 
constitutional and moral principles rather than popular pressure for land and wealth. 
In a widely read pamphlet entitled Peace with Mexico (1847), the Whig politician 
Albert Gallatin also posited that war and conquest eroded the moral fabric of republican 
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rule.  Drawing upon the old discourse of classical republicanism, Gallatin argued that the 
democratic promotion of the war led to the centralization of executive power and political 
corruption.  He called upon his republican faith to assert that the greatest threat to 
republican order arose from within the republic itself, from the democratic ideals of 
radical social equality and popular sovereignty.  The American people, Gallatin wrote, 
were blinded to the moral purpose of the American republic by the “romantic” pursuit of 
national honor and the appropriative ethos that sought the acquisition of new territory.  
Implicit in his criticism of the appropriative tendencies of the democratic creed was the 
position that an exaggerated commitment to the equality of conditions and landed 
independence turns American citizens into “vulgar conquerors.”  Gallatin believed that an 
excessive commitment the ideals of radical social equality and popular self-rule at the 
center of American democracy engendered war and conquest.
63
 
Instead of “democracy,” most Whigs preferred the language of “republic” to 
characterize the national government, which retained much of its classical emphasis on 
the virtuous rule of an elect body of governors and ideals of balanced government that 
insulated national power from popular control.
64
  Embedded in this distinction was a 
difference concerning the spatio-temporal dimensions of the American republic.  
Whereas Democrats held that expansion in space provided institutional durability in time, 
Whigs invoked classical republicanism to criticize empire as a source of decline.  As 
such, they remained within a classical model of republican temporality marked by the 
cyclical rise and decline of republics and empires.  As one historian has put it, “The rise 
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of romantic democracy, with its expanded suffrage and mass politics, threatened to 
submerge the more restricted and stable pattern of republican behavior in a tyrannical 
public opinion” that drove the national government to war and conquest.  In the minds of 
many Whigs, the popular passions unleashed by the rise of the common man as the locus 
of political rule threatened to destabilize the republic.  Whigs remained committed to 
ideals of divided government as a means of hedging in the expansionist tendencies of 
democracy.  For Democrats, conversely, the transition from “classical republicanism to 
romantic democracy” was a continuation of the American Revolution, with the Mexican 




Just as the Whigs were sharpening their differences with the Democrats with regard 
to imperial ideology, traditional party distinctions began to fracture along the fault lines 
of empire exposed by the Mexican War.  Beyond the question of what to do with 
conquered Mexican subjects, the conclusion of the War also challenged the imperial 
visions of Young America by bringing the question of slavery to the fore.  From the very 
beginning, the new democratic conceptions that emerged in the Jacksonian era were 
inextricably bound to the expansion of slave power.  Indeed, the unification of the 
Democracy depended on keeping the divisive issue of slavery off the national agenda in 
accordance with the spirit of the Missouri Compromise (1820), which regulated the 
expansion of slavery in the western territories by establishing the 36
th
 parallel as the 
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dividing line between free and slave territories.  For those who subscribed to the racialist 
ideologies of the slave system, the expansion of slavery posed no significant problem.  
But to those who attached their democratic visions to values of reformism and free soil, 
the expansion of democracy was of ambiguous value.  As democracy expanded across the 
continent and progressed into the future, slavery expanded with it, and the despotic 
imperial imaginary resiliently attached itself to the democratic imperial imaginary at the 
center of the Young American ideology. 
Although Manifest Destiny represented a form of democratic nationalism in which 
the nation would be united around the simultaneous pursuit of democracy and expansion, 
the conclusion of the Mexican War exposed the contradictions of race and class at the 
center of the ideology of democratic empire.  Just as Europe was crashing under the 
duress of its own class contradictions with the Revolutions of 1848, democratic 
expansionists in the U.S. held to the vision of a democratic empire.  For Emerson and 
O’Sullivan, the U.S. would escape the contradictions plaguing France and other European 
states through the relief provided by the safety valve of western land.  Nevertheless, the 
dream of a unified vision of democratic expansion would soon be challenged by the 
slavery question.  Eric Lott has aptly put the point:  “Manifest Destiny… was egalitarian 
ideology gone west…  [H]owever, this ‘beautiful’ evasion of both wage labor in the 
North and slavery in the South, a political solution to conflicts in civil society, only 
served to open those conflicts all the more, for it posed in ever starker form the question 
of whether the new territories would be slave or free.  In a telling irony, the myth of 
potentially endless frontier expansion actually exposed rather than disguised patterns of 
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class conflict and racial oppression which American democracy was supposed to have 
done away with.”66   
As the next chapter will show, America’s own version of 1848 represented not so 
much a sharpening of sectional conflict at the heart of the nation as it did the division of 
the ideology of democratic empire into two competing imperial imaginaries:  an empire 
of free soil and free labor and an empire of slavery and domination.  The American 1848 
signified the fracturing of Manifest Destiny into two competing ideologies of empire.  
With the dissolution of the Democracy, the free-soil democrats were in many ways the 
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Race of the Conquering March:  Democracy, Civilization, and Slavery 
 
“It is according to the interest of ‘the Few’ that colonies should be cultivated.  This, if it is true, accounts 
for the attachment to colonies, which most of the countries, that is, of the governments of modern Europe, 
have displayed.”  James Mill, “Colony,” Encyclopedia Britannica (1825) 
 
The close of the Mexican War signaled a crucial shift in the ideology of democratic 
empire and the dynamics of settler expansion.  The hallmark of the Jacksonian coalition 
that dominated antebellum politics was an agreement to keep slavery off the national 
agenda so as to maintain a cross-class democratic movement consisting of Southern 
planters, industrial working-men, urban artisans, and independent farmers.  This 
arrangement was given institutional legitimacy in the Missouri Compromise of 1820, 
which regulated the expansion of slavery in the western territories by establishing the 36
th
 
parallel as the dividing line between free and slave territories.  The political stability 
provided by the Compromise was significantly jeopardized with the onset of the War as 
the Democratic coalition splintered around the slavery question.  In 1846, Representative 
David Wilmot introduced his famous Wilmot Proviso into Congress, which mandated 
that if the U.S. invaded Mexico, any newly acquired territories would be free rather than 
slave states.  Wilmot drew on the legacy of the Northwest Ordinance for a framework of 
settler expansion that privileged principles of free soil over the extension of slavery. 
Although the Wilmot Proviso was defeated in the House of Representatives, it re-
opened national debate about the relationship between slavery and territorial expansion 
by questioning the basis of the Missouri Compromise.  Disaffected with the previous 
partisan arrangements in which Whigs and Democrats refused to address the slavery 
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question, a faction of anti-slavery Democrats (called the Barnburners) from New York 
joined radical abolitionists and anti-slavery Whigs to form the Free Soil Party in 1848.  
As I will argue at length in this chapter, the emergence of the Free Soil Party (which 
eventually morphed into the Republican Party) represented a reconfigured form of settler-
colonial ideology in the antebellum era, which placed ideals of free labor and free soil at 
the center of national visions of democratic empire. 
Walt Whitman, early on in his journalistic writings, established this new conception 
of free-soil empire.  Whitman had long been both an opponent of slavery and a proponent 
of settler expansion, and he explicitly aligned the two in his writings for the Brooklyn 
Daily Eagle touting the virtues of the war with Mexico.  As one of the first periodicals to 
actively support the Wilmot Proviso, Whitman’s Eagle contested that the extension of 
slavery in the territories violated American founding principles and further stretched the 
chasm between the ideal and the real in American politics.  In an 1846 editorial, Whitman 
condemned slavery as a “disgrace and blot on the character of our Republic, and on our 
boasted humanity!”1  At the same time Whitman trumpeted the conquest of Mexico and 
further expansion into the West as the triumph of democratic principles. 
What made Whitman so central to the ideology of democratic empire was how he 
attached radical-democratic principles of popular sovereignty to a broader framework of 
settler expansion.  In line with the safety-valve theory of democratic expansion, his 
notion of democracy was characterized by a spatial imaginary in which the under-
populated and “uncultivated acres of land” in the West provided an outlet of colonization 
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for the over-populated spaces of the “crowded East.”  Similar to the relationship between 
the democratic social state and settler expansion, Whitman’s democracy required the 
transfer of settler populations to western territory.
2
  In providing the material basis for the 
rule of the people, Whitman praised “The boundless democratic free West!”  The 
“cheapness of land” in the West erases hierarchy and inequality, producing a social 
condition that frees citizens from “conventionalism” and “common want.”  Consonant 
with Emerson’s romantic reconstruction of the safety-valve theory of democratic 
expansion, Whitman contested that the experience of settling the West produced creative 
intelligence and a “Democratic vitality” that made the common man suitable for self-
rule.
3
  For Whitman, the individual labors of colonizing the land would lead to an 
elevation of mind that prepared men for the intellectual rigors of democracy. 
In this chapter, my objective is to trace the development of this incipient vision of 
free-soil empire that pervaded the political culture of the antebellum period.  In both his 
early journalistic writings and his later poetry and prose, Whitman attached the ideology 
of democratic empire to free-soil principles.  Scholars often advise against reducing 
Whitman’s aesthetics and poetics to his politics, yet this position ignores the profound 
continuities between the two.
4
  Although he is not a systematic political philosopher, 
there are consistent and durable principles at work in his poetic-political thought that 
derive from wide variety of sources such as his reading of Hegel, his involvement in 
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partisan newspapers in the 1850s, and especially his affiliation with the Free Soil Party.
5
  
My goal is less to provide new insights about Whitman’s political thought than it is to use 
it as a means of outlining the ideological contours of American democratic culture and its 
complex relationship with settler expansion. 
As this chapter will argue at length, free-soil democrats envisioned American 
democracy as a form of civilizational empire driven by the conviction that “God has 
specifically chosen the nation to work out a higher type of civilization than any other 
State has yet attained.”6  Civilizational empire begins with a set of specific cultural values 
particular to a certain geographic location and by imputing a sense of superiority onto 
those values extrapolates them to a broader sphere and makes them representative of a 
universal notion of humanity.  The notion of a civilizational empire entails not simply a 
set of values that are universal, but a “set of Western values, ideals, and institutions that 
are being inculcated across the globe to slowly but surely realize a degree of political, 
social, legal, economic, and cultural homogeneity.”7  This conception of civilizational 
empire in the U.S. conceptually emerged through processes of settler expansion, and 
more precisely through imperial conflict between two competing visions of empire.  
In constructing a civilizational empire, free-soil democrats opposed democracy not 
only to the degraded social forms of Mexicans and Indians but also to the oligarchic and 
backward elements of Southern slave society. The Wilmot Proviso shifted the primary 
cleavage of imperial conflict in American ideology from inter-imperial conflict between 
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the United States and Russia, Britain, and Spain to intra-imperial conflict between the 
North and South.  In this reconfigured ideological conflict, the South provided the 
“negative reference point” against which free-soil democrats defined American imperial 
identity.
8
  In fashioning democracy as a mode of civilizational empire, free-soil 
expansionists articulated democratic ideals through discourses and practices of settler 
colonialism that promoted a form of territorial expansion based on the agrarian political 
economy of free labor over the slave economy of the South. 
To understand these shifts in the ideology of democratic chapter, this chapter draws 
on the framework of the “American 1848” in which the democratic dream of a unified 
nation committed to a common colonial project fractured along the fault lines of slavery.  
The idea of the American 1848 comes from David Potter’s The Impending Crisis, where 
he argues that U.S. victory in the Mexican War was a primary cause of the Civil War.  
Although victory over Mexico and the conquest of the West and the Southwest “sealed 
the triumph of national expansion… it had also triggered the release of forces of sectional 
dissension.”9  Michael Rogin drew on Potter’s historical periodization to draw a contrast 
between the European 1848, in which the liberal dream of a national state premised on 
individual liberty and equal rights “foundered on the social question,” and the American 
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1848, in which the democratic ideal of a national republic was jeopardized by political 
conflict over the slavery question.
10
 
However, while both Rogin and Potter treat the contradictions animating American 
society during the American 1848 as a form of “sectional dissension,” I propose to 
examine those contradictions as a form of imperial conflict generated by two competing 
ways of organizing and expanding democratic empire:  a slave empire conjoined with a 
racially exclusive herrenvolk democracy and an empire of free soil, free labor, and free 
trade.  Just as the European 1848 signified the constitutive divisions and contradictions at 
the center of European civil society, the American 1848 highlighted the central 
contradictions that slavery and empire posed to the viability of American democracy.  
That is, if class conflict in Europe was the primary expression of the contradictions 
inherent in modern civil society, in the U.S. it was imperial and racial conflict generated 
by the politics of slavery’s expansion. 
Slavery and the Empire of Free Soil 
With the close of the Mexican War in 1848 and the slavery question back on the 
national agenda, Whitman joined disaffected Democrats, Whigs, and abolitionists in 
forming the Free Soil Party in Buffalo, New York, nominating Martin Van Buren as their 
presidential candidate under the slogan of “Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Labor, and Free 
Men.”  The ideals of Free Soil Party revolved around two central principles.  First, the 
primary mode of labor in the western territories would be independent agriculture rather 
than slave or wage labor.  Second, free labor based on widespread property ownership 
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entailed the free acquisition of land by settlers.  The platform of the Free Soil Party 
proclaimed, “Not more slave states and no more slave territory.  Let the soil of our 
extensive domain be kept free for the hardy pioneers of our land and the oppressed and 
banished of other lands seeking homes of comfort and fields of enterprise in the new 
world.”  In promotion of this vision, the Party called for land to be issued by means of a 
“free grant to actual settlers” for the purposes “making settlements in the wilderness,” 
which would ensure the rule of “the people under the banner of free democracy.”11 
In this democratic vision, settler expansion ensured the equality of citizens and 
sustained institutions of popular self-rule.  The expansion of slavery represented to the 
Free Soil Party the triumph of feudal society and aristocratic principles over the principle 
of popular sovereignty.  The language of empire underpinned free-soil fears of slavery’s 
expansion.  In their opposition to the resurgence of feudal society, free-soil democrats 
juxtaposed an “empire of freedom” to an “empire of slavery.”  One Ohio politician 
claimed, “The slave drivers seek to make our country a great slave empire: to make slave 
breeding, slave selling, slave labor, slave extension, slave policy, and slave dominion, 
FOREVER THE CONTROLLING ELEMENTS OF OUR GOVERNMENT.”  Attendees 
at the Free Soil convention in Buffalo similarly held that the eclipse of free-soil ideals by 
the empire of slavery would replace a “government by the people” with a “government 
by an oligarchy.”12 
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To free soil democrats, feudal rule threatened to undermine democratic institutions 
and turn the nation into an oligarchy ruled by the economic elite.  In this manner, the 
ideological conflict between these two conceptions of empire was a battle between the 
“Democratic principle” and the “aristocratic element of slave labor society.”13  The 
opposition of free-soil democrats to slavery’s expansion was rooted in the Enlightenment 
notion that an empire of conquest and despotism was the result of unchecked oligarchic 
elements in society.  To Northerners, the South was a feudal society, and the aggressive 
expansion of the slavery stemmed from the oligarchic basis of the South.  Drawing on 
Enlightenment thinkers like Condorcet, free-soil democrats viewed imperial conquest as 
an ineluctable feature of slave society.  In their thirst for glory and wealth, Condorcet 
argued that oligarchic societies inevitably lead to war and conquest.  In the absence of a 
feudal order, the leveling of social rank in America eroded the basis of aristocratic values 
such as chivalry, wealth, and military virtue.
14
  The empire of slavery violated democratic 
convictions that expansion should be pursued for the public good rather than the 
aggrandizement of the wealth and glory of the economic elite. 
In their efforts to contain the expansion of slavery, free-soil democrats adopted 
categories derived from justifications of Indian removal and the Mexican conquest to 
similarly sanction the expansion of the Northern free labor ideal:  civilization and 
progress.  As the Free Soil Party morphed into the Republican Party in 1854, Republican 
leader Carl Schurz vividly geo-graphed the superiority of northern civilization:  “Cast 
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your eyes over that great beehive called the free States.  See by the railroad and telegraph 
wire every village, almost every backwoods cottage, drawn within the immediate reach of 
civilization.”15  To free soil democrats, civilization encouraged not only regimes of free 
labor, but also the extension of commercial networks that spanned the continent.  A 
society based on free labor and free soil was superior to slave society because it made 
more productive use of the nation’s resources. Free-soil democrats generally feared that 
allowing slavery in the territories would impede the transfer of free laborers from the 
eastern states.  Rooted in Lockean notions of labor, such a view held that the 
civilizational progress was incompatible with slave labor because slaveholders could not 
make adequate improvements of uncultivated land.  Slaves and slaveholders alike, 
Tocqueville noted, lacked the “spirit of enterprise” that attended modern commerce and 
thus lacked incentives to improve the land.
16
 
Several historians of Southern society have noted that one of the primary factors in 
the expansion of slavery was the need for more land as well as a desire to extend the 
reach of the peculiar institution.  The emphasis on cotton mono-cropping and the general 
failure to diversify the Southern economy led slaveholders to seek more fertile land due 
to soil erosion and other forms of environmental degradation.
17
  One prominent 
Republican thus asserted that “an inferior civilization must give room to that which is 
superior,” signaling that the battle against the slaveholding oligarchy was a territorial 
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battle that could be won through a systematic program of settler colonization involving 
the expansion of free labor and agrarian capitalism.
18
   
Commensurate with what I have called the “Tocquevillean moment,” in which settler 
expansion establishes the foundation of American democracy, free-soil democrats 
pursued a program of settler colonization in an attempt to extend the durability of 
democratic institutions.  If slavery was institutionalized in the West, it would prevent free 
settlement and erode the free labor ideal, leading to the stagnation and decline of 
American democracy.  The expansion of free settlers provided the key to social mobility 
and democratic equality in the North, which sustained visions of economic development 
and civilizational progress.  But when free-soil democrats “turned their gaze southward, 
they encountered a society that seemed to violate all the cherished values of the free labor 
ideology, and seemed to pose a threat to the very survival of… their free-labor 
civilization.”19  Southern society, with its structural adherence to fixed hierarchy, 
appeared in free soil ideology as a stagnant and feudal society. 
The political economy of democratic empire, however, cannot be understood without 
attention to the cultural construction of free-soil ideals.  Several scholars have 
demonstrated how free- soil democrats and labor republicans constructed the meaning of 
the free labor ideal in opposition to the unfree labor of chattel slavery and the inefficiency 
of Mexican labor.
20
  Yet the language of empire and conquest also significantly shaped 
dominant conceptions of free labor in antebellum democratic culture.  The primary 
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categories that Jacksonian democrats employed in the conquest of Indians and Mexicans 
– progress and civilization – also anchored free-soil ideology.  The idea of a free soil 
empire carried within it an “ideology of civilization” that divided the world into civilized 
and savage, progressive and backward.
21
  Yet the ideology of civilization extended not 
only to the conquest of Indians and Mexicans, but also to Southern slave society. 
Nowhere is the ideology of civilization more evident than in Emerson’s cry for 
Northern victory in the Civil War.  In his 1862 essay, “American Civilization,” Emerson 
laid out a stadial view of history, the starting point of which is the “rudest state in which 
man is found.”  In Emerson’s view, each nation has its own distinct civilization, and 
consequently its own distinct path of progress.  Yet what distinguishes American 
civilization is not its similarity to other nations at similar stages of development, but 
rather its opposition to the lack of progress in indigenous and African communities:  “In 
the brutes is none; and in mankind, the savage tribes do not advance.  The Indians of this 
country have not learned the white man’s work; and in Africa, the Negro of today is the 
Negro of Herodotus.”  As a consequence, it is inevitable that backward societies of 
Africans and Indians will be overpowered by the superiority of Anglo-American culture 
and subjected to the logic of native elimination. 
The objective of Emerson’s essay, however, was not to justify the conquest of 
indigenous peoples.  It was, rather, to justify the potential military triumph of Northern 
civilization over the South.  For Emerson, the problem of the Civil War is a problem of 
                                                 
21
 Frank Ninkovich, “Theodore Roosevelt:  Civilization as Ideology,” Diplomatic History, 10, 3 (July 
1986), pp. 221-245.  Also see Wendy Brown’s notion of a “civilizational discourse;” Regulating Aversion:  
Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton University Press, 2006). 
 211 
 
civilizational progress:  “We have attempted to hold together two states of civilization:  a 
higher state, where labor and the tenure of land and the right of suffrage are democratical; 
and a lower state, in which the old military tenure of prisoners or slavers, and of power 
and land in a few hands, makes an oligarchy.”  Like Tocqueville, Emerson drew on the 
language of the democratic social state, at the center of which are arrangements of free 
labor and free land tenure, to uphold the superiority of Northern civilization over the 
feudal social state of the South.  Emerson laments, “Why cannot the best civilization be 
extended over the whole country, since the disorder of the less civilized portion menaces 
the existence of the country?”22  If free-soil ideology was built upon notions of 
civilizational progress, then its expansionist vision associated the barbarism of Southern 
slavery with indigenous savagery, further authorizing the conquest of both as the a 
necessary byproduct of democratic development. 
Beyond cultural discourses, the free-soil vision of democratic empire was 
institutionalized in land reform policy throughout the 1840s and 1850s, culminating in 
the Homestead Act of 1862.  Free-soil ideology, in key respects, has its roots in 
Jeffersonian democracy.  In spite of the institution of slavery at the center of antebellum 
democratic ideology, the Jeffersonian idea that free land should be cheaply granted to 
settlers in order to populate the West and augment the power of the agrarian yeomanry 
gained momentum among Northern abolitionists and proponents of free-soil principles.  
When attached to Northern political visions, the Jeffersonian ideal of securing democracy 
through settler expansion took an anti-slavery cast.  In their opposition to the expansion 
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of slavery, free soil democrats saw no reason why wealthy Southerners should be able to 
consolidate their land holdings by expanding slavery westward.
23
 
From the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 until the late 1830s, federal land policy 
revolved around the Public Land Survey System, in which the federal government 
surveyed and sold land to the highest bidder so as to increase government revenue.  
Although the survey system was designed to facilitate an orderly process of colonization 
and settlement, settlers and squatters often moved quicker than the federal government.  
By improving plots of land before the government could assess the price, squatters 
challenged the authority of the federal government over the distribution of western land.  
Throughout the early nineteenth century, squatters asserted their rights to settle “vacant” 
land independent of federal authority.  Based on the Lockean ideal that the labor 
expended cultivating land provides legitimate title to property, settlers often claimed 
property rights to land by virtue of the very fact of settlement. 
By the 1830s settler ideology clashed with federal authority as the survey system 
became the subject of intense political scrutiny.  In opposition to the federal policy of 
selling land at the highest price possible, settlers argued that successful colonization 
required the distribution of “free grant of lands.”  Having been the system under which 
the original colonies were settled, they held that the act of conquering new territory and 
“driving out the savage beasts and still more savage men” provided the basis for free 
entitlement to land.  In this vision of colonization, the labor of settling free land is itself a 
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form of conquest aimed at extinguishing indigenous sovereignty and land title, thereby 
establishing the legitimate property title of settlers.
24
   
The survey system also violated democratic conceptions of equality because “the 
wealth of a country is drained off to be expended elsewhere.”  In other words, the survey 
system privileged the wealthy elite in the race for land acquisition, further solidifying 
entrenched political and economic inequalities.  As a result colonial expansion becomes 
an instrument of oligarchic power rather than a device for spreading popular liberty and 
social equality.  In such a program of territorial expansion, the free territories of the west 
come to stand in relation to the federal government and the wealthier states of the East as 
colonial dependencies in which the “fruits of our labor are drawn from us to enrich other 
and more favored sections of the union.” Rather than free and equal constituents of 
empire, new states and territories become dependent entities, both economically and 
politically.
25
  Clearly indebted to Paine’s model of democratic expansion, democratic 
settlers in the Jacksonian era held that settler expansion should serve the public good. 
Throughout the 1840s and 1850s, land reform legislation initiated a shift in federal 
land policy from the survey system to a homesteading system.  The first step in federal 
land reform came with Preemption Act of 1841, which gave squatters the right of 
purchasing land at a minimum price if they settled the land before the government was 
able to survey it.  The Preemption Act, which also drove settler expansion during the era 
of Manifest Destiny, became the primary vehicle by which settlers colonized the west in 
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an effort to challenge the expansion of slavery.
26
  By the 1850s the policy of preemption 
strengthened the land reform movement, which began to agitate for more drastic 
measures in providing cheap land for free settlement.  Although Southern planters had 
once stood beside Western farmers in opposing Northern industrial interests, by the 
1850s they came to see the independent farmer as a threat to their economic and political 
system.  Indeed, plantation interests in the Senate throughout the 1850s persistently 
opposed the formation of a homestead bill that would grant cheap land to independent 
settlers on the basis of the labor they expended cultivating the land.
27
 
The Lockean principles of homesteading acquired institutional force with the 
Homestead Bill of 1862, a policy driven by the efforts of Northern Republicans and free-
soil democrats to reserve the western territories for free labor.  The Homestead Bill 
directly drew on the safety-valve theory of democratic expansion, in which reservoirs of 
cheap land in the West would attract unemployed laborers from the East.  According to 
this theory, surplus labor in industrial society suppressed the wages of mechanics and 
artisans and thus threatened to stoke the flames of class conflict and metropolitan 
instability.  The principles underpinning the homestead system were premised on 
Lockean notions of natural right wherein the only valid title to property is the expenditure 
of physical labor to cultivate and improve the land.  Upon this basis, the homestead 
principle also undermined the ideological foundation of Southern expansion by 
suggesting that productive labor conferred just title to property, barring inefficient 
regimes of slave labor from having any place in free-soil expansion.  In their opposition 
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to slavery, free-soil democrats envisioned the free settlement of the West as a barrier to 
the expansion of slavery.
28
  Settler expansion mitigated the contradictions of modern 
class conflict by promising the industrial working classes relief from poverty and 
unemployment through landed independence.  Settler colonialism is thus a political-
economic system by which modern society spatially displaces its contradictions to an 
alternative geographic space in order to prevent the dissolution of social order. 
While free soil ideology offered a vision of democratic empire that put the 
independent settler at the center of its expansionist program, pro-slavery theorists had 
their own vision that differently reconciled democracy and empire around the logic of 
domination.  The language of conquest and empire played a significant role in national 
debates about slavery ever since the Missouri Compromise.  Although the Compromise is 
often remembered as an amenable agreement for both sides, many pro-slavery theorists 
vociferously denounced the law.  For instance, John Taylor of Caroline drew on the 
principle of new state equality to challenge Congressional restrictions on the expansion of 
slavery.  Imposing conditions on the settlement of new territories placed Congress in the 
position of “feudal chiefs” who pursued conquest for their own sake.  Taylor maintained 
that in a federal republic founded on popular sovereignty, “conquests are made for the 
community” and not for the interests of the few.29  To deny the right of settlers to bring 
their chattel with them was to deny the right to property, turning new territories into 
colonial dependencies rather than equal constituents of empire. 
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Taylor’s argument, however, was predicated on the idea that slavery was a regional 
rather than national institution.  By denying the right to expand the institution of slavery, 
Congress was essentially privileging the regional interests of the North over the South, 
thereby violating liberal property rights and principles of federalism.  But by the 1850s, 
pro-slavery theorists went on the offensive in casting slavery not as a local or even 
national institution but more precisely as a global imperial power.  Although scholars 
have long examined the centrality of the politics of territorial expansion to the antebellum 
period, it is only until recently that they have begun to place slavery in the broader 
context of global capitalism.  The historian Walter Johnson has illustrated the “global 
reach of the cotton economy – in which millions of pounds and billions of dollars were 
annually traded, in which credit chased cotton from the metropolitan banks of Europe to 
every plantation outpost of the Mississippi valley and then back again.”30  Any attempt to 
understand slavery in the antebellum period takes us beyond national frameworks of 
sectional conflict by forcing us to comprehend slavery as a global institution. 
 The global dimension of the slavery directly figured into the ideologies of Southern 
political culture in profound ways.  By the late 1840s, due to the Wilmot Proviso, 
Southern thinking had undergone a significant shift from an apology to an embrace of 
imperialism.  As Southerners became convinced of the necessity of slavery for economic 
progress and prosperity, they became less inclined to permit the territorial exclusion of 
slavery and instead embraced an “imperious desire to spread it westward to the Pacific.”  
While Virginian slaveholders like Jefferson and John Taylor expressed a lukewarm 
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commitment to the peculiar institution, the imperialist tradition was more aggressive in 
defending the expansion of slavery.
31
  In place of the agrarian republic of Jefferson, the 
imperialist tradition sought the resurrection of a Greek conception of democracy, in 
which slavery and domination were seen as direct extensions of democratic self-rule.  In 
the Southern tradition, liberty was a function of power:  the more power one possessed 
the more liberty to which one was entitled.  Southern imperialism thus implied not the 
spread of democratic equality but rather the spread of hierarchy and domination. 
 This Old South vision of democracy was indebted to ancient Greece in its embrace of 
the idea that democratic equality for whites depended on slave labor.  In this vision of 
“herrenvolk (master-race) democracy,” individual liberty entailed the natural right of 
superior races to enslave those of inferior racial stock.  The notion of herrenvolk 
democracy at the center of the Southern tradition upheld a conception of freedom in 
which power was an entitlement to liberty such that liberty depended on the degree of 
power one held over others.
32
  In the pro-slavery interpretation, popular sovereignty and 
democratic self-rule implied the right to dominate others, to establish institutions not just 
of self-government but also institutions of slavery.  The right to govern oneself was thus 
intricately bound to the right to enslave others. 
 This ancient conception of democracy is best exemplified in the famous 1858 speech 
by the U.S. Senator of South Carolina, James Hammond.  Declaring that “Cotton is 
King,” Hammond articulated the Greek conception of democracy in which freedom for 
                                                 
31
 Vernon Parrington, The Romantic Revolution in America, 1800-1860 (University of Oklahoma Press, 
1987), pp. 61, 67. 
32
 See Joel Olson, The Abolition of White Democracy. 
 218 
 
the white community depended on the enslavement of inferior races.  “In all social 
systems,” Hammond asserted, “there must be a class to do the menial duties, to perform 
the drudgery of life.”  The enslavement of one class by another was necessary for the 
progress of civilization.  To condemn all citizens to the “drudgery of life” would be to 
subject the intellect of the white race, preventing them from guiding the progressive 
development of society.  Because human freedom depended on enslavement, slavery 
constituted the “very mud-sill of society and of political government.”33 
 Hammond’s speech represented a significant shift in pro-slavery theory.  Throughout 
the 1850s, Democrats largely adhered to Stephen Douglas’s principle of “squatter 
sovereignty,” wherein the legitimacy of slavery in the territories was determined by the 
popular will of the settlers themselves.  In arguing against such a principle, Hammond 
held that no political force, not even settler sovereignty itself, could limit the expansion 
of slavery, signaling the rise of slavery not just as a national but a as global institution.  
Due to the expansion of slavery and the increasingly central place of cotton commodities 
in the global economy, Hammond asserted that the South will be “an empire that shall 
rule the world.”34  Given Hammond’s emphasis on the broader hemispheric expansion of 
slavery, it is evident that his vision of Southern power challenged democratic visions of a 
free-soil empire.  Ever since John Calhoun enlisted the principle of nullification in 
service of the pro-slavery cause in the 1830s, Americans had seen slavery as a regional 
rather than a national institution.  But Hammond’s speech highlighted a lurking anxiety 
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among North abolitionists:  in becoming a global, imperial power the South would pose 
obstacles to the expansion of free soil and free labor. 
 Hammond’s imperial vision of Southern society acquired legal force in Chief Justice 
Roger Taney’s majority opinion, Dred Scott v. Sanford, which argued that the 
Constitution gave Congress the exclusive right to establish the rules of naturalization and 
the standards of citizenship.  As is well-known, the decision effectively ruled that 
Congress lacked any power whatsoever to restrict the expansion of slavery in the 
territories, and consequently that the free-soil ideal whereby slaves might become citizens 
upon entering into free territory was unconstitutional.  Yet one often unexplored 
implication of Taney’s decision was that it offered a competing conception of imperial 
identity that cohered around the empire of slavery.  Refuting Douglas’s doctrine of 
“squatter sovereignty,” wherein the authority of slavery in territories gained from colonial 
conquest was contingent on local practices of self-government, Taney held that wherever 
Congressional authority held, slavery was legal.  He thus rejected Douglas’s notion of 
squatter sovereignty and instead held that the sovereignty of the people implied the 
sovereignty of master over slave in any current or future territory under the sway of the 
American flag.  As such, colonial expansion necessarily entailed the extension of slavery. 
 Although Taney’s judgment that black slaves could never become free citizens is 
fairly straightforward, more perplexing is his position that indigenous peoples were able 
to become American citizens.  This is more puzzling considering Taney’s earlier decision 
in U.S. v. Rogers, which held that Indians and whites were members of irreconcilably 
opposed cultural groups.  In this decision, Taney held that a white man adopted by an 
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Indian tribe was always a U.S. citizen because only those “who by the usages and 
customs of the Indians are regarded as belonging to their race.”  If white men could not 
become Indians, then Indians could not become white men.
35
 
By Dred Scott, however, Taney shifted his views on indigenous peoples, arguing that 
unlike the black population, the “Indian race” was fit for American citizenship:  “[I]f an 
individual should leave his nation or tribe and take up his abode among the white 
population, he would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which would belong to an 
emigrant from any other foreign people.”36  The shift in Taney’s views on the 
assimilation of Indians into U.S. citizenship makes perfect sense in consideration of the 
newly founded imperial visions of pro-slavery theorists.  In a context in which the 
continued vitality of slavery depended on the acquisition of new territory, assimilating 
Indians into white citizenship was a means of extinguishing native land title.  In the face 
of a greater need for the appropriation of new land by the slaveholding empire, Taney 
held that assimilation was a more effective means of indigenous dispossession. 
William Seward and the Empire of Free Trade 
Although the project of settler expansion at the center of free-soil ideology directed 
its focus on continental conquest, the imperial framework of free-soil democracy 
encapsulated a much broader geographic scale.  The imperial gaze of the free-soil 
democrats almost always pierced beyond the continental boundaries of North America, 
fixating on commercial supremacy in the Pacific.  No one so perfectly condensed this 
dimension of Northern imperial desire and its democratic moorings than William Henry 
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Seward, a vocal opponent of the slaveholding empire who was also one of the early 
architects of America’s free trade empire.  While Seward was a not a particularly original 
political thinker, his writings significantly synthesized existing currents of American 
thought and culture.
37
  Specifically, he synthesized free labor and free soil visions of 
empire with a global vision of American commercial hegemony.  Furthermore, Seward’s 
enlistment of civilizational discourses of progress and modernity had a profound 
influence on Walt Whitman’s democratic imagination. 
Although originally an anti-slavery Whig, Seward had long expressed much more 
democratic leanings than his more conservative counter-parts.  Where Whigs typically 
condemned the Mexican War from a conservative standpoint as a war of democratic 
excess, Seward agreed with radical democrats in viewing it as a vital stage in the 
inexorable path of democratic modernity.  In 1850 Seward celebrated the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo for allowing the settlement of the Pacific coast and establishing the 
germ of global empire that would soon spread over the world:  “If, then, the American 
people shall remain an undivided nation, the ripening civilization of the West, after a 
separation growing wider and wider for four thousand years will in its circuit of the 
world, meet again, and mingle with the declining civilization of the East on our own free 
soil, and a new and more perfect civilization will arise to bless the earth, under the sway 
of our own cherished and beneficent democratic institutions.”38  Seward was drawing 
here on the discourses of universal history and translatio imperii, in which civilization 
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relentlessly progresses westward, extending from its ancient origins in Asia to its final 
resting place in the Americas.  He imagined the extension of American commerce into 
the Pacific as the triumph of a universal form of democratic civilization on the world 
stage.  Slavery represented to Seward less a wedge of sectional conflict than the central 
institution in a competing way of imagining empire and organizing universal civilization. 
The idea of democracy occupied a central place in Seward’s imperial imaginary.  
Resonating with the free-soil vision of empire, he proclaimed that the “center of political 
power must rest… in the agricultural interests and the masses, who will occupy the 
interior of the continent.”39  The democratic masses flooding the west constituted the 
primary source of imperial power.  Yet Seward’s promotion of settler expansion across 
the continent existed alongside commercial expansion into the Pacific.  The political 
economy of settler colonialism in the antebellum period is best viewed as a form of 
agrarian capitalism.  Settlers colonize new land not simply to acquire landed 
independence, but also to enhance their own economic opportunity by producing 
agricultural commodities to sell on global markets.  Such an imperial vision embraced the 
expansion of free trade into the Pacific as a central aspect of individual independence and 
popular self-rule.  Seward admonished settlers that their attempts to extend their “power 
to the Pacific Ocean and grasp the great commerce of the east” were vital to “maintaining 
the democratic system of government.”40  Although free-soil ideology largely rejected 
wage labor as a form of economic dependence, it embraced the opportunity for 
independent farmers to sell surplus commodities on global markets. 
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Seward’s imperial vision positioned settlers as the driving force of imperial 
expansion.  Settlers expanded the scope and authority of modern democracy by 
colonizing the west and founding new states:  “The native colonist no sooner reaches a 
new and distant home, whether in a cleft of the Rocky mountains or on the seashore, than 
he proceeds to found a state, in which his natural and inalienable rights shall be secure.”  
This conception of settler expansion directly drew on the Northwest Ordinance, which 
offered a new imperial vision that institutionalized the equality of the constituent parts of 
empire, preventing the formation of colonial dependencies.
41
  Consonant with the 
ideology of democratic empire, settler expansion proceeded through the replication of 
colonial polities in a “vacant” wilderness.  In founding new polities along the frontier, 
settlers retained their status as free and equal members of a civic community. 
The extension of slavery posed a clear threat to Seward’s vision of settler expansion.  
By consolidating landholdings in a slaveholding oligarchy, the empire of slavery 
represented the resurgence of feudalism in the New World and thus violated national 
ideals of social equality.  The expansion of slavery, Seward feared, would introduce an 
“aristocratic element” into government based on two principles:  “the privileged own the 
lands” and the “laborer works on compulsion.”  These two principles, which together 
comprise a feudal social state, combine to institute an oligarchic government based on the 
rule of the few.  In contrast, free government depended on a democratic social state 
marked by free soil and free labor.
42
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Much of Seward’s criticism of slavery cohered around a civilizational discourse that 
divided political space into barbarism and civilization.  He insisted that the democratic 
creed embraced a singular idea:  “That civilization is to be maintained and carried on 
upon this continent by federal states, based upon the principles of free soil, free labor, 
free speech, equal rights, and universal suffrage.”43  The expansion of slavery meant the 
decline of democratic society.  In making this claim, however, Seward had to explain 
why slavery was so entrenched in the Americas.  If the New World represented the 
pinnacle of democratic society, then slavery’s persistence provided counter-evidence to 
this thesis.  Seward explained slavery’s persistence in terms of two competing modes of 
civilizational empire.  Slavery and the slave trade were “altogether foreign from the 
habits of the races which colonized these States, and established civilization here [North 
America].”  Drawing on the Black Legend of Spanish cruelties, Seward held that slavery 
was “introduced on this continent as an engine of conquest, and for the establishment of 
monarchical power, by the… Spaniards.”  By exonerating free settlers from complicity in 
slavery’s expansion, settler colonization appeared in national discourse as a force of 
civilizational progress.  In addition, Seward’s comparative theory of empire authorized 
the construction of an imperial geo-political order that subjected Latin America, with its 
“poverty, imbecility, and anarchy,” to the civilizing power of the U.S.44 
Colonialism and Cultural Democracy 
Although Seward was a better speech writer than a poet, he tried his hand at offering 
a poetic vision of democratic empire:  “Our nation with United interests blest, / Not now 
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content to poise, shall sway the rest; / Abroad our Empire shall no limits know / But like 
the sea in boundless circles flow.”45  While Seward was no poet, American culture had its 
own national bard that turned his imperial vision in a poetic vision.  Whitman was also 
influenced by Seward’s own political thinking, especially his notion of settler expansion 
as a force of civilizational progress.  In an 1855 letter requesting a collection of Seward’s 
papers (ostensibly used in Eighteenth Presidency!), Whitman wrote, “I too have at heart 
Freedom, and the amelioration of the people,” signaling that Whitman also believed in a 
“higher law” that demanded that the new territories be free territories.46 
My aim in juxtaposing Whitman’s poetic vision to free-soil ideology is not to reduce 
his poetics to his politics.  It is to illuminate how his poetic-political vision constructed 
the “American people” as an imperial constituency who demanded land, free commerce, 
and settler expansion as necessary for the realization of modern democratic ideals.  
Poetics and imperial politics, for Whitman, were closely connected.  In accordance with 
his conviction that a self-consciously democratic culture provides the firmer foundations 
for American democracy, he gave poetic substance to free-soil visions of democratic 
empire.  In turn, narratives of settler expansion also influenced Whitman’s poetry at the 
level of his belief in the formative influence of language and culture on the development 
of modern democracy.
47
  Whitman’s poetry and prose, therefore, both reflect and 
reinforce the ideology of democratic empire. 
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Whitman’s political tract, The Eighteenth Presidency! (1855), readily illustrates the 
role that free-soil ideology played in his cultural conception of democracy.  The objective 
of the tract was to incite the American people into mass electoral action against the pro-
slavery Democratic Party.
48
  Yet although Whitman’s views were closely aligned with 
the Republican and Free Soil parties, The Eighteenth Presidency! was more than a piece 
of campaign literature.  In speaking not to sectional interests or partisan factions but 
rather the American people as a whole, Whitman held that the question of slavery in the 
territories was much larger than partisan politics, for it cut to the very heart of American 
democratic identity.  The relationship between democracy and settler expansion provided 
the animating thread of The Eighteenth-Presidency.  Whitman framed his discussion in 
terms of the location of the sovereign, posing the question, “First, Who are the Nation?”  
Whitman writes, “Before the American era, the programme of the classes of a nation read 
thus, first the king, second the noblemen and gentry, third the great mass of mechanics, 
farmers, men following the water, and all laboring persons.”  The modern era inaugurated 
a new epoch in which the “theory of government” positioned the power of the third class 
above the first two.
49
  Estimating that around six million workingmen made up the nation 
and only 350,000 slaveholders, Whitman grouped the latter class among “noblemen and 
gentry.”  If the slaveholding class comprised the oligarchic element of society, the 
workers, farmers, and sailors made up the democratic element. 
The question of land in the western territories, then, was a question of which class 
would constitute the primary force of colonization.  In answering this question, Whitman 
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cheered the “national tendency toward populating the territories full of free work-
people,” which was the program of colonization most consistent with the promulgations 
of “the fathers.”  The project of settling the west with the free population was “vital to the 
life and thrift of the masses of the citizens.”  To allow the expansion of slavery would be 
to put democratic society “violently… back under the feet of slavery.”50  By further 
consolidating landholdings in the hands of the slaveholding oligarchy, the democratic 
masses would be kept from forming state governments based on egalitarian principles.  If 
slavery was not prohibited from the American territories, “there will steadily wheel into 
this Union… slave state after slave state, the entire surface of the land owned by great 
proprietors, in plantations of thousands of acres, showing no more sight for free races of 
farmers and work-people than there is now in any European despotism or aristocracy.”51  
As a result, American politics would be characterized by institutionalized hierarchy and 
the master-slave relationship rather than social equality.  Throughout his poetry and 
prose, feudalism served as the constitutive outside against which Whitman defined 
democracy and American identity.  If democracy was the cultural form of the future, 
feudalism represented a decaying form of civilization associated with the Old World.
52
  
Whitman viewed feudalism not only as a form of politics, but also as an economic system 
in which the mass of laborers was exploited for the benefit of the ruling aristocracy.  His 
fear of feudalism fueled his opposition to the expansion of slavery, which he thought 
would subject the mass of free laborers in the west to economic dependence. 
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Whitman closed his essay by drawing on one of the main poetic tropes that would 
come to shape his poetry throughout his career:  the idea of the poet as the representative 
voice of the nation.  In the closing sections of the essay, he imagines himself as the 
representative poet of the masses:  “Circulate and reprint this voice of mine for the 
workingmen’s sake.”  The expansion of the democratic masses portends for Whitman a 
new order of the ages in which the disintegration of Old World hierarchies culminates in 
a new vision of humanity.  At the center of this was the democratic-settler as 
representative man:  “Never was the representative man more energetic...  He urges on 
the myriads before him, he crowds them aside, his daring step approaches the arctic and 
Antarctic poles, he colonizes the shores of the Pacific, the Asiatic Indias, the birthplace of 
languages of and of races, the archipelagoes, Australia.”  In doing so, he “re-states 
history” and “enlarges morality,” and he further establishes the moral universality of the 
modern democracy, which acquires its force and moral valence from global processes of 
colonization.
53
  Personified by Whitman himself, the democratic-settler occupies a central 
place in this global vision of settler-colonial empire. 
Whitman’s personification of the settler-citizen as the force of democratic expansion 
also shaped his poetry.  In “Starting from Paumanok,” which references the Algonquian 
name for Long Island (where Whitman was born), Whitman personifies the nation’s 
expansionist drive across the continent in his own autobiography.  In doing so, he 
imagines himself as a pioneer ushering in the democratic promise of the “New World.”54  
Similarly, in his paean to settler expansion “Pioneers! O Pioneers!,” Whitman includes 
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himself among the rank of settlers and free laborers seeking a new world of equality and 
fraternity in the West:  “All the past we leave behind, / We debouch upon a new mightier 
world, varied world, / Fresh and strong the world we seize, world of labor and the 
march.”55  The logic of settler colonialism is forcefully expressed in the idea that settlers 
come to a New World in order to free themselves from the hierarchies of the Old World.  
Yet settler colonialism entails much more than merely the escape from European 
hierarchies.  If settler colonialism is marked by the transposition of mass populations into 
new spaces, then the symbol of the “New World” entails the displacement of indigenous 
peoples.  Whitman’s poetic vision of modern democracy partakes in the colonial legacy 
of discovery and conquest.  He envisions “successions of men, Americanos,” flooding 
into “vast trackless spaces” of the west:  “Americanos!  Conquerors!  Marches 
humanitarian! / Foremost! Century marches! Libertad! Masses!”56 
In this new world conception of democratic empire, the disavowal of indigeneity is 
the condition of possibility for modern American democracy.  By the close of the poem, 
Whitman pauses to consider the fate of the “red aborigines” that previously occupied the 
New World:  “Leaving natural breaths, sounds of rain and winds, calls as of birds and 
animals in the woods, syllabled to us for names, / Okonee, Koosa, Ottawa, Monongahela, 
Sauk, Natches, Chattahoochee, Kaqueta, Oronoco, Wabash, Miami, Chippewa, Oshkosh, 
Walla-Walla, / Leaving such to the States they melt, they depart, charging the water and 
the land with names.”57  A characteristic feature of Whitman’s poetry was the use of 
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indigenous names to construct a new American vernacular that was distinct from British 
English.
58
  Although he sought the preservation of indigenous languages in the landscape 
and lamented the abuse of indigenous peoples, he also subscribed to notions of social 
evolution that condemned indigenous communities to inevitable extinction.
59
 
In this manner, the eradication of old orders in the Americas (lamentable as it may be) 
paved the way for a new, democratic order.  Whitman integrated indigenous names into 
American democratic identity at the level of language, yet his American landscape is 
evacuated of indigenous cultures and sovereignties.  Alongside his praise of equality 
among white settlers, Whitman celebrated settler expansion as a hierarchical process by 
which civilization overcomes savagery:  “A new race dominating previous ones and 
grander far, with new contests, new politics, new literatures and religions, new inventions 
and arts.”60  The democratic promise of the New World thus involves freedom from 
feudal hierarchies as well as the eradication of the old indigenous orders that previously 
dominated the American landscape.  As a result, Whitman’s democratic imaginary is 
indistinguishable from the settler imaginary.  Both cohere around the mass expansion of 
settler populations to distant and underpopulated spaces that were considered void of 
indigenous inhabitants.  The assimilation of indigenous language into democratic culture, 
therefore, is thoroughly consonant with the logic of native elimination. 
                                                 
58
 In his essay, “The Spanish Element in our Nationality,” Whitman posited that indigenous and Spanish 
names would provide the essential parts of the “composite American identity of the future.”  While 
indigenous languages will leave an imprint on American identity, Whitman asserted that indigenous 
communities “must gradually dwindle as time rolls on, and in a few generation more leave only a 
reminiscence, a blank;” Poetry and Prose, p. 1171. 
59
 Ed Folsom, Walt Whitman’s Native Representations (Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 57.  Also see 
David Reynolds, Walt Whitman:  A Cultural Biography (Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), pp. 471-472. 
60
 Whitman, “Starting from Paumanok,” p. 187. 
 231 
 
What struck Whitman about the United States was that the nation spoke itself into 
existence in a singular act of poetic self-creation.  Nevertheless, the auto-poetic 
constitution of American democracy hinges on the eradication of those cultures that came 
before it.  In its appropriation of indigenous languages, Whitman’s democratic poetry 
exemplifies the “typical settler narrative.”  Settler narratives rely on two complementary 
forces:  the “effacement of the indigene” proceeds alongside the “concomitant 
indigenization of the settler.”61  By integrating indigenous languages into his poetry, 
Whitman distinguishes U.S. democratic culture from the language, culture, and poetics of 
the European homelands from which settlers emigrated.  At the same time, the formation 
of an American democratic culture also implied that indigenous cultures vanish before 
the superior vigor of Anglo settlers.  Whitman’s democratic poetry, which gave a poetic 
voice to the democratic identity of settlers, arose out of a ground constituted by conquest 
even as it incorporated indigenous elements. 
Nowhere was Whitman’s imperial vision more forcefully evidenced than in his poem, 
“Salut Au Monde” (1860), where he envisioned himself as the embodiment of a new 
cosmopolitan order marked by the global interconnection of diverse races and cultures.  
Throughout the poem, Whitman constructs an inclusive vision of global civic order, 
expounding lists upon lists of disparate geographic spaces and the diverse cultures that 
occupy them.  The lists and litanies of the poem endorse a vision of global order without 
international hierarchy.  Lists allow Whitman to impose order on the disparate elements 
of world history and global society without constructing hierarchies.  Indeed, Whitman 
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consciously included the entirety of the world into this global civic vision:  “I see ranks, 
colors, barbarisms, civilizations, I go among them, I mix indiscriminately.”62 
But when Whitman comes to describing the indigenous peoples of Africa, Australia, 
and America, he suspends his inclusive and egalitarian vision and slides into the language 
of civilizational hierarchy by constructing an alternative list that is outside of his 
internationalist vision:  “You Hottentot with clicking palate! You wooly-hair’d hordes!... 
/ You human forms with the fathomless ever-impressive countenance of brutes!... / You 
Austral negro, naked, red, sooty, with protrusive lip, groveling, seeking your food…  / 
You roamer of Amazonia! You Patagonian!... / I do not say one word against you, away 
back there where you stand, / (You will come forward in due time to my side.)”63   To 
justify the spread of modern civilization, Whitman imagines indigenous peoples as 
inhabiting a lower stage of development, who will eventually be assimilated into the 
structures of democratic modernity.  Insofar as natives cease to be natives, assimilation 
and acculturation operate as modes of native elimination that clear the way for the 
construction of a new democratic order. 
Although Whitman subscribed to the Hegelian view of universal history in which 
civilization moves westward, the expansion of slavery complicated the directionality of 
settler expansion.  In “Facing West from California’s Shores,” Whitman imagines 
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himself standing on the shores of the Pacific, witnessing the triumph of democratic 
modernity as civilization completes is global circuit and finds its final resting place in the 
ancient lands of Asia.  Yet Whitman experienced the triumph of modernity less as a 
victory than as a form of loss, for he remains “seeking what is yet unfound.”  His 
ambivalence about seeing the circle of world history complete itself was driven by an 
anxiety about the potential triumph of slavery.
64
  In another tribute to the global reach of 
modernity, Whitman ended not with the spread of democracy into the Pacific, but with a 
vision of American settlers marching back toward the Atlantic from their settlements in 
California:  “They shall now also march obediently eastward for your sake Libertad.”65  
With the onset of the Civil War in 1861, he celebrated the agents of empire returning east 
in order to reclaim American power from the slaveholding oligarchy.  By the close of the 
Civil War, he further celebrated Union soldiers as brothers in arms, who after having 
found economic opportunity in the west descended back upon the eastern war theater to 
assert the empire of democracy over slavery.
66
 
As the principles of democratic expansion triumphed over the expansion of slavery 
with the end of the Civil War, Whitman articulated a colonial vision of American 
democracy.  In “Years of the Modern” (1865), we get a glimpse of how coloniality 
defined democratic modernity.  Praising the pioneers that have pushed back savagery and 
guarded against the resurgence of feudal land title, Whitman proclaims, “I see men 
marching and countermarching by swift millions / I see the frontiers and boundaries of 
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the old aristocracies broken.”67  In addition to shaping the moral character and political 
identity of settler-citizens, the widespread diffusion of property in mass society sustains 
democratic society against the anti-modern forces of feudal society and indigenous 
sovereignty.  Like Tocqueville, Whitman envisioned modern democracy as a process of 
colonization by defining it in terms of the double absence of feudal social structures and 
indigenous sovereignties.  In his praise of the common man, Whitman imagines the 
settler as the primary force driving the spread of modern democracy:  “His daring foot is 
on land and sea everywhere—he colonizes the Pacific, the archipelagoes.”  Having 
declared its victory over feudalism in the South, American democracy continued its 
relentless march over the indigenous peoples of the Pacific. 
Colonial Vistas 
By the time of Reconstruction, Whitman turned more forcefully to prose writing and 
came to synthesize his poetic vision of democratic expansion into a political theory of 
American democracy.  Outlined in his essay, Democratic Vistas (1871), Whitman’s 
democratic theory flowed directly out of his poetic reflections on the relationship 
between democracy and settler expansion.  Although colonial and imperial themes are 
more subtle in Democratic Vistas than in his earlier poetry, reading his theory of 
democracy as a byproduct of his earlier poetry illustrates that settler expansion still 
grounds his moral vision of democratic community. 
In offering a democratic theory, Whitman located democracy less in its constitutional 
form than in the social relations and cultural bonds that united citizens.  “Democracy was 
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not to be a constitutional device for the better government of given nations, not merely a 
movement for the material improvement of the poorer classes.  It was to be a social and a 
moral democracy and to involve an actual equality among all men.”68  Like Tocqueville 
and Emerson, Whitman invested his hope in the social condition of democracy rather 
than in its political form.  For Whitman, “democratic literature” and “democratic 
sociology” are closely connected, both of which constitute of the “chief influence in 
modern civilization.”69  Literature has an expressly sociological role in shaping the 
cultural values and moral bonds that tie citizens together in a broader community.  
Democracy is not simply a set of political institutions that ensure general suffrage.  It 
provides a “literature underlying life… handling the elements and forces with competent 
power, teaching and training men.”  In conceiving of democracy in this way, Whitman 
offers a novel form of democratic theory.  His answer to the “great question of 
democracy” is not “the result of studying up in political economy, but of the ordinary 
sense, observing, wandering among men, these States, these stirring years of war and 
peace.”70  Whitman’s theory of democracy stems directly out of the human experiences 
of settler expansion that provide the content for his poetic vision of democracy.  
Whitman considers democratic literature to be a form of democratic theory in its own 
right because he thought that literature will provide the primary justification for 
American democracy.  He justified American democracy not through a set of abstract 
principles but through an account of the moral and spiritual benefits that democracy 
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offers.  Democratic culture gives a “moral identity” to the political community as defined 
by its “Constitutions, legislative and judicial ties.”71  After the Civil War, Whitman 
continued to wrestle with the question of the relation between the one and the many in 
modern democracy.  To this end, he sought to reconcile democratic individuality with 
“democratic nationality.”72  In offering a solution to this problem, the binding force of 
democratic culture operates on two levels:  it binds individuals to the community by 
offering a cohesive sense of national identity; and it binds the separate states into a larger 
federal union, what Whitman called a “compacted imperial ensemble.”73   
On the first level, individuals must experience a sense of moral autonomy but at the 
same time experience themselves as members of a political community.  For Whitman, 
individualism and political democracy must be made commensurate by developing the 
political personality of citizens.  To discern the shape of this political personality, 
Whitman called for a “democratic ethnology of the future,” the aim of which was to 
discover a new political species.  He argued that “to practically enter into politics is an 
important part of American personalism,” suggesting that political participation is a vital 
element of the new democratic character.
74
  Yet Whitman’s ethnology was 
indistinguishable from democratic literature because its objective was not to discover this 
new political specimen as an empirical fact, but to create and constitute a new form of 
democratic subjectivity through poetic regimes of representation. 
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On the second level, Whitman offered his notion of federalism not as an alternative to 
empire, but rather as an alternative understanding of democratic empire that would 
transcend “history’s hitherto empires or feudalities.”  The “moral and spiritual idea” at 
the center of American democracy is vital to “carrying out the republican principle to 
develop itself in the New World.”  Like the individual, each state is afforded a relative 
degree of autonomy from the federal government within its own sphere.  Federalism thus 
requires that popular sovereignty be institutionalized in both federal and state 
governments.  Whitman considers this to be the “original dual theory and foundation of 
the United States.”75  Federalism, however, provided more than an institutional theory of 
government that balanced state and federal authority.  It provided a moral vision that 
united separate communities into a larger imperial union.  
Based on this theory of moral democracy, Whitman offered a theory of democratic 
development that divided American history into three stages.  The first involved 
establishing the “political foundation” of American democracy by inscribing the rights 
and liberties of the “immense masses of people” in the Constitution, Declaration of 
Independence, and the state governments.  This first stage was primarily a form of 
political development in which electoral institutions of universal suffrage granted the will 
of the people legislative force.  The second stage was a form of economic development 
that established prosperity and opportunity for the masses through the expansion of 
commerce.  Although Whitman thought both of these stages were essential, they were 
insufficient to produce a higher stage of moral democracy.  Mere political institutions 
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served as an insufficient adhesive for the democratic community.  Without a moral 
identity, the nation would remain a fragile confederation of states and individuals each 
pursuing their own economic interests, causing the republic to degenerate into base 
materialism.  The third stage was thus a form of social and cultural development that 
would establish a “sublime and serious Religious Democracy.”76  
Whitman’s moral theory of democratic development is commensurate with and 
indeed depends upon settler colonialism.  As Benjamin Barber puts it, modern democracy 
was “able to root itself in firm soil only because of the deracination of those who came 
before.”77  Like Marx, Whitman believed that the construction of a new, modern order on 
top of the decimation of the old involves the obliteration of feudal hierarchies that restrict 
the development of regimes of free labor.  In the context of American democracy, this 
fear of feudalism involved restricting the spread of slavery.  But underneath the 
destruction of feudal hierarchies lies the deracination of indigenous sovereignties that 
previously occupied the New World.  Whitman contends that “democracy can never 
prove itself beyond cavil, until it founds and luxuriantly grows its own forms of art, 
poems, schools, theology, displacing all that exists, or that has been produced anywhere 
in the past.”78  American democracy rests upon the deracination of indigeneity not simply 
for the material benefits of open land, but more precisely for the sake of the geographical 
conditions that provide soil for the growth of moral democracy.  Directly rooted in the 
settler ideals of the free-soil movement, Whitman demanded that a “programme of 
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culture” be formed “with an eye to the practical life, the west, the working-men, the facts 
of farms and jack-planes and engineers.”79 
Although not pre-determined, Whitman’s conception of history was a teleological 
one.  His democratic theory was not a simple justification of the present state of affairs, 
for he thought that without the third stage of moral and cultural development American 
democracy would remain mired in the second, materialistic stage of development.  The 
cultivation of a democratic literature and a new democratic personality, Whitman held, 
would lead to a “spiritualization” of politics that will “offset… our materialistic and 
vulgar American democracy.”  The futurity of the democratic personality, however, rests 
upon the continued process of settler expansion.  Recapitulating the discourse of Manifest 
Destiny, Whitman pronounced that the “Almighty had spread before this nation charts of 
imperial destinies.”80  Yet the teleology linking settler expansion to the formation of 
moral democracy was not automatic.  Whitman called upon the democratic masses to 
march upon the West and the Pacific so as to make moral democracy a reality. 
Although taking root in the New World, Whitman insisted that modern democracy 
remains “unperform’d.”  In spite of largely succumbing to the ideological impulses of 
Manifest Destiny, Whitman departed from this broad ideological formation in one key 
respect:  he saw the future as marked by contingency, not locked-in to a deterministic 
process guided by Providence.  While it might stand to reason that this distances him 
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from the idea of Manifest Destiny, Whitman still remains confined within the ideology of 
democratic empire.  Although he anxiously pronounced that “No one knows what will 
happen next,” he prophetically performed the future of democratic modernity by intoning 
the “irresistible power” of democracy.  In proclaiming that modern democracy remains 
“unperform’d,” Whitman was calling on settlers to instantiate a new democratic order.  
His claims about the unwritten history of American democracy and the unperformed 
nature of the democratic epic might be read as performative speech acts that constitutes 
settler communities as democratic communities.  Although the future was yet to be 
written, Whitman interpellated settler constituencies as democratic constituencies, calling 
on the settler masses to theatrically perform the future of American democracy. 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has shown, the politics of settler expansion profoundly shaped 
democratic culture in the antebellum period.  Indeed, the task of Reconstruction itself was 
significantly colored by the language of empire.  Although Whitman and free-soil 
democrats continued to think of democratic-settlers as the driving force of American 
empire, the realities of economic and political consolidation after the War posed a 
significant challenge to the ideology of democratic empire.  The Vice President of the 
Confederacy, Alexander Stephens, denounced “Imperialism in this Country” as a force of 
centralization and despotism that would abolish the “principle of the sovereign right of 
local self-government.”  Stephens portrayed the new national powers of the Union that 
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emerged after the Civil War not as a source of progress but as the “inevitable despotism 
of a Consolidated Centralized Empire,” which would lead to tyranny.81 
In response, Republican politicians who inherited the free-soil ideal defended state 
consolidation as necessary for the realization of human rights.  The Radical Republican 
Charles Sumner argued that a unified nation requires the centralization of authority to 
protect “all the rights of citizenship.”  In discerning the meaning of the term “nation,” 
Sumner asserted that Americans are “one people” who have reached an “advanced stage 
of political development” in which political and civil rights are secured by a “common 
power.”  In asserting that the centralization and consolidation of political authority differs 
from “our Indians” who lack anything resembling political society, he constructed 
American national identity through the civilizational categories of settler colonialism.
82
  
The centralized power of the new American nation-state represented to Sumner the 
“highest civilization.”  As if to directly respond to Stephens, Sumner proclaimed, “Call it 
imperialism, if you please; it is simply the imperialism of the Declaration of 
Independence, with all its promises fulfilled.”83 
In Sumner’s remarks here, we see the origins of the “imperialism of human rights” 
that authorizes American imperialism into the twentieth and twenty first centuries.
84
  
While Sumner does not explicitly authorize the imposition of American culture on distant 
populations, his understanding of the Declaration as an instrument of imperialism accords 
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with the civilizing mission of progressive imperialism and contemporary assemblages of 
humanitarian warfare.  As these closing remarks should suggest, the notion that 
Americans developed an imperial self-consciousness only with the conquest of Cuba and 
the Philippines in the 1890s is an artifact of historical narratives that ignore how settler 
expansion acquired conceptual and philosophical coherence through discourses of 
empire.  Accounts that construct a division between overseas and continental expansion 
not only ignore how both were rooted in dynamics of settler colonialism.  They also 
obscure the profound historical continuities between the colonial frontiers of the 
antebellum period and the early twentieth century as well as those continuities that link 



















William Apess and the Paradox of Settler Sovereignty 
 
 “What, then, shall we do?  Shall we cease crying and say it is all wrong, or shall we bury the hatchet and 
those unjust laws and Plymouth Rock together and become friends?”  William Apess, Eulogy on King 
Philip 
 
Processes of settler expansion have played a constitutive role in shaping antebellum 
democratic culture.  In a material sense, the democratic foundations of America have 
their source in regimes of native elimination – removal, conquest, and assimilation – that 
clear the ground for the development of a new type of egalitarian society based on 
principles of popular sovereignty.  Because the egalitarian distribution of land prevents 
the return of feudal hierarchy, enabling the sovereign people to rule in their equal civic 
status, institutions of popular sovereignty came to rely on settler expansion.  In a 
discursive sense, narratives of democratic identity cohered around the disavowal of 
indigenous sovereignty in North America, resting as they do on tropes of terra nullius 
and the vanishing Indian that serve to loosen the hold and legitimacy of indigenous land 
claims.  The disavowal and elimination of indigenous sovereignty thus stands at the 
center of hegemonic founding narratives of American democracy. 
Nevertheless, colonial subjects of democratic empire have continually enlisted 
democratic values and principles of popular sovereignty in in their struggles against 
settler colonialism.  Attending to these discursive modes of appropriation and revision 
takes us far beyond founding narratives to what we might call counter-narratives of 
democratic empire.  Turning to the political writings of William Apess, this chapter 
examines counter-narratives of American democracy that confront the ideology of 
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democratic empire by exposing the entwinement of egalitarian and democratic principles 
with the constitutive exclusions of settler-colonial conquest.  Apess foregrounds how, 
rather than separate and antithetical traditions, democracy and empire have been 
articulated together in American history, refusing interpretations that view American 
democracy as containing an inherent and progressive tendency for emancipation and 
equality.  In crafting a counter-narrative that tells the story of American democracy not 
from the perspective of settlers but from that of colonized and conquered subjects, Apess 
engages in an ideological critique of democratic empire that exposes the paradox of 
settler sovereignty, the fact that popular sovereignty for settlers depends upon settler 
conquest.  Apess thus locates the problem of settler colonialism as central rather than 
ancillary to the development of modern democratic thought, illuminating how settler 
expansion established the political foundation of modern American democracy. 
A Pequot Indian by birth, Apess became a vocal and influential proponent of 
indigenous rights in New England and national politics through his involvement in a 
small but significant conflict between the Massachusetts government and a community of 
Wampanoag Indians on a Cape Cod town called Mashpee.  As an itinerant preacher in the 
late 1820s, Apess heard of increasingly strained relations between settlers and Indians 
and went to Cape Cod to offer his services.  He came to Mashpee in May of 1833 and 
found a struggling town, one of the sole remaining Wampanoag settlements that had 
survived after the Puritans went on a wave of mutilation during King Phillip’s War in 
1676.  The plantation was settled in 1667 on land provided by the Reverend Richard 
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Bourne.  In accordance with the Crown charter and Bourne’s will, Mashpee was 
organized as a self-governing community.
1
 
In 1788 the Massachusetts government fully rescinded these rights and implemented 
a law appointing three white guardians to manage the town.  Mashpee was rich with 
resources, with over eight thousand acres of pitch pine and two thousand acres of oak and 
another two thousand acres of cleared and arable land for agriculture.  The 1788 law 
granted the guardians the authority to lease land to whites, the revenue of which was put 
at the sole discretion of the guardians.  The guardianship system was premised on the 
common law principle that orphans or other physical or mental dependents with property 
claims should have a court appointed guardian to administer their affairs and prepare for 
the future.  In spite of its paternalistic motives, the law authorized the direct expropriation 
of Indian land.  Operating under the Lockean assumption that uncultivated land could 
justifiably be expropriated under natural law, the General Court of Massachusetts 
authorized guardians to dispose of Indian surpluses in wood and land to white farmers 
and ranchers, a practice that continued into the 1830s.
2
 
When Apess arrived in Mashpee, he attended a religious service held by a white man 
named Phineas Fish, who was one of three state-appointed guardians of Mashpee.  He 
was astounded to find Fish preaching to an exclusively white congregation.  When Apess 
asked Fish where all the Indians were, he replied that they preferred to worship with an 
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Indian preacher named Blind Joe Amos.  When Apess expressed his desire to hold a 
meeting among the Mashpee, Fish warned him not to speak of oppression, which would 
only hasten their discontent.  “They thought themselves oppressed,” Fish observed, “but 
such was not the case.  They had already quite liberty enough.”  Distraught at Fish’s 
arrogance, Apess delivered a lecture to the meeting based on his “sketch of the history of 
the Indians of New England” (a text which provided the basis for his Eulogy on King 
Philip), which he recalled was met with shouts of “Truth, truth!”  After listening to their 
stories, Apess assisted the Mashpee in writing a list of their grievances and presenting 
them to the Massachusetts Governor.  The outcome was the “Indian Declaration of 
Independence,” a series of resolutions declaring Mashpee political autonomy and 
nullifying the Massachusetts laws establishing the guardianship system.
3
   
All of this came to a head when the Mashpee resolutions went into effect on July 1, 
1833.  A few days later two white brothers named Sampson defied the resolutions by 
taking wood away from the plantation.  Catching the men in the act, Apess calmly 
explained the intentions of the tribe and the preceding resolutions declaring the plantation 
exclusive property of the Mashpee.  After the men refused to desist from loading their 
carts, Apess insisted that the Mashpee were intent on carrying their resolutions into 
effect, at which point a group of Indians arrived and began to unload the carts and return 
the wood.  Although the brothers left without any violence, Apess was later arrested on 
charges of inciting a riot.
4
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After he was released from jail in early August, the Mashpee continued their struggle.  
To further the cause, Apess and Blind Joe Amos mounted a publicity campaign and 
gained significant allies such as Benjamin Hallett, a prominent Massachusetts lawyer and 
editor of the Boston Advocate, and William Lloyd Garrison, whose newspaper the 
Liberator endorsed the Mashpee struggle.
5
  Such high profile allies set off a storm of 
commentary in the political press debating the Mashpee incident in particular and the 
Indian question in general.  Partially in an attempt to clear his name of any wrongdoing 
and partially to further the cause of Indian rights, Apess composed a collection of 
documentary evidence surrounding the Mashpee incident interspersed with his own 
commentary titled Indian Nullification of the Unconstitutional Laws of Massachusetts 
Relative to the Marshpee Tribe; or, The Pretended Riot Explained.
 6
 
Immediately evident from the title of Apess’s work, questions of constitutional 
authority loomed large in his political thought and rhetoric.  But how should we make 
sense of Apess’s activation of constitutional discourse in his defense of Mashpee rights?   
Prevailing accounts posit that he articulated a hybridized Indian-American identity in 
order to demand inclusion into the U.S. constitutional order.  The most vocal proponent 
of this interpretation, David Carlson, argues that Apess forged a discourse of “Indian 
liberalism” that revolves around liberal conceptions of the self and contractual freedom in 
American political and legal discourse.  For Carlson, the rhetorical effect of Apess’s 
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This simplistic reading, however, is underpinned by the assumption that liberal legal 
discourse was adequate to the task of articulating the wrongs imposed upon Indians.  
Liberal discourse, however, is unable to capture the settler-colonial foundations of 
American democracy because it lacks the concept of “conquest” in its discursive register.  
As Michel Foucault has explained, the notion of the contract in liberal political thought 
operates to obscure how processes of conquest figure into the formation of modern 
sovereignty.  Absent a concept of conquest to express indigenous societies as conquered 
nations, liberal legal discourse casts Indians as paternalistic wards of the state unable to 
make legal and political claims on their own.
8
  The language of liberal democracy is thus 
unable to express the American founding as an instance of settler conquest.  To navigate 
this predicament, Apess developed “Indian nullification” as a political-rhetorical form 
that Jacques Ranciere calls dissensus, a disruption in the hegemonic ordering of who 
counts as a legitimate political subject that occurs when excluded subjects speak in a 
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language they are not entitled to use.
9
  In his appropriation of democratic-republican 
discourse, Apess seeks to represent that which is unrepresentable, that which doesn’t 
register as politically intelligible on the grid of liberal-republican democratic discourse. 
If one of the primary problems of modern democracy concerns the issue of how to lay 
a solid basis for an enduring political regime based on the principles of self-rule, then 
Apess explicitly addressed the question of political foundations.  Through his rhetorical 
deployment of “Indian nullification,” Apess confronts what political theorists have 
identified as the fundamental paradox of law and sovereignty in modern democracies:  
the fact that any constitutional order rests on forms of exclusion that are beyond the realm 
of legal legitimacy.  Because attempts to draw the boundaries of popular sovereignty can 
never be accomplished by democratic means, law and sovereignty always rest on some 
form of violence and exclusion.  Indeed, Apess’s rhetoric suggests an acute sense that 
settler colonialism and imperial conquest form the material and symbolic ground of 
modern democracy.
10
  As in any democratic state, the settler state requires, in Mouffe’s 
words, “drawing a frontier between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ those who belong to the demos and 
those who are outside it.”  In the case of liberal settler states, however, the fundamental 
divide grounding sovereignty and law is the binary schematic of settler-indigene.  To the 
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extent that settler sovereignty and popular sovereignty are the same,
 
the conquest and 
exclusion of indigenous peoples is the condition of possibility for democratic self-rule.
11
 
To represent this fundamental division that anchors the authority of American 
democracy, Apess employed the concept of nullification less as a feature of institutional 
design than as a discursive mode of representation that exposes democracy’s constitutive 
exclusions, the way in which liberty and equality rest upon settler conquest for their 
conceptual coherence.  In doing so, he calls the authority of the constitution into question 
by bringing its colonial tendencies into critical focus.  Indeed, Apess is acutely aware of 
how American democracy is deeply bound to and depends upon settler colonialism.  
Nevertheless, rather than reject democracy as a mode of colonial imposition, Apess 
employed the basic terms of democratic discourse to articulate claims for the political and 
cultural autonomy of indigenous communities.  In this manner, Apess re-signifies the 
meaning of nullification circulating in antebellum constitutional discourse in a way that 
exceeds the initial contexts to which it was originally intended to correspond.  As a result, 
nullification becomes an indigenous concept that marks the limits of settler authority and 
asserts the political and cultural autonomy of Indian communities. 
Constituting Settler Democracy 
To properly understand Apess’s concept of Indian nullification, it is essential to 
locate it in the context of what I call “the paradox of settler sovereignty.”  In order to 
                                                 
11
 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (Verso, 2009), p. 4.  While Mouffe employs the frontier more as a 
symbolic delineation of the boundaries of the democratic community, our focus on settler colonialism 
requires us to see it as a material space of colonization wherein the settler-indigene divide is constructed.   
As Elkins and Pedersen put it, a settler state is one which continues to “structure power along a settler-
indigene divide;” Introduction to Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century, p. 4. 
 251 
 
provide the contours of this paradox, we can read Daniel Webster’s “Plymouth Oration” 
and Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America for the dynamic interplay between 
democratic equality and settler sovereignty.
12
  Both writers understand how the process 
of constitution-making entails not only the founding act of setting up the formal political 
institutions that bind a community (i.e. the capital “C” Constitution) but also requires the 
ongoing cultivation of habits and norms that make those institutions and membership in 
them meaningful.  Furthermore, they both reveal how the underlying values of 
democratic culture that sustain popular sovereignty are predicated on settler conquest. 
Settler conquest is best understood as a form of foundational violence that seeks the 
elimination and erasure of indigenous orders so as to clear the ground for the constitution 
of a new democratic society.  It institutes a rupture in political time, creating a disjuncture 
between the eradication of the old order and the constitution of the new.  If settlers in the 
North American context are marked by their status as founders of new political societies 
who retain their civic standing and sovereignty in migrating to and expropriating distant 
land, then the foundational violence of native elimination is a defining characteristic of 
settler sovereignty.  But more than a one-time event, the foundational violence of the 
settler colony continues to structure the settler state along the lines of a settler-indigene 
divide.  By engaging the paradox of settler sovereignty, Apess employs the concept of 
Indian nullification to call attention to how the constituent sovereignty of settlers operates 
as a form of native elimination. 
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Settler conquest thus constitutes what the foundational wrong or constitutive 
exclusion of American democracy.  As a constitutive exclusion that provides the 
condition of possibility for democratic sovereignty, settler conquest paradoxically 
unsettles the democratic foundations of the settler state.  Any polity founded on conquest, 
always risks subverting its own foundations because without ideologically masking its 
origins in conquest, it sanctions rebellion and sedition as a means of political change.  In 
this way, the “paradox of conquest” closely mirrors the “paradox of sovereignty,” both of 
which combine to form what I call “the paradox of settler sovereignty.”13  Rather than a 
condition to overcome, we should read the paradox of settler sovereignty as a productive 
feature of modern politics.  It institutes a temporal rupture in political order that exposes 
the contingency of state legitimacy and political authority, opening up the space for an 
antagonistic politics of conflict and contestation.  As we will see, the concept of Indian 
nullification exposes how American democracy is never able to claim full sovereignty 
and legitimacy, and more precisely, how the sovereignty of the settler state is always 
incomplete, resting on what Ranciere would call “the absence of a foundation.”14  Apess 
used the concept of Indian nullification to create an antagonistic space of contestation in 
which indigenous claims for political and cultural autonomy might be articulated. 
Daniel Webster’s “Plymouth Oration” significantly illustrates how American 
democracy was founded on and perpetuates settler conquest, further illuminating the 
paradox of settler sovereignty.  The occasion of Webster’s speech, delivered at Plymouth 
in December 1820, was to memorialize the Puritan foundations of the American republic.  
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A generation apart from the founders of the American republic, Webster intended his 
oration as both a commemoration of their achievements and as an account of the deep 
roots of their beliefs and principles in the American landscape.  Webster’s choice of 
Plymouth Rock on the 200
th
 anniversary of the founding of the Plymouth colony was not 
merely incidental to the praise showered upon the founding generation.  Plymouth Rock 
was more than a set of local attachments of interest only to the people of New England.  
Rather, it represented a founding moment of the U.S. constitutional order.
15
  Webster 
traced a linear path from Plymouth Rock to the American Revolution and Constitution.  
The “original character” of the colonies left an indelible impact on subsequent U.S. 
constitutional development.  Exemplifying the solid foundation of American democracy, 
Webster’s glorification of the settlement of New England casts a founding narrative that 
inadvertently articulates a settler colonial identity for the young republic. 
Integrated into Webster’s narrative of settler colonization is an implicit comparative 
dimension that juxtaposes North American settlement to other projects of colonization.  
What made the North American colonies truly unique was that the primary aim of 
settlement was the constitution of a new political order and the creation of a new society 
and a new political order.  In Webster’s assessment of the Greek and Roman examples of 
colonization “the owners of the soil and of the capital seldom consider themselves at 
home in the colony…  Nobody comes but to return.”  In the British colonies of North 
America, however, profits obtained from commercial ventures did not flow entirely back 
to the metropolis but were invested in the development of a new society.  As a result, the 
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“spirit of permanent improvement” prevailing in New England solidified an attachment 
to place and location that in turn fueled a drive for separation and independence.
16
 
Another distinguishing feature of North American colonization is the specific form of 
government that settlers carried with them.  Even before they had reached the shores of 
North America, English settlers had already developed an elaborate system of self-
government based on models of congregational governance.  Webster writes, “At the 
moment of their landing, therefore, they possessed institutions of government… framed 
by consent, founded on choice and preference.”17  But Webster is clear that what makes 
American democracy unique extends beyond its constitutional form.  “A republican form 
of government,” Webster claimed, rests on more than “political constitutions.”  The 
firmer foundation of a free state resides in those laws that regulate the inheritance and 
transmission of property, which through the abolition of primogeniture prevents the 
formation of a landed aristocracy.  Presaging by a decade what Tocqueville called the 
“equality of conditions,” Webster appreciated that the form of government constructed in 
New England was enabled by a “condition of comparative equality in regard to wealth.”  
Coupled with the plentitude of fertile soil “unreclaimed from barbarism” and open to 
anyone willing to cultivate it, the equality of conditions provides the foundation of 
democratic government by guarding against the resurgence of feudal land title.
18
   
In this understanding of American democracy, the expropriation of indigenous land is 
a precondition of democratic equality among white settlers.  Expropriated land constitutes 
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the literal and figurative ground of the U.S. Constitution, establishing the material and 
symbolic foundation of American democracy.  In another well-known speech at Bunker 
Hill, Webster pronounced, “The principle of free government adheres to the American 
soil.  It is bedded in it, immovable as its mountains.”19  Webster’s conceptions of self-rule 
and democratic equality thus come to rely on a certain conceptualization of land and 
territoriality that disavows an indigenous presence in North America.  Native elimination 
operates in Webster’s speech not as the overt presence of violence and conquest but as 
the absence of indigenous cultures and sovereignties.  Webster clearly echoes the 
discourse of terra nullius, which cast the Americas prior to colonization as empty waste 
land awaiting European discovery.  Despite the fact that Puritan society was defined by 
continuous Indian wars in the seventeenth century, Webster purifies the American 
founding by disavowing the colonial violence at its core.
20
  The erasure of indigenous 
sovereignty in North America conceptually grounds the positive valence of American 
democracy by suppressing the modes of conquest, war, and exclusion that established the 
condition of democratic equality for white settlers. 
Similar to Webster, Tocqueville also imagines the foundations of Puritan political 
culture symbolized by Plymouth Rock as the deeper foundation of American democracy.  
For Tocqueville, we can speak of the constitution and founding of American democracy 
at two levels: at the level of constitutional form and at the level of political culture.  To 
emphasize the latter is to recognize that democracy best represents a new kind of society 
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rather than, exclusively, a form of government.  More precisely, American democracy is 
best captured by paying attention not simply to the institutions that organize political life, 
but also the sociological dynamics that establish the basic values, habits, and mores of 
democratic citizens.  Tocqueville offered an “original sociological approach, which 
stressed the influence of the social order on the functioning of political institutions.”  In 
this framework, the social condition of a democratic regime lays the basis for political 
institutions of modern democracy premised on the principle of the sovereignty of the 
people.
21
  Political democracy and popular sovereignty are only possible insofar as they 
rest on a deeper social condition defined by geographic conditions of bountiful land, legal 
regimes of land distribution that prevent the concentration of landed wealth, and cultural 
norms of citizenship that privilege social and civic equality over cultural values of 
deference and fixed social hierarchy.  Understood as a dual-layered conception of 
democracy, the democratic social state and its cultural grammar of citizenship provide 
what literary critic Kenneth Burke calls the “Constitution-beneath-the-Constitution.”22 
For both Tocqueville and Webster, the social condition symbolized by Plymouth 
Rock provided a wider and more solid basis for American democracy.  From the moment 
that Europeans arrived on the shores of the New World, Tocqueville asserts, the 
characteristics of national identity were already significantly fixed in place.  The English 
colonies, consequently, were, as a matter derivative of their principle origins, “destined to 
offer the development of freedom, not the aristocratic freedom of their mother country, 
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but the bourgeois and democratic freedom of which the history of the world had still not 
offered a complete model.”  This development of freedom was almost sown into the 
seeds of its very origin, for Tocqueville expresses that the principles of freedom and 
equality informing the New England township were almost providentially destined to 
“penetrate the entire confederation,” now exerting influence beyond their original limits, 
over the entirety of America.
23
  Principles that originated in the early Puritan settlements 
of New England eventually spread to the neighboring states and established their 
predominance as the prevailing features of the Union. 
In his attempt to explain the unique character of American democracy, Tocqueville 
afforded special explanatory power to geographic conditions.  Outlining the chief causes 
tending to maintain the stability of the American democratic republic, he posited that 
English settlers “brought equality of conditions… onto the soil they inhabited, from 
which the democratic republic would one day issue as from its natural source.”  
Americans have not only inherited the democratic social state from their Puritan fathers, 
but also from nature and God, who together “left them a boundless continent” and 
“accorded them the means to remain equal and free for a long time.”  As a sort of divine 
inheritance, the most extraordinary thing about the social condition of Americans is “the 
soil that supports them.”  As this portrait of democracy makes clear, the social state in 
America, chiefly defined by the unique configuration of land and geography, is naturally 
democratic.  Yet when it comes to accounting for the prior inhabitants of North America, 
Tocqueville notes that settlers largely find themselves in “an empty continent, a 
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wilderness land, that awaited inhabitants.”24  Reinforcing the notion that Anglo settlers 
were chosen by God to inhabit the continent, Tocqueville erases the presence of 
indigenous societies in North America and in turn obscures the forms of colonial violence 
that have fundamentally produced the democratic social state. 
As Tocqueville makes clear, democratic self-rule gained its energy from the virtue, 
customs, and habits of free citizens, which were cultivated on top of a land base marked 
by the absence of indigenous societies.  This colonial disavowal, however, is not simply a 
misleading oversight.  It is, rather, a productive absence that grounds the very conceptual 
meaning of modern American democracy and popular sovereignty.  By casting the land 
and the social condition that arises out of it as an object acquired through inheritance 
rather than conquest, Tocqueville and Webster mask the role of settler colonialism in 
constituting the democratic social state.  Further portraying the sovereignty of the people 
as a natural byproduct of geographic conditions, they make the boundaries of popular 
sovereignty appear as pre-political and thus outside of the realm of political contestation, 
reinforcing structures of settler authority. 
Nullification in American Constitutionalism 
The concept of nullification entered directly into U.S. constitutional discourse with 
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, which James Madison and Thomas 
Jefferson, respectively, drafted in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts.  While 
Madison’s notion of interposition only granted states the authority of constitutional 
interpretation and the right to make their complaints heard, Jefferson’s theory of 
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nullification went a step further by declaring the Alien and Sedition Acts “void and of no 
force,” signaling that states had the right to prevent the enforcement of the law within 
their jurisdiction when federal government exercised power outside of its proper limits.
25
 
While it is unnecessary to rehash the debates about the constitutional legitimacy of 
nullification, there are three dimensions of the concept that Apess directly engaged.  First, 
who is the foundation of constitutional authority?  Nullificationists broadly held to a 
compact theory of government that viewed the separate and independent states as the 
basis of constitutional authority.  Operating under the assumption that the Constitution 
should be interpreted as a compact among separate political communities rather than a 
contract among free and equal individuals, the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions 
allowed state legislatures to challenge the authority of the federal government to enforce 
the Alien and Seditions Acts.  During political debate over the legitimacy of a tariff 
imposed on British imports in 1828 (which in turn threatened the economic viability of 
Southern society), then Vice President John Calhoun asserted the right of states to declare 
federal laws that overstep their proper boundaries to be unconstitutional and to prevent 
the enforcement of those laws.  Because states form the basis of the federal government’s 
authority, they have the right to impede “unconstitutional oppression.”26 
Conversely, nationalists like President Andrew Jackson and Senator Daniel Webster 
(the same one) adhered to a contract theory of government that located constitutional 
legitimacy in the protection of individual rights.  In opposition to Calhoun, Senator 
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Webster asserted that the Constitution is not a compact or a treaty among separate 
sovereigns leading to a loose confederation but is the result of a contract establishing the 
basis of civil law for the new nation.
27
  In his Proclamation declaring the illegality of 
nullification, Jackson elaborated a similar theory in maintaining that the Constitution 
forms a government based on the consent of “all the people” and not a loose 
confederation of distinct and independent political communities formed by a “compact 
between the States.”28  Apess draws out of the compact theory of government a defense 
of indigenous communities in order to oppose the “settler contract,” not of independent 
state authorities.
29
   
Second, what is the proper relationship between minority and majority rights?  While 
Webster and Jackson steadfastly held to principles of majority rule, Jefferson and 
Calhoun posed nullification as a means of protecting minority rights from majority 
tyranny.  Presaging his theory of the “concurrent majority” later developed in The 
Disquisition on Government, Calhoun asserted in the tariff debates that the Constitution 
must provide a check to “prevent the major from oppressing the minor interests of 
society.”30  As a veto reserved to minority interests, nullification was a negative power 
that granted states the authority to contain the encroaching power of the majority. 
The nullification crisis prompted by South Carolina’s opposition to federal tariffs 
consisted of an ideological conflict over the legacy of republican ideology and its central 
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concept of popular sovereignty.  While the nullificationists saw the doctrine as a means 
of protecting minority rights against an overbearing majority tyranny, Jackson believed it 
led to the fragmentation of popular sovereignty and consequently corruption and 
faction.
31
  Webster also charged proponents of nullification with violating the “first great 
principle of all republican liberty; that is, that the majority must govern.”  Webster said 
that in “matters of common concern, the judgment of a majority must stand as the 
judgment of the whole.”32  If Calhoun rejected the idea that “the entire sovereignty of this 
country belongs to the American people,” Webster claimed that majority rule was the 
only legitimate expression of sovereignty.
33
  Although Jackson was firmly committed to 
states-rights in opposition to Webster’s more loose construction of federal authority, they 
both agreed that the Constitution formed a liberal contract among free and equal 
individuals and not a compact among states, and consequently that nullification violated 
the basic notion of democratic sovereignty grounded in the rule of the majority.
34
 
Third, who has the right to invoke the powers of nullification?  Jefferson and Calhoun 
were clear that you must be part of the original compact that establishes constitutional 
authority to claim the powers of nullification.  For Jefferson and Calhoun, the federal 
government derived its authority from a compact among the individual states.  As a 
result, “every State has a natural right in cases not within the compact, (casus non 
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foederis), to nullify of their own authority all assumptions of power by others within their 
limits.”35  The right of nullification was lawfully exercised by any party to the compact. 
Indian nullification thus stands in a peculiar relation to the doctrine elaborated by 
Jefferson and Calhoun.  Distinct from the equal states that constituted the federal 
compact, indigenous communities were never independent agents in the creation of the 
federal state.  Insofar as Indians were wards of the state and lacked standing to sue in 
court, as Marshall’s decision in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) made clear, they did 
not count as legal and political subjects and thus had no right to claim rights.  If Indians 
were fundamentally excluded from the federal compact on the basis of their status as 
wards of the state, then they had no right to claim the rights of nullification. 
Indian Nullification 
Keeping partially within the compact theory of government, Apess employed the 
concept of Indian nullification to challenge the contract theory of government.  In direct 
contravention of the contract theories espoused by Jackson and Webster, Apess drew on 
the theory of nullification to assert that the liberal contract was in fact a “settler contract” 
premised on the erasure of indigenous sovereignty and to interpose indigenous authority 
into the hegemonic space of constitutional discourse.  According to Indian nullification, 
the basic constituent of government is not the abstract, unencumbered individual but 
rather independent political communities with their own distinct forms of indigenous 
culture and property that have been disavowed by hegemonic discourses of democracy.  
In highlighting this disavowal, Indian nullification not only calls into question the 
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legitimacy of settler democracy, it also asserts the cultural autonomy of indigenous 
communities whose distinct social systems have been subject to the logic of elimination. 
Although Apess’s collection of documents and commentary pertaining to the 
Mashpee revolt of 1833, Indian Nullification, is widely read and discussed by critics, few 
have fully appreciated the conceptual significance of his notion of Indian nullification 
and its place in U.S. democratic discourse.  As a counterpoint to the colonial tendencies 
of American democracy, Apess adopted the tradition of Jeffersonian republicanism in 
upholding the legitimacy of nullification.  The concept of Indian nullification employed 
by Apess, however, is not a constitutional doctrine that establishes rules and procedures 
of institutional order (as in Calhoun and Jefferson).  It is rather, a narrative mode of 
representing the constitutive exclusions of American democracy that has both a negative 
and productive function.  The concept of Indian nullification allows Apess to stage a 
performative contradiction that at once exposes the complicities of democracy in settler 
colonialism and calls for the reconstitution of the North American political order. 
At first glance, it appears that Apess draws on the language of the Declaration of 
Independence and Constitution to call on white settlers to extend their founding ideals of 
juridical equality before the law and individual rights free from arbitrary power to 
Indians.  The Indian Declaration states, “Resolved, That we, as a tribe, will rule ourselves, 
and have the right to do so; for all men are born free and equal, says the Constitution of 
the country.”36  The Mashpee resolutions might therefore read as an attempt to expose the 
hypocrisy of white settlers and encourage them to live up to the true meaning of their 
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professed ideals.  As the resolution suggests, the Mashpee harness the authority of the 
Constitution in order to express their claims for the protection of their property rights and 
rights of self-government.  In an open letter opposing Apess’s imprisonment, legal 
counsel for the Mashpee Benjamin Hallett expressed the legitimacy of indigenous land 
claims in the liberal language of contractual freedom.  “In fact the Marshpee Indians,” 
Hallett wrote, “to whom our laws have denied all rights of property, have a higher title to 
their lands than the whites have, for our forefathers claimed the soil of this State by the 
consent of the Indians, whose title they thus admitted was better than their own.”37 
But one gets an immediate sense that much more is at work in Indian Nullification 
when the Mashpee announced that in nullifying the authority of the guardians they have 
“acted in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution, unless that instrument be a device 
of utter deception.”  Such an assertion suggests that it was not only the Massachusetts 
laws but also the Constitution itself that “was founded on wrong and misconception.”38  
At the same time, the Mashpee continually insisted that the guardianship laws were 
unconstitutional.  Apess directly drew on the discourse of American independence to 
assert that “we Mashpees account all who opposed our freedom, as Tories, hostile to the 
Constitution and the liberties of the country.”39  The “unless” of the proclamation, 
however, stages a contradiction by asserting that the Constitution is at once a source of 
liberty and equality affirming indigenous autonomy and a device of conquest and 
colonization designed to dispossess Indians of their customary lands. 
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In something of a paradoxical twist, Apess bases his rights claims on the authority of 
a constitution which he himself exposes as lacking authority.  The effect of this is to 
ideologically unveil the modes of settler conquest and native elimination that form the 
basis of American democracy.  Although Apess harnesses the authority of the 
Constitution and Declaration in his argument for indigenous autonomy, he clearly 
understands that both documents rest on a conception of citizenship that fundamentally 
excludes indigenous practices of property.  Immediately preceding Apess’s arrest, a 
lawyer for Massachusetts requested a local judge “to explain to the Indians the laws… 
and the consequences of violating them.”  Significantly paralleling ongoing debates about 
the validity of nullification in the U.S. Congress, the judge explained to Apess that 
“merely declaring a law to be oppressive could not abrogate it” and that a surer remedy 
would be to act as “good citizens” and wait for the Legislature to implement suitable 
relief.  Apess interjected into his report of the proceedings the assertion that the category 
of citizenship did not adequately apply to the people of Mashpee:  “Surely it was either 
insult or wrong to call the Mashpees citizens, for such they never were, from the 
Declaration of Independence up to the session of the Legislature in 1834.”40 
According to the Declaration and the Constitution, settlers are citizens because they 
possess what Indians lack:  the capacities for rational self-government and legal 
institutions of private property, both of which define legal personhood.  Insofar as U.S. 
citizenship is legally “defined through the natural right to own property” and rests on the 
self-ownership of the possessive individual, Indians negatively define settler citizenship 
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by representing the negation of the proprietary self in the absence of dominant 
conceptions of private property.
41
  To the extent that American democracy depends on 
the propertied independence of citizens, the enclosure of land in private property mirrors 
the enclosure of settler sovereignty.  In highlighting the constitutive exclusions of settler 
democracy, Indian nullification operates less an institutional feature of constitutional 
design than as a discursive mode of representation that captures the foundational division 
of the settler polity, the structuring of citizenship along a settler-indigene divide. 
While the debate between nullificationists and nationalists revolved around the proper 
balance between majority rule and minority rights, Indian nullification fundamentally 
unsettles this distinction.  Indian nullification cannot be taken as an assertion of minority 
rights because the debates between minority and majority rest on the exclusion of Indians 
from counting as part of either faction.  Giving a different cast to Tocqueville’s thesis 
about the “tyranny of the majority,” Apess shows how the rights of both majority and 
minority rest on the dispossession of indigenous peoples.  Indian nullification, therefore, 
is not a discourse asserting the validity of minority rights but rather asserts that even the 
rights of the minority of white settlers depend for their coherence on the structures of 
settler colonialism.  As such, Indian nullification must be understood not as an assertion 
of minority rights but as the “staging of a nonexistent right.”42 
 Moreover, it is important to highlight the very different conceptions of property rights 
at work in the two notions of nullification.  While Jefferson’s theory of nullification was 
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tied to a liberal understanding of individual rights, Apess directly challenged the 
hegemony of liberal property rights as the basis of an egalitarian constitutional order.  For 
Jeffersonian republicans, the violation of individual rights of free speech and due process 
committed by the Alien and Sedition Acts reflected a violation of property rights.  As 
Madison put it, “[A]s a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said 
to have a property in his rights.”43  Ostensibly reflecting this understanding of property 
rights, Apess condemned white settlers for dispossessing “the red men of the woods” of 
their land and violating their “inherent rights.”44 
 Apess and the Mashpee, however, mean by “inherent rights” something very different 
than individual property rights, a point adequately grasped by considering the complex 
practices of property at work throughout Mashpee’s history, which were composed of a 
hybrid mix of proprietary rights operating in the English plantation system and aboriginal 
customary law.  In 1685 the Plymouth Court stipulated that Mashpee land could not be 
purchased or taken by English settlers without Indian consent.
45
  By 1723 the Mashpee 
developed their own practices of property rights and instituted a proprietary system 
whereby the tribe owned the land and was allocated to individual families.  While 
children could inherit land, it reverted back to tribal control in the absence of an heir.  
“Tribal membership assured the individual the right to land, and, conversely, having a 
right to land identified an individual as a member of the group.”  A standard practice 
among many Algonquian nations, aboriginal customary law had long provided for the 
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allocation of “parcels of land for agricultural use by members of the extended family.”46  
Nevertheless, in these proprietary arrangements, land was exclusive to the tribe. 
 It is in this context that the meaning of the second resolution to the Indian Declaration 
of Independence must be understood.  The Mashpee Indians resolved, “That we will not 
permit any white man to come upon our plantation, to cut or carry off wood or hay, or 
any other article, without our permission.”47  The Mashpee Declaration tied the rights of 
self-government to the exclusion of liberal property rights from the Mashpee plantation.  
These hybrid proprietary arrangements were central to the very meaning of independence 
as articulated by the Mashpee.  In December 1833, Apess issued “An Indian’s Appeal to 
the White Men of Massachusetts,” which proclaimed that just as the Cherokee should be 
an “independent people” the Mashpee should also have the same rights of self-rule. What 
this independence implied was that both the Mashpee and Cherokee had the right to hold 
property in common, which tied indigenous property to indigenous culture, thereby 
excluding white settlers from having any effective claim over “virgin land.”  Indeed, 
Apess contends that the land Fish sold to whites “belongs in common to the Marshpee 
Indians.”48  Rejecting the focus of liberal-democratic discourse on the nexus between 
citizenship and private property, Apess leveraged constitutional rhetoric to defend 
customary-hybrid forms of property ownership. 
By calling attention to the foundational division of American democracy (i.e. the 
settler-indigene divide), nullification produces the “Indian” as a political subject.  This 
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political subject directly challenged the liberal paternalism of President Jackson and the 
Massachusetts liberals, both of whom believed that Mashpee and Cherokee alike cannot 
govern themselves because of their arrested capacities for rational improvement.  For 
Apess, the paternalist laws of Massachusetts mirrored the federal laws of Indian removal, 
which operated according to the settler logic of native elimination:  “The laws were 
calculated to drive the tribes from their possessions and annihilate them as a people.”49  
The assertion of indigenous sovereignty first requires the nullification of those laws of 
paternalism and elimination that deem indigenous forms of polity and property 
incompatible with the democratic-settler state.  Indian nullification thus becomes not a 
principle of constitutional design asserting minority rights over the majority of the 
tyranny, but a means of contesting the wardship status imposed on Indians. 
In Ranciere’s terms, Indian nullification reconfigures civic space by introducing the 
Indian as political subject into a political order whose authority fundamentally rests on 
the exclusion of that subject.  The “partition of the perceptible,” for Ranciere, is a distinct 
configuration of political order and an ordering of subjects that determines what is able to 
be represented.  All political orders are governed by regimes of representation:  certain 
bodies are rendered visible and legible and consequently able to speak and enunciate 
political claims as legitimate subjects.  The primary “visual regime of colonization” in 
settler polities configures the land as terra nullius, and Indians as vanishing people soon 
to be swept away by the winds of modern progress.  Tocqueville, for example dedicated a 
separate chapter to the condition of slaves and Indians on the premise that they were both 
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unrepresentable within the terms of democratic discourse.  Reflecting the historical trope 
of the “vanishing Indian,” and further enacting the invisibility of Indians within the 
representational regime of liberal democracy, Tocqueville felt that “The Indian races are 
melting in the presence of European civilization like snow in the rays of the sun.”50   
Beyond the historical tropes of terra nullius and “the vanishing Indian,” the 
imputation of wardship status onto Mashpee and Cherokee also configured the partition 
of the perceptible by preventing both communities from registering as legal and political 
subjects able to enunciate political claims.  As a result, liberal paternalism politically 
neutralizes indigenous communities by rendering them as administrative populations 
subject to state protection rather than political entities that relate to the settler state in 
terms of the friend-enemy distinction.
51
 
 One sees this configuration of settler society and the distribution of bodies that can be 
seen and heard play out when the liberal-minded editors of the Boston Advocate 
published a sympathetic plea of support for the Mashpee struggle.  The short article 
suggested that the Mashpee have been wronged by the white settlers and encouraged 
whites to act with justice toward the Indians.  Nevertheless, the letter assuaged white 
concerns that the Indians were inclined toward violence and radicalism by accusing the 
Mashpee of misrepresenting many of their grievances:  “Undoubtedly some of their 
supposed grievances are imaginary and much exaggerated, but others are real, and tend 
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greatly to depress them.”  The article then exhorted the Mashpee to refrain from violence 
and place their hopes for redress fully in the state legislature.  To give their audience a 
flavor of Indian grievances, the Advocate published two anonymous letters from the 
Mashpee Indians, likely drafted by Apess himself. 
 As if to respond to Gayatri Spivak’s famous question – “can the subaltern speak?” – 
the anonymous authors of the two letters stated that “Mashpee Indians speak for 
themselves.”  But the wrong they seek to voice is an impossible enunciation that cannot 
be heard within the hegemonic language of liberal-democratic discourse except as a 
radical mode of dissensus.  In response to the accusations of exaggerated grievances, the 
authors assert, “It is impossible to give the details of the wrongs imposed upon the 
Indians.”52  The letters thus depict the aporetic nature of articulating the constitutive 
exclusions of settler democracy within the linguistic terms of the colonizing discourse.  
The impossibility of representing the Mashpee grievances in the language of liberal 
democracy points to the inadequacy of linguistic categories grounded in constitutional 
discourse to represent the foundational wrong of the settler polity.  But rather than remain 
within the space of paradox and agree with Spivak that the representation of colonized 
subjects only reinforces the power of the settler state, the Mashpee appropriated the 
language of the colonizer and articulated their rights claims in a language they were not 
entitled to use.  The effect was to stage a polemical form of dissensus that leads to a clash 
between competing logics of equality and inequality, instituting a rupture in the 
democratic order that stems from the introduction of new political subjects into the 
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partition of the perceptible.  What Ranciere calls “dissensual subjectification” thus 
reveals the constitutive divisions that form the basis of political society.
53
 
Burying the Hatchet and Plymouth Rock 
Although Apess’s Indian Nullification and his Eulogy on King Philip are structured 
by different literary conventions and are driven by different political intentions, they both 
share a similar set of questions concerning the foundations of the settler state.  Returning 
to the theme of the relation between Puritan settlers and Indians, Apess further elaborated 
his primary contention put forth in Indian Nullification that the Constitution was founded 
on the mutually reinforcing relationship between liberty and equality for white settlers on 
the one hand and fraud and colonial violence for Indians on the other.  If we understand 
Puritan political culture and the equality of conditions prevailing in colonial New 
England as the Constitution-beneath-the-Constitution, then Apess’s Eulogy can be read as 
a further elaboration of Indian nullification insofar as it continues to reveal the dynamic 
interplay between settler colonialism and American democracy. 
Apess’s Eulogy on King Philip was first delivered in Boston on January 8, 1836.  On 
one level, the immediate concern of the speech was a commemoration of King Philip’s 
War and a tribute to the Wampanoag sachem, Metacomet, or King Philip, who led an 
alliance of Algonquian tribes against the Puritan settlers in 1676.  In an attempt to 
revitalize King Philip’s legacy and importance for contemporary Indian struggles, Apess 
drew a direct comparison between Metacomet and General Washington as two great 
defenders of civil and political rights for whites and Indians alike.  In this regard, Apess’s 
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Eulogy directly undermined dominant representations of Metacomet as a ruthless and 
savage warrior by portraying him as an “able defender of his rights.”54  On a broader 
level, Apess deconstructed Anglo-centric histories of the United States by counter-posing 
indigenous narratives of settler conquest to Puritan founding narratives. 
To accomplish both of these tasks, Apess engaged a master-narrative of American 
civic identity that has long served as a powerful discourse authorizing the elimination of 
the native:  the myth of the savage war.  The savage war myth, a powerful and persistent 
trope in American literature, holds that history unfolds as a clash between civilization and 
savagery, a dichotomy that is given a moral valence with civilization positioned as the 
triumphant force.  If civilized people rule over each other in a “civil government,” 
uncivilized people occupy an anarchical state of nature lacking the rule of law.  Further 
underwriting this dichotomy was a distinction between “savage war” and “civilized war.”  
While the latter was rational, honorable, and subject to the dictates of natural law and just 
war theory, the former was characterized by irrationality and the ferocity of unrestrained 
violence.  Savage wars were irrational because they exceeded the moral boundaries of 
just conduct and were undertaken for the sake of uncontrollable passions such as revenge 
or the fulfillment of sadistic desires.  Savage wars were wars of extermination because 
civilization can only triumph if the savage races are thoroughly eliminated.
55
 
Instead of assuming that “savage war” is a natural category grounded in the conflict 
between savagery and civilization, Apess asserted that the state of war between settlers 
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and Indians was itself produced by the foundations of Puritan society.  As with Indian 
Nullification, his primary aim in the Eulogy was to represent the foundational division of 
American democracy (i.e. the settler-indigene divide, which in this case is represented by 
the distinction between civilized and savage war).  Toward this end, he begins the Eulogy 
by rejecting the assumption that settler and Indian modes of warfare can be adequately 
captured through the distinction between civilized and uncivilized, insisting that “we 
cannot but see that one mode of warfare is as just as the other.”  Portraying it as a just 
war, Apess contests that King Philip’s prosecution of the war was “no savage war of 
surprise… but one sorely provoked by the Pilgrims themselves.”56 
Apess’s de-naturalization of the savage war myth allows him to cast King Philip as a 
defender of civil and political rights on par with founding figures like General 
Washington.  Indians must fight not because of their savage nature nor because they 
reject the basis of rights but because they cannot “look a white man in the face and ask 
him for them.”57  But we must ask what kind of rights he was defending?  Again, we find 
that liberal property rights enshrined in the Constitution fail to fully capture Apess’s 
meaning.  The violation of rights addressed by King Philip deal less with infringements 
on individual rights of property and conscience than with deeper questions that touch on 
the foundational violence of the settler polity.  King Philip fought not so that Indians 
could mimic white settlers in their forms of polity and property, but against the 
obliteration of indigenous legal and social customs, against the “injuries upon injuries, 
and the most daring robberies and barbarous deeds of death that were ever committed by 
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the American pilgrims.”58  In a speech calling the Wampanoags to arms in defense of 
their rights, King Philip thoroughly recounts the wrongs committed against them:  “all 
our ancient customs are disregarded; the treaties made by our fathers and us are broken… 
Brothers, these people from the unknown world will cut down our groves, spoil our 
hunting and planting grounds, and drive us and our children from the graves of our 
fathers.”  Apess sees in Philip a defender of neither the abstract rights of the liberal 
subject nor of the republican rights of the active citizen, but of the customary rights of a 
nation subject to settler invasion. 
Furthering this theme, Apess begins his conclusion to the oration by lamenting the 
loss of these rights:  “Our groves and hunting grounds are gone, our dead are dug up, our 
council fires are put out, and a foundation was laid in the first Legislature to enslave our 
people, taking from them all rights.”  By connecting his criticism of the savage war myth 
with the “foundation” that destroyed indigenous rights, Apess contests that the Puritan 
foundations of American democracy instituted a state of war between settlers and 
Indians.  Where Tocqueville sees the liberal “spirit of enterprise” derived from an 
acquisitive commercial ethos, Apess highlights the “spirit of avarice and the usurpation 
of power” on the part of white settlers as the primary forces driving frontier settlement 
and incessant warfare plaguing the North American landscape.  Damning the “foundation 
which destroyed our common fathers in their struggle together,” he exposed the spirit of 
conquest as a foundational aspect of American political culture and constitutional law.
59
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By disrupting the distinction between savage and civilized war, proving King Philip 
to be a defender of his inherent rights, the Eulogy destabilizes exceptionalist narratives of 
American development that cast settler expansionism as a historical process sanctioned 
by divine providence.  As Barry O’Connell puts it, to include Indians within this 
providential narrative “would undermine the construction of the particular ideological 
history that has shaped ‘America’ as a virgin land settled by God’s chosen people… in 
the name of freedom and opportunity.”60  In this way, the Eulogy serves as a counter-
narrative of settler conquest that includes indigenous peoples within a political narrative 
whose coherence fundamentally rests on the disavowal and elimination of indigenous 
cultures.  The effect of drawing a parallel between General Washington and King Philip 
is not to illustrate how American founding ideals might be fulfilled but rather that the 
inclusion of indigenous perspectives into founding narratives must entail a radical 
transformation of American political order.  For Apess, true justice for Indians requires 
not that we live up to the political ideals expressed in the nation’s founding documents, as 
if to fulfill and redeem the promise of their original meaning, but that we transform them 
into something they are not and have never quite been. 
Conclusion 
Read in this light, Apess’s version of the Puritan founding narrative sharply contrasts 
with Webster’s Plymouth Rock oration.  In disavowing an indigenous presence in North 
America, Webster retains a sense of settler colonial identity as derived from pure and 
progressive origins untouched by the founding violence of settler colonialism.  While 
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Apess asks us to bury Plymouth Rock because fidelity to it perpetuates a state of war 
between settlers and Indians (signified by the hatchet that Apess also wants to bury), 
Webster insulates the cultural foundations of constitutional democracy from complicity in 
settler conquest.  Moreover, while Webster and Tocqueville imagine the Puritan 
foundations of the U.S. as instituting a democratic social state, Apess asserts that those 
foundations have enacted a process of native elimination that vitally sustains the equality 
of conditions among white settlers.  Such a counter-narrative highlights the double 
narratology of settler conquest – the split between the founding narratives of settler 
authority and indigenous counter-narratives that reveals the constitutive exclusions and 
foundational violence of American democracy.
61
 
To the extent that it renders the double narratology of settler conquest intelligible, 
Indian nullification operates as a mode of narrative representation that exposes the 
political, social, and ethical roots of American democracy (represented in the symbol of 
Plymouth Rock) in settler colonialism.  Nevertheless, we should read Apess’s 
deployment of Indian nullification not within the teleological terms of American 
democracy, marked by the progressive extension of equal rights to previously 
marginalized groups, but as an attempt to represent that which is unrepresentable in the 
terms of republican and liberal discourses of democracy, those constitutive exclusions 
that have provided the foundation for American democracy yet have been systematically 
disavowed by liberal and republican democratic discourse.  Because they are about 
providing a public justification for the American settler state, liberal and republican 
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democracy are unable to represent the founding of American society as an instance of 
settler conquest.  Yet in appropriating and revising the categories of American 
democratic theory, Apess’s counter-narrative exposes popular sovereignty as settler 
sovereignty.  He thus developed the concept of Indian nullification not to challenge 
particular unjust laws, but to nullify, in general, the injustice embedded in the settler 








In the wake of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the language of empire assumed a 
central position in public discourse, revolving around conflict over its conceptual and 
historical relationship to democracy.  While George W. Bush justified the invasion of 
Iraq as a form of “democratic imperialism,”1 one of the most influential anti-war writers, 
Chalmers Johnson, sought to re-narrate the relationship between democracy and empire.  
Johnson argued that throughout the twentieth-century imperial power has continually 
eroded the basis of democratic-republican institutions.  For Johnson, the freedom and 
equality of domestic, democratic government is in tension with the realities of an 
American empire based on conquest and tyranny:  “The American attempt to combine 
domestic democracy with such tyrannical control over foreigners is hopelessly 
contradictory and hypocritical.  A country can be democratic or it can be imperialistic, 
but it cannot be both.”  With the expansive power of the contemporary imperial 
presidency, Johnson warned, America risks losing its cherished democratic tradition to an 
imperial state.  He further contested that the Founders tried to forestall the consolidation 
of imperial power by constructing republican institutions after the Roman model.
2
  The 
emergence of an American empire is thus an affront to America’s republican origins, 
spelling the decline of its democratic heritage.  
The problem with such a perspective is that appeals to founding principles and 
traditions, in opposition to what many see as the contradictory impulses of imperialism 
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and neocolonialism, ultimately ignore that the American democratic tradition was itself 
constructed through settler colonization.  If we take seriously the history of the U.S. as a 
democratic empire, which expands through the popular sovereignty of settlers to establish 
self-governing communities on top of expropriated land, then an appeal to the democratic 
and republican foundations of America risks recapitulating rather than critically 
confronting the contemporary dynamics of U.S. imperialism because it ignores the deep 
links between popular sovereignty and settler expansion.  Attempts to reclaim and 
redeem some pure, anti-colonial conception of American democracy is hopelessly 
idealistic, for it overlooks that settler colonialism has always been a defining feature of 
the American democratic tradition. 
Yet the place of settler colonialism in the American political tradition is becoming an 
increasingly contentious issue among scholars of U.S. political thought and culture.  
Samuel Huntington has led the charge in reclaiming American national identity as a 
settler democracy, which he defines in terms of the American Creed, a relatively fixed 
and stable cluster of beliefs, customs, and habits that give substance to American 
citizenship.  The targets of his scorn are the new Hispanic immigrants whom, he believes, 
have failed to assimilate into the core American culture.  Insistent on maintaining dual 
citizenship and hybrid identities, Hispanic immigrants have largely retained their 
traditional cultural values rooted in Hispanic culture and Catholic religion at the expense 
of forming deep attachments to American national identity characterized by the 
Protestant work ethic, individualism, the rule of law, egalitarianism, and popular 
sovereignty.  Operating under the assumption that a stable democracy requires a common 
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set of cultural values, Huntington draws on Tocquevillean insights to call for a more 
restrictive immigration policy.  Reversing the polarity of settler narratives of colonial 
invasion, he contests that restrictive immigration is necessary in order to protect settler 
democracy from la reconquista of the U.S. by the Hispanic hordes outside the gates.
3
 
In this effort, Huntington engages a dominant trope of American national identity, the 
idea of a “nation of immigrants.”  He does not deny that immigration was crucial in 
defining American identity, but he asserts that it is a “partial truth” that obscures a more 
important aspect:  the fact that the American founders were not immigrants but rather 
Anglo-Protestant settlers.  If immigrants leave an existing society to join a new one 
(thereby accepting an obligation to adopt the new norms and culture), settlers leave an 
existing society, often as a community rather than as individuals or families, in order to 
create a new political society, carrying their metropolitan culture and values with them 
and then implanting those values in a distant territory.  While settlers constitute a new 
political order in their sovereign capacity as both founders and migrants, immigrants join 
an existing society rather than create a new one.  Insofar as settlers are founders with 
distinct social values rooted in Anglo-Protestant culture, the process of settlement and 
founding are synonymous.  Huntington asserts that the American Creed was “the product 
of the distinct Anglo-Protestant culture of the founding settlers,” highlighting how settler 
colonization established durable cultural patterns that provided the basis of American 
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  Thus, to protect America from the barbarian hordes is to protect the sanctity 
of the founding of settler democracy. 
Huntington offers his narrative of settler democracy not only as a defense of 
restrictive and exclusive immigration policy, but also as an implicit justification of 
indigenous dispossession and settler conquest.  He writes, “The seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century settlers came to America because it was a tabula rasa.  Apart from 
Indian tribes, which could be killed off or pushed westward, no society was there; and 
they came in order to create societies that embodied and would reinforce the culture and 
values they brought with them from their origin country.”5  Clearly evidenced in the 
Lockean assumptions concerning North American land as tabula rasa, such an assertion 
self-consciously recapitulates the narrative tropes and legal doctrines of terra nullius and 
the vanishing Indian.  In Huntington’s view, indigenous tribes were so sparse and weak 
that they did not constitute recognizable societies with legitimate claims over land that 
settlers appropriated.  By presenting North America as empty land, he obscures the 
constitutive role of native elimination in the founding of settler democracy. 
In opposition to Huntington’s enlistment of America’s settler colonial legacy in a 
continued defense of nativist and exclusivist conceptions of democracy, Aziz Rana and 
Rogers Smith have sought recently to reclaim the settler tradition in the hopes of creating 
a more inclusive and egalitarian project of popular self-rule that sheds its attachments to 
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ascriptive traditions and practices.  In this effort, both Rana and Smith offer what I call a 
political theory of postcolonial settlerism wherein the pioneer ideals of settler democracy 
are separated from their larger tensions with exclusive standards of citizenship.  Although 
I will spell out what it means more extensively in the remainder of this coda, the political 
theory of postcolonial settlerism is fundamentally concerned with asking what values, 
principles, and institutions should animate democratic life in a post-settler-colonial 
condition.  Just as political theorists of postcolonial society are concerned with 
developing democratic frameworks of inclusion to overcome past legacies of colonialism, 
the political theory of postcolonial settlerism focuses on elaborating constitutional 
frameworks of rule designed to challenge the hierarchies and exclusions derived from 
settler colonial legacies.  In dealing with these questions, the political theory of 
postcolonial settlerism ultimately seeks to revise settler traditions of democratic thought 
so as to disconnect them from their exclusivist and hierarchical impulses. 
The limitations of the political theory of postcolonial settlerism employed by Smith 
and Rana derive from broader methodological limitations that keep them from seeing the 
deep, conceptual links between democratic conceptions of popular sovereignty and 
continued processes of settler expansion and indigenous dispossession.  The link between 
democracy and settler colonialism exists in (for Smith) identity narratives employed by 
political coalitions to make their governing visions legitimate and tenable or (for Rana) 
the political requirements of a constitutional project committed to the realization of 
republican liberty in a settler society.  In both cases this connection is a product of 
historical not conceptual development.  Yet by basing their critique on a separation of 
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historical and conceptual development, Rana and Smith ultimately reinstate settler 
structures of authority by drawing on the settler tradition itself to challenge settler 
hierarchies.  The result is that they normalize settler traditions of thought and culture as 
the uncontested and necessary ground of modern democratic politics. 
Ultimately, I want to suggest that the political theory of postcolonial settlerism 
normalizes the political experiences of American settlers with popular sovereignty and 
social equality as the unsurpassable horizon of democratic self-rule.  In this regard, they 
both engage in an attempt to redeem the settler tradition of American democracy from the 
exclusivist traditions of conquest and dispossession, ignoring how land appropriation and 
settler expansion provide the very foundation for democratic values in the U.S.  As long 
as settler experiences define the meaning of modern democracy, settler societies will fail 
to overcome their legacies of conquest and dispossession. 
After the publication of Civic Ideals (1997), Smith has become increasingly 
concerned with crafting what he calls “ethically constitutive stories of peoplehood.”  
Holding that political identity is socially and politically constructed, Smith searches for 
ethical and moral standards by which political leaders might construct “political 
communities in morally defensible forms.”  Beyond political power and economic stories 
of peoplehood that emphasize either shared collective power and personal security or 
material benefits (respectively) for members of a political community, ethically 
constitutive stories offer normative visions of community as “somehow intrinsic to who 
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its members really are, because of traits that are imbued with ethical significance.”6  
Ethically constitutive stories are important for Smith because the production of narratives 
of peoplehood serve to create stable structures of power that allow leaders to achieve 
certain ends in morally defensible ways.  For Smith, ethical narratives of peoplehood give 
political community moral significance while shedding ascriptive and dominant racial 
visions that serve to justify the power of some groups over others. 
Searching for an ethically constitutive story of peoplehood, Smith settles on the idea 
of Americans as a “pioneering people.”7  He directs his conception of a pioneering people 
against conservative critics such as Huntington who ground U.S. identity in a mythic past 
that defines the political community in terms of an essential set of characteristics derived 
from the founding tradition.  In disavowing the constructed character of American 
identity, such narratives authorize unjust forms of exclusion and deflect the possibility of 
“critically reflective attachment.”8  This backward looking, conservative view that seeks 
the preservation of founding ideals is not only unwarranted but is deeply paradoxical 
because it ignores a primary trait of the founding generation:  their pioneering character.  
Americans were pioneers in law, commercial institutions, religious toleration and 
separation of church and state, individual rights and community rights, and liberties of 
speech and press.  In doing so they gave concreteness to the philosophical assertions of 
universality in the American Enlightenment. 
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Smith acknowledges that Americans were pioneers in both a positive and negative 
sense:  they pioneered new systems of collective emancipation such as democratic 
government, rule of law, and separation of powers; but they also pioneered new 
technologies of domination such as the reservation, restrictive immigration, segregation, 
chattel slavery, and legal protections of employers over the rights of wage laborers.  
Smith writes, “They were pioneers, of course, in establishing settlements on lands not 
previously occupied by Europeans.  But they were also pioneers in a whole range of other 
ways.  They did not simply establish systems of republican self-governance; they 
pioneered new ones…  The pioneers usually displaced the tribes through unjust means 
and they sometimes verged on committing genocide; and US policy toward aboriginal 
Americans has been a fluctuating mix of just and repressive measures ever since.”  
Although not all modes of pioneering are commendable, Smith contends that this is 
nevertheless how Americans should read their political identity:  as pioneers in new 
political experiments rather than as “pious preservers of past achievements.”9   
But the question arises, what is the relationship between Smith’s two senses of 
Americans as a “pioneering people?”  Based on his prior work on the “multiple traditions 
thesis,” Smith would likely separate these two senses of pioneering peoplehood into two 
analytically and logically separate political traditions:  a liberal-republican democratic 
tradition and an exclusivist, hierarchical, and ascriptive tradition that embraces settler 
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conquest and dispossession.  Several scholars have criticized Smith for overlooking the 
deep links between racially exclusionary practices/ideologies and liberal-republican 
democracy.  By attributing inegalitarian practices only to ideologies of ascriptive 
nationalism rather than liberal-republican democracy, he makes the boundary between 
settler expansion and democracy so rigid so as to preclude any consideration of their 
mutual constitution.  In doing so, he insulates democracy from having any role in the 
production of racial exclusion, conquest, or indigenous dispossession.
10
   
Smith has addressed this criticism by claiming that he does indeed view the 
relationship between settler exclusion and American democracy as symbiotic, but he 
clarifies that his understanding of symbiosis differs from those who adhere to the thesis 
of “strongly reinforcing partnerships” (between modes of racial domination such as 
settler expansion and liberal-republican democracy).  Those who view racial exclusion 
and democracy in terms of their mutual constitution argue that both acquire their energy 
and conceptual coherence from each other.  That is, they are mutually beneficial and in 
that sense reinforce each other.  Such a view implies that liberal-republican democracy 
would collapse without settler expansion.  Smith, however, takes a weaker view of 
symbiosis, opting to see it in terms of a “commensalist” relationship in which “one 
organism benefits and the other is neither much helped nor harmed.”11  In reference to the 
two traditions of pioneering peoplehood, therefore, Smith would assert that although 
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settler colonialism might have gained ideological justification from democratic values, 
the latter were largely unaffected by their association with the former. 
As I have shown, however, this view overlooks how settler expansion undergirds the 
conceptual meaning and institutional development of American democracy.  In his 
understanding of symbiosis, Smith might grant that democratic narratives and ideologies 
have been appropriated to justify and strengthen projects of settler expansion, but he 
would seem to deny that this relationship has any bearing on the conceptual meaning or 
political realization of democratic values.  In other words, he would certainly resist the 
idea that democracy has in some sense necessitated settler expansion or that settler 
colonialism has provided the condition of possibility for American democracy.  For 
Smith, such a claim would require that we demonstrate that political actors must argue for 
settler expansion in order to argue for democracy, that the connection is so tight that you 
could not have one without the other.  Smith is asking us here to engage in 
counterfactuals.  He suggests that political actors could have argued for democracy 
without settler colonialism, inviting us to imagine such a scenario.  The reality is, 
however, that in their historical actuality, principles of social equality and popular 
sovereignty did rely on settler colonialism.  If we accept Smith’s invitation to imagine 
otherwise, we would be speaking at such a highly abstract level, entirely divorced from 
concrete historical contexts, so as to render any insight we might draw from such a 
thought experiment either meaningless or banal. 
What is at stake here is the relationship between political development and conceptual 
development.  Smith’s standard of evidence is only viable if we imagine the two as 
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separate currents of historical temporality, as analytically distinct layers of development.  
For instance, criticizing Michael Rogin’s assertion that “Jackson’s negative, laissez-faire, 
paternal state made the logical marriage of paternal authority to liberal egalitarianism,” 
Smith argues that the “recurring admixture” of democratic ideals and ascriptive 
inegalitarianism does not imply logical compatibility.
12
  Smith can only sustain this 
criticism, however, by separating American development into different streams that, 
although congeal together, are not determinative of each other in any sense.  Each 
ideological tradition is understood as having its own internal, coherent principles that are 
“inconsistent with each other as a matter of formal logic.”13  Yet historical context is not 
merely an ancillary component of conceptual logics, but is in fact constitutive of them.  
That is, historical logic and conceptual logic are two sides of the same coin.  The logical 
relationship between democracy and settler colonialism, therefore, does not necessarily 
inhere in either concept as a matter of abstract doctrine but is articulated through 
processes of historical development.  “Just as little as a simple fact can be thought 
without a concept, because to think it always already means to conceptualize it,” Theodor 
Adorno writes, “it is equally impossible to think the purest concept without reference to 
the factual.”14  It is only by treating liberal-democracy as having a formal logic detached 
from its historical context that Smith is able to posit a formal lack of identity between 
democracy and settler colonialism as a matter of internal and logical coherence. 
                                                 
12
 Smith, “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America,” American 
Political Science Review, 87, 3 (Sept. 1993), p. 556.  Smith’s criticism is of Rogin’s Fathers and Children.  
See also Smith’s Civic Ideals:  Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in US History (Yale University Press, 
1999), p. 199. 
13
 See Smith’s exchange with Jacqueline Stevens, “Beyond Tocqueville, Please!,” American Political 
Science Review, 89, 4, (Dec. 1995), p. 991. 
14
 “The Essay as Form,” The Adorno Reader (Blackwell Publishing, 2000), p. 98. 
 290 
 
Viewed through the development of their conceptual-historical logics rather than 
abstract philosophical logics, settler colonialism and American democracy exhibit a 
closer and more complex relationship than Smith’s commensalist view allows.  
Throughout the nineteenth century, America became more democratic and egalitarian (at 
least for white settlers) precisely because of rather than in spite of settler expansion and 
the continued conquest of foreign populations.  At the same time, these processes of 
conquest and dispossession gained energy and ideological legitimacy from democratic 
doctrines of popular sovereignty that cast popular self-rule as the primary engine of 
settler expansion.  Moreover, by treating North America as empty land occupied by 
vanishing Indians, democratic narratives of settler identity provided ideological cover for 
the real material processes of conquest at work in the construction of an egalitarian and 
democratic social order.  Smith’s two senses of pioneering peoplehood and settler 
democracy are indeed mutually constitutive, resulting in a durable ideological formation. 
Although Aziz Rana has better accounted for the deep links between settler 
colonialism and American democracy, his attempt to reclaim what he considers to be the 
egalitarian and emancipatory trajectories of settler democracy ultimately re-inscribes the 
political theory of post-colonial settlerism.  In an attempt to overcome Smith’s 
limitations, Rana accounts for the ways in which settler conceptions of democracy and 
republican liberty “politically necessitate” settler colonialism.  He thus criticizes Smith, 
as I have, for treating the two traditions of pioneering peoplehood as analytically and 
conceptually discrete, foregoing consideration of how “democratic ideals themselves 
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gained strength and meaning through frameworks of exclusion.”15  Similar to the account 
offered here, Rana unearths the constitutive role of settler-colonial hierarchies in shaping 
American traditions of populism and republican liberty.  In this alone, Rana significantly 
distances himself from Smith’s account. 
Yet the gap between their two conceptions of settler democracy is much narrower 
than we might think.  In his account of the relationship between settler expansion and 
liberal-republican democracy, Rana argues that although the latter politically entailed the 
former as a means of realizing dominant racial visions and exclusive projects of political 
peoplehood, the relationship between the two is by no means conceptual.  He explicitly 
rejects the idea that the link between settler colonialism and democratic republicanism is 
philosophically or conceptually essential because such a view “too quickly rejects the 
emancipatory features of the republican tradition.”16  Similar to Smith, he seeks the 
redemption of settler conceptions of democracy by delivering on the true promise of 
American liberty.  In this regard, he refuses to shed the assumptions of American 
exceptionalism, and he admits as much:  “the real exceptionalism of the American 
project” lies in the efforts of some American settlers to “strip republican ideals of their 
oppressive roots to make free citizenship broadly accessible to all.”17  Rana, like Smith, 
rejects that the link between settler colonialism and democracy exists at a conceptual 
level by failing to understand that historical context is constitutive of conceptual logic. 
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This presents methodological problems at two levels.  First, the narrative structure of 
Rana’s account is at odds with his assertion that settler colonialism is constitutive of 
American democracy.  To set up his historical narrative, he contends that settler 
democracy “entailed imperial frameworks, which over time undermined the very promise 
of this ideal.”18  If settler forms of expansion and hierarchy do not logically flow from 
settler ideals at a conceptual-historical level, then the problem seems to be in their 
fortuitous and contingent association in the process of historical development.  In this 
regard, Rana relies on an Aristotelian framework in which settler democracy has a pure 
form at the conceptual level but then becomes perverted, acquiring expansionist and 
exclusionary tendencies in its historical development.  The argument that exclusion and 
settler ideals are linked solely at the historical rather than conceptual level relies on the 
assumption that such ideals are somehow pure in their conceptual origins but become 
perverted in the historical process.  But if American democracy’s settler-colonial 
entailments come only from its contingent association in historical development, then 
Rana offers an argument that is little different from Smith’s.  Both follow a narrative 
structure of redemption in which the emancipatory promise of settler democracy can be 
disconnected from its expansionist and exclusionary connotations. 
Second, Rana’s own normative commitments are also at odds with his constitutive 
view.  When he comes to the normative component of his argument, he is ultimately left 
arguing, quite simply, that settler conceptions of democracy need not be rejected but 
rather affixed to more inclusive and universal legal frameworks.  Rana’s primary 
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normative question is, “What constitutional structures should govern a postsettler society 
and what account of freedom could justify these structures and ground a new ethical basis 
for citizenship?”19  But the question of course arises, from what wellspring should we 
draw up these conceptual, political, and theoretical resources to challenge the exclusive 
and hierarchical tendencies of settler colonialism?  Turning to the writings of Thomas 
Paine, Orestes Brownson, and Randolph Bourne, Rana calls on the settler tradition of 
democracy itself to challenge settler colonial hierarchies.  But in exclusively drawing on 
settler traditions of thought and culture to reconfigure colonial hierarchies, he normalizes 
the power, presence, and subjectivity of settler colonials. 
Part of the problem here stems from Rana’s exclusive attention to the constitutional 
development of settler democracy.  Amending a socio-cultural perspective to the 
constitutional entwinement of democracy and empire reveals the project of conjoining 
frameworks of inclusion and universalism with settler principles to be extremely limited 
as an effort to overcome U.S. Empire.  Rana ignores how settlerness inheres in the norms, 
habits, and customs of American citizenship, which were not only cultivated on top of an 
expropriated land base but were also shaped and given political and cultural meaning 
through settler expansion.  It is precisely by ignoring these dynamics and then calling on 
settler-democratic norms to combat the very colonial hierarchies it has produced that 
Rana (and Smith) norm-alize settler experiences.  The consequence of settler 
normalization is the disavowal of how subjects and victims of American colonialism have 
articulated their own modes of democratic self-rule that, while vitally draw on American 
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democratic ideals, appropriate and revise the terms of modern democratic theory in a way 
that extends beyond their original meaning. 
Detaching democracy from settler-colonial empire requires more than simply 
attaching more inclusionary frameworks of constitutional law to democratic institutions.  
It suggests that we must re-think the very democratic values that give rise to those 
institutions in way that sheds its ideological entwinements in settler colonialism.  As 
Mahmood Mamdani has put it, “Engaging with the native question would require 
questioning the ethics and the politics of the very constitution of the United States of 
America.  It would require rethinking and reconsidering the very political project called 
the USA.”20  A genuine engagement with the history of settler expansion requires us to 
rethink the very ethical and political basis of American democracy.  
Stemming from these limitations, the political theory of postcolonial settlerism fails 
to engage the complex dynamics of decolonization in settler societies.  In their attempts 
to formulate a political theory suitable for a “postsettler society,” both Smith and Rana 
misunderstand that there is no such thing as “postsettler colonialism.”  Because they are 
constituted by invasions that become a structural condition, settler societies are marked 
by a certain resilience that troubles the very idea of a postcolonial order.  There is a 
necessary difference between narratives of decolonization in settler-colonial and 
exploitation-colonial contexts.  While exploitation-colonial stories follow the narrative 
structure of the Odyssey, marked by an outward projection of people and power and then 
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a contraction or return to the metropolis, settler colonial narratives are structured 
according the Aeneid in which the colonizer follows a linear path with the aim of leaving 
an old society to establish the new.
21
  Insofar as they are circular, Third World narratives 
of decolonization imply the restoration of native sovereignty over and against the 
sovereignty of the colonizer.  While decolonization is typically understood as a transition 
from dependent colonies to sovereign nation-states, the politics of indigenous nations 
struggling for de-colonization in the Fourth World reveals that “sovereignty was and is 
negotiated within a polity, rather than between polities.”22  Elaborating theories of 
decolonization in settler societies thus presents a set of conceptual difficulties that cannot 
be subsumed into frameworks of decolonizing movements where settler structures were 
not as pervasive, troubling the notion of a political theory for “postsettler society.”  
If we truly wish to decolonize modern democracy, then we should start by rejecting 
attempts to redeem settler democracy and start conceiving of alternative traditions of 
political thought and culture that have fallen by the wayside of democratic empire.  
Scholars of American political thought would do well to turn to indigenous, Mexican, 
Caribbean, métis, and Asian Pacific perspectives that are not exhausted by the values and 
categories of the U.S. political tradition.  To unsettle democracy would be to recognize 
democratic self-rule and popular sovereignty not simply as a set of principles or as a form 
of government, but as a material set of practices that refuse containment by the geo-
political, cultural, and institutional borders of the settler state.  Such an orientation would 
allow us to recognize the diverse array of democratic practices and experiences that 
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exceed and in some cases critically confront settler conceptions of self-rule.  Engaging 
such perspectives would force us to look beyond settler experiences as the “horizon of the 
taken-for-granted” in defining modern American democracy, which normalizes ruling 
ideas as the uncontestable ground of political life.
23
  Such a project would call for the 
ethical and political reformulation of the democratic tradition, leading to a decolonial 
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